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C o a l i t i o n  G o v e r n m e n t s  a n d  P o l i c y  
A g r e e m e n t s :  I n t r o d u c t i o n
In the thirty years of history of coalition research, almost permanent asymmetry has existed 
between the theory and practice of coalition governments. This asymmetry has taken two 
forms which have emerged successively.
First, for a long time, there was a mismatch between certain deductive theories and 
the phenomena these theories were supposed to explain or predict. This was most clearly the 
case with the formation of a coalition, where traditionally attention in coalition research was 
focused. Most basic theories on coalition formation began to be criticised for their 
simplifications, in particular for largely ignoring the policy motivations of political parties. 
The elements of ideology and po licy  distance were introduced in later theories, which in turn 
were replaced by theories which began to consider government formation as a real process 
of bargaining between parties or party leaders. These theories had more empirical relevance, 
but they often concerned bargaining over the distribution of cabinet portfolios rather than 
policy issues.
Second, asymmetry existed because theoretical concern was focused typically on 
government formation and to a smaller extent on the end of coalitions, rather than on the life  
of coalition governments. Even in countries known for long coalition formation and frequent 
coalition crises, the ’life’ still takes most of the time that parties interact in coalition systems. 
The consequence of this theoretical neglect has been that accounts of the life of governments 
are largely the domain of country specialists. For this reason, studies of governments and 
policymaking have come to form a distinct field of research. With the installation of coalition 
governments, coalition theory thus far comes to a halt, or takes a big leap to the end of 
governments.
AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO COALITION 
GOVERNMENTS AND POLICY
Bargaining between parties is one of the key features of coalition government. In most
1
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approaches to coalition government, which focus on the formation stage, interparty 
bargaining is implicit. Despite the fact that coalition theory has become more realistic by 
taking into account the different motivations of parties, thus paying attention not only to the 
desire to be in power, but also to the policy intentions of parties, coalition bargaining has 
hardly been dealt with as a process. Bargaining results in a national executive but possibly 
also in some form of agreement on coalition policy. The process of bargaining and its 
consequences has received little systematic attention from coalition researchers, both in 
theoretical and in comparative work. Budge & Keman note in their book Parties a n d  
D em ocracy , one of the few systematic studies of the formation and functioning of coalition 
governments, ’agreements of this kind are only patchily reported anywhere, even in otherwise 
detailed accounts of the political situation’ (1990: 83). These agreements may be more or less 
complete, and vary in scope and specificity. Moreover, they may involve interparty as well 
as intraparty negotiations.
Generally, a coalition policy agreement may be seen to link government formation to 
the life of the government. Though each party will estimate its policy payoffs before the 
government takes off, these payoffs concern intentions, which can only begin to have a 
substantive meaning once the government is in office. In addition, during the life of the 
government, policy bargaining may be continued. This may be on different issues, but also 
on the same issues as those discussed during the formation of the government, especially if 
the formation talks did not yield very concrete results. Thus, bargaining on coalition policy 
is a dynamic and continuous prosess.
This more realistic image of coalition bargaining does not preclude the possibility o f 
identifying, for analytical purposes, a beginning and an end to the process: government 
formation and the moment of dissolution. Government formation may be preceded and the 
end of the government followed by parliamentary elections, but in some countries this is not 
always the case. Often, an issue that triggers the fall of a coalition government is high on the 
agenda in the formation of a new government. This is partly because in many countries it is 
the convention that conflictual issues are not dealt with by the government if it has caretaker 
status, which happens after it breaks down or is dissolved until new elections follow. This 
setting of the formation agenda may take place even if there is a (partial) change of parties.
From country reports we know that there is considerable variation in the time spent on policy 
negotiations during government formation, as there is variation in the length of government 
formation. This will also apply to the output of these negotiations, though much less is known 
about this.
In this respect, we could take a sceptical stand and wonder whether negotiations on 
policy during government formation actually mean anything, and bear any relevance to what 
happens later in the coaliton. In their book M ultiparty Government. The Politics o f  Coalition  
in W estern E urope  (1990), Michael Laver and Norman Schofield argue that interparty policy
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negotiations often have a symbolic purpose at coalitional level, confirming pre-existing 
agreements rather than really establishing agreement on manifest policy conflicts. If parties 
are willing to form a coalition, it is argued, why would they bother about policies (and 
certainly conflictual ones) in advance and constrain themselves by formulating intentions 
which only commit them? Gregory Luebbert (1986) asserts that negotiations during 
government formation have mainly intraparty purposes. Party leaders are seen to use these 
negotiations to show their concern for a number of policy principles which are central to their 
respective parties, to secure their future as party leader. These views imply doubts about the 
significance of policy bargaining in government formation and as a consequence, of the 
impact of such bargaining on the policymaking latitude of the government which ensues from 
the negotiations.
The question here is whether such general views give an adequate picture of the 
process and results of policy negotiations during coalition formation. To answer this question, 
we need to take into account findings from empirical research, and if these are not available, 
there is a clear need for such research.
The subject of policy negotiations before governments take office and the effects of such 
negotiations during the life of governments can also be studied from a point of view that 
contrasts with the viewpoint given above. In this alternative view, government formation is 
an arena p a r  excellence for bargaining on coalition policy. This may be because discussions 
between party leaders and, eventually, other party spokespeople can be more informal or 
even held in secret and therefore are less exposed to party followers and public opinion. As 
a consequence, party spokespeople may be less induced (or pressed) to be intransigent on 
policy issues, and instead reach agreement on conflictual matters relatively easily. Apart from 
this context which facilitates cooperation, the formation stage also enables policymakers to 
circumvent, at least for some time, the formal legislative procedures which often hold up the 
policymaking process for a considerable length of time, though there may be good reasons 
for this from the perspective of democratic theory.
It is true that the advantage of invisible politics may be reduced if agreements are 
made public. When party leaders present the results of negotiations, each respective party or 
different sections or factions within individual parties may make an estimation of the payoffs. 
This estimation is likely to determine the extent to which the policy agreement will be 
supported. An indicator of party support may be the voting results at the party congresses or 
special conferences which often are held at the end of government formation, though such 
votes may at the same time concern the composition of the government, which makes it more 
difficult to draw conclusions. The risk for party leaders thus is perhaps not so much that they 
are condemned for discussing specific policies instead of general ones, but rather that they 
are seen to have done it in the wrong way, by making too many concessions.
In the formation period, parties or party leaders are likely to focus their attention on
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particular matters, rather than deal with the complete range of policies included in the parties* 
election programmes. One obvious reason for this is the time constraint, as government 
formation is aimed at producing a new government within a reasonably short time. In a 
country such as Israel, the maximum formation length is limited constitutionally to 119 days 
(this norm tells something of the difficulties of forming governments in this country). Another 
reason is that party leaders may only want to deal with a limited number of issues. In one 
concept of government formation mentioned above, each party leader is seen to select the 
policy principles that are central to his or her party. This is because the party rank and file 
expects the party leadership to behave in this way, and the latter will therefore use these 
policy principles to obtain enough credits within the party to be re-elected as party leader. 
Party leaders however may not just use policy as an instrument to secure their own continuity 
in office, and they also may not always tune their position to the ’Downsian centre’ of party 
opinion. Party leaders may to an extent, be policy users but they may also be policy seekers. 
Indeed, parties such as the traditionally programme oriented Socialist parties may even not 
give their leadership much leeway in government formation. More than just a few policy 
principles may be expected to be raised during the negotiations.
A key question here is to what degree of specificity and how persistently viewpoints on 
policy are actually put forward during the formation talks, and what might be the 
consequences? In 1982, Browne & Dreijmanis envisaged negotiations as a process ’to 
apportion influence among the partners and establish an initial condition of programmatic 
unity among them’ (349-350). If the stakes are general party principles, thep rim a  fa c ie  result 
may be a deadlock in the negotiations, as party principles will often be partly or wholly 
incompatible. Such a result is not very likely, if only because then no coalition government 
would ever be formed. To avoid confrontations of this kind, party leaders may be careful 
about taking firm positions in the negotiations and instead choose to be pragmatic. This may 
enable parties to reach agreement without finding too many divergent views in their way. As 
a consequence, the agreement that is produced will contain some general and vague joint 
intentions rather than substantial policies, as these were simply not introduced at the 
negotiation table.
In contrast, if substantial interparty conflicts become manifest during government 
formation, this may indicate that policy is dealt with in a more rigorous manner, rather than 
that the parties are debating party principles in the abstract. Though we cannot exclude the 
possibility that there still is an element of bargaining posture, this becomes less likely when 
conflicts are more specific. Such conflicts do not only arise during the formation stage; they 
may also have emerged earlier, during the tenure of the previous government. Indeed, they 
may even have triggered the fall o f the previous government. Further, in some countries at 
least, party leaders are often the most prominent, but not the only party spokespersons. 
Discussions on coalition policy may thus also involve party politicians who wish to deal with
4
matters more extensively.
Another reason why parties may want to deal seriously with certain policies and be 
prepared to bargain extensively on them is the existence of mistrust, which may increase as 
party competition becomes closer. Coalitions in multiparty systems are not a marriage 
d'am our.
For these different reasons, bargaining on policy during government formation may 
be more than a ritual. One possible indication that policy bargaining really means something 
is the occurrence of conflicts on policy. After all, bargaining in the actual sense of the word 
will always involve at least some degree of conflict.
COALITION GOVERNMENTS AND POLICY AGREEMENTS: 
AIMS OF THE STUDY
If we take manifest controversy on policy as the point of departure, a question that follows 
is to what extent such conflicts are resolved in the formation stage? Another question is how, 
if at all, this is reflected in a coalition agreement? In a coalition, the typical positive results 
of bargaining are compromises. Such compromises may be over one single issue, but they 
may also be more complex and take the form of a package deal including different issues in 
different areas.
If the results of bargaining are written down, it probably is not just due to convention 
but because verbal agreements are considered too weak to rely on, and this may be because 
parties mistrust each other. This does not mean however, that written agreements always 
contain substantive and specific compromises; there may be situations in which partial 
agreements on certain issues are deliberately left vague, so that none of the parties makes 
clear gains or losses. The latter may well be an indication that a particular policy conflict has 
not really been resolved. This may also be the situation if the agreement is procedural rather 
than substantial and is an agreement to disagree. Moreover, a manifestly controversial matter 
may not be mentioned in the coalition policy agreement at all. Bargaining on such issues may 
then be continued after the government is sworn in. Such bargaining may take place within 
the government or somewhere else in the coalition, or perhaps even partly outside the 
coalition, involving one or more external parties.
When agreements made on controversial issues during the formation stage are on the 
governmental agenda, different things may happen. They may be implemented directly or 
become the object of further bargaining between or within the coalition parties. If direct 
implementation requires that an agreement is sufficiently specific and clear cut, it is not 
automatically the case that such agreements are really implemented. This is something to be
5
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assessed empirically and not simply assumed. The same goes for less specific, vague or even  
ambiguous agreements, which seem to be a potential source of conflict within the 
government. Thus, coalition policy agreements may have different kinds of effects on 
governmental decision making. It may be assumed that a certain type of policy agreement has 
a particular type of effect, but any theoretical argument on this matter remains sterile if it is 
not studied empirically. In their study of government formation and functioning, Budge & 
Keman have noted that policy agreements exist but are rarely reported (1990 : 83-84).
Such an empirical investigation is the central aim of this study. The general point o f  
departure is that coalition policy agreements link government formation to the life o f the 
government. I first consider this link from a general and theoretical perspective. In this 
exercise several relevant, and mostly recent, studies are considered. Since however, most o f  
the literature on coalition theory which emerged in the 1960s and 1970s ends about where 
the argument presented in this study begins, I will not deal with the ’first generations’ o f  
coalition research here. These have been discussed at length in the last ten years (see for 
example: Browne & Franklin, 1986; Budge & Laver, 1986; Laver & Schofield, 1990).
The character of negotiations on coalition policy agreements may differ as these 
negotiations take place in countries with different party systems and varying constitutional 
rules and other kinds of constraints on government formation. For this reason, I first consider 
the different contexts in which coalition agreements may or may not emerge. If such contexts 
are obviously systems in which coalition governments ensue, I go a little further and examine 
different types of multiparty systems. Another crucial question at the beginning of an 
investigation of coalition agreements is how interparty bargaining on policy during 
government formation can be envisaged. Following from this, another question concerns the 
general features of coalition policy agreements as the result of bargaining in the relevant 
countries. What is the average length of coalition agreements, how broad is their scope and 
how specific do they become? How much variation exists across and within countries? These 
points are considered in chapter two.
Though these questions are important, the aim of this study is more than to give a descriptive 
and content analytical account o f coalition agreements in a number of countries. What is 
written down in coalition agreements will reflect directly the way in which parties perceive 
policy bargaining in government formation. What factors determine that such bargaining is 
seen as a serious affair or is instead conducted only for the sake of appearances? Here, the 
literature on coalition politics provides interesting and rather different viewpoints. These 
viewpoints may also be seen to underlie different functions of coalition agreements, first of 
all in the perception of the coalition parties. When parties engage in the formulation of a 
coalition agreement, they may do so for symbolic purposes or because they see government 
formation as an opportunity to make a substantive preparation for decision making when the
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government is in office. The parties may not only intend to set part of the governmental 
agenda but also deal with politically sensitive matters to prevent conflict later on. This may 
mean that certain issues are removed rather than placed on the agenda. This function may be 
especially important if controversial issues are the main topics of negotiations over a coalition 
agreement.
A question that follows is whether coalition agreements formulated for substantive 
purposes also have a substantive and positive impact during the life of governments. One of 
the questions that will arise if the actual effects of coalition policy agreements are considered 
is how these agreements are enforced. This is an important aspect, as there is no neutral actor 
in the coalition game that can enforce the implementation or observation of the agreement. 
For this reason, enforcement of the agreement must be secured from within the coalition. The 
different views on agreements, their functions and effects, and the factors that may be 
relevant in the process of enforcement are dealt with in chapter three.
Apart from raising questions, discussing possibilities and formulating hypotheses on the 
functions and effects of coalition agreements, this study is also intended to give answers, even 
if these will be neither complete nor immediately generalisable. This empirical task will be 
the central point of concern in the chapters Five through eight, which contain four case studies 
of coalitions in Belgium and the Netherlands, two from each country. Chapter four provides 
an introduction to the two countries and to the case studies taken from these countries. In the 
case studies, the focus will be on manifestly controversial issues, that is, issues on which 
serious conflict existed between two or more parties during government formation. A case 
study approach is chosen to examine empirical processes within a limited number of 
coalitions and place the findings in their relevant context, even if the emphasis is not always 
on this ’unique’ context.
Finally, in chapter nine I consider the Findings from the four case studies together. 
Here, I deal with the general patterns which emerge from the preceding chapters. What types 
of arrangements ensue where and in what policy Fields? What is the general picture of success 
and failure of coalition governments? Is there a pattern to be found in the performance of the 
substantive functions of coalition agreements? Are there differences between cases, or 
perhaps between countries? If the outcome is failure, in what arena has this failure occurred? 
Further, what can be said about the different factors that are assumed to be favourable or 
unfavourable conditions for implementation? What factors may apply more in general, which 
have mainly a local relevance, and which are not relevant at all?
It will be clear that these are not simple questions. As said, this study is not intended to 
provide deFinitive answers. Rather, it is meant as a beginning to addressing these questions 
about internal processes within government coalitions in countries where policy issues are on 
the agenda when coalitions are formed.
7
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COALITION GOVERNMENTS AND COALITION STUDIES
Most Western European countries, and an increasing number of countries outside Western 
Europe, have experienced coalition government in the last fifty years. Only two countries in 
Western Europe, Spain since 1977 and Britain since the second world war, have no record 
of coalition government in the strict sense, that is, with the government itself consisting o f  
two or more political parties. In all other Western European countries, coalition governments 
have been in office for some or most of the time. In Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Iceland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, and, through a constitutional 
provision, Switzerland, multiparty government has been the dominant form of government 
since 1945. The same applies to Israel, which since its foundation in 1948 has had coalition 
governments exclusively. .
These coalitions however do not always have majority status; this is so even if  
minority governments are mostly single  party  governments. Coalition governments without 
a formal parliamentary majority depend on the active or passive support of one or more other 
parties in parliament. Sometimes, this is formalised in a support agreement, which is made 
during or shortly after government formation.
Coalition governments do not only emerge in minority situations; in Austria, 
Germany, Italy, Sweden and France after 1958, one party with an absolute majority has 
formed a coalition government with one or more other parties. With the exceptions of France 
(1968-1973 and 1981-1984) and Sweden (1951), however, the other three countries 
experienced this type of government only in the immediate post-war years.
It is therefore not surprising that the phenomenon of coalition government has received much 
theoretical attention in the last thirty years. Initially, this attention was focused on which set 
of possible coalitions was likely to form, rather than on what particular coalition w ould  form. 
The underlying assumption was that parties as rational actors try to form party combinations 
that are minimal winning, as in this case an individual party would have to share least power 
with any other party. This "minimal winning" was operationalised in various ways; it could
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regard those combinations in which every party is indispensible to maintaining a 
parliamentary majority (Riker, 1962); it could mean the absolutely smallest parliamentary 
majority beyond the 50 percent mark (Gamson, 1961; Riker, 1962); or it could mean the 
minimal num ber  of parties necessary for a parliamentary majority (Leiserson, 1968). Thus, 
in these approaches, the size of parties was the key variable.
These ’size based’ approaches were found to be only modestly successful in 
accounting for coalitions emerging in the real world. One major criticism was that they 
ignored the element of ideology or policy. This criticism was contructive, as it led to more 
refined theories in which the element of ideology or ’policy’ was present. The central 
characteristic of these approaches was that they identified the parties’ ideological positions, 
often on one ’policy dimension’, the left-right scale. For one theory, the assumption was that 
coalitions will contain parties that are ’connected’ on the dimension (Axelrod, 1970). For 
another, the predicted set of coalitions consisted of party combinations in which parties were 
not only each other’s closest ideological neighbours, but also together had a ’minimal 
ideological range’ (De Swaan, 1973). In both approaches size aspects remained important. 
In Axelrod’s theory, for example, the predicted coalitions were minimal connected winning. 
These theories were more specific, and indeed they had more empirical relevance.
Theories of government stability or duration were also developed alongside these 
theories of government coalition formation. These were oriented primarily on party system 
features or on size or ideology related ’attributes’ of governments. Coalitions of minimal size 
and minimal ideological heterogeneity were thought to be the most durable (Dodd, 1976; 
Sanders & Herman, 1977; Warwick, 1979). Thus, two different phenomena, government 
formation and government duration, were accounted for by essentially the same factors.
In the 1980s, these theories in turn came to be criticised. To many authors, the 
problem was perhaps not so much the empirical performance (predictive success) of the 
existing theories, but rather their ’formal’ and ’static’ character. A common point of criticism 
was that coalition formation was too strongly depicted as being a game played at one fixed 
point in time, and the end as something that just happened, without it being clear why on 
Friday 13th and not any other point in time. Giving more attention to the dynam ic  character 
of coalition politics was seen to be necessary; a government not only is formed and dissolved, 
but also has a ’life’ in between. A second line of criticism was that the underlying assumption 
of parties as ’office seekers’ left the construction of minority governments and more than 
minimal winning governments unexplained. Office seeking in these theories implied a 
reluctance to be office sharing , hence surplus majority coalitions, or more suggestively, 
’oversized coalitions’, were not expected. Though the growing attention being paid to policy 
did not immediately mean that parties came to be seen as being interested exclusively in 
policy, this development was nonetheless important. The concept of policy came to be used 
less in the abstract and more in relation to issues on which parties profile themselves. Finally, 
the unitary actor status of parties, an assumption present implicitly in the ’classical’ theories
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of coalition building, increasingly was called into question. Parties came to be seen as arenas 
of competition also on policy, with often delicate relationships existing between party leaders 
and party followers. These points have been discussed at length and in detail by many 
authors, and with different emphases (see, for example: Browne & Franklin, 1986; Budge 
& Laver, 1986; Laver & Schofield, 1990; Luebbert, 1983, 1986; and Strom, 1984, 1990).
This chapter builds on a number of important results of coalition research, which concern 
both theory oriented and empirical studies. It consists of three sections. In the first section, 
the bargaining system perspective is introduced as it sets the scene for an analysis o f  
bargaining on and in coalition governments. I consider government formation and duration 
in different types of bargaining systems briefly. In the second section, I focus on policy 
bargaining in what is called the ’multidimensional policy space’, as this is the aspect o f  
coalition politics which is most central in this study. The perspective in section two is mostly 
theoretical, while section three contains a general empirical assessment of the occurrence and 
profiles of coalition agreements in different types of bargaining systems.
BARGAINING SYSTEMS AND COALITION GOVERNMENTS
Coalition bargaining takes place within a bargaining system. Such a system is relevant to the 
way in which coalition governments are formed, maintained, and end and to the way in 
which the three are related. Basically, by speaking of a ’bargaining system’ I mean the 
relevant parties in a particular country and the way in which these are interrelated. A party 
is considered ’relevant’ if it has (coalition) government potential.
Each relevant party takes a particular position on one or more ’policy dimensions’, 
a policy dimension being essentially a set of theoretically possible policy preferences. 
Basically, a policy dimension represents a cleavage, which can be socio-economic, religious, 
ethno-linguistic, or some other. These cleavages constitute the historical basis of parties, and 
new schisms may lead to party realignments or new parties. In the present context, it is 
important to appreciate that cleavages do not only have an effect on the party system in a 
structural sense, in terms of its size and form, they may also have an effect on bargaining 
relationships within the system. Among other things, these bargaining relationships depend 
on the position that parties take on the relevant policy dimension, or within the policy space 
if there are more relevant dimensions. Such positions of course are not ’fixed’; rather, parties 
as it were move in different directions within the policy space.
Laver & Schofield distinguish three types of bargaining systems borrowed from 
international relations literature: unipolar, bipolar and multipolar systems (1990: 110-137).
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Another important concept is the median party. If a party takes the m edian position  on a 
relevant policy dimension (and parties take an interest in policy), no viable majority can be 
formed without the party holding that position. The median party is thus in a strategic 
position when issues relating to the relevant dimension are on the agenda, and this position 
may even be very strong if there is only one relevant policy dimension.
Unipolar systems contain one large party and a number of (much) smaller parties. 
This situation exists in Ireland, Norway, Sweden, and existed in Denmark until 1971 (after 
this year, new parties greatly reduced the hegemony of the Social Democrats).1 Israel until 
the mid-1970s could also be classified as a unipolar system, in which the Labour party was 
the largest party amidst three or so smaller and several very small but still relevant parties. 
In 1977, when several electoral realignments took place and drastic shifts in parliamentary 
strength occurred, Israel transformed into a multipolar system, which might rather be called 
’fragmented’ (Schofield, 1993: 2).
Laver & Schofield further distinguish between unipolar systems in which the large 
party is in the median position on one or more dimensions, as is the situation in Ireland, and 
’off centre systems’, in which the large party is not in the median position (1990: 114-116). 
In this last type of system, which exists in Scandinavia, we find alternations of single party 
governments formed by the large party (Social Democrats or Socialists) and coalitions 
containing the ’bourgeois’ parties. Though coalition governments emerge from both types of 
unipolar systems, they are not typial coalition systems.
Bipolar systems are characterised by the presence of two parties of more or less equal 
size and a third and possibly a fourth much smaller one. In Germany and Austria, the 
Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU in Germany) or Conservatives (the OVP in Austria) form 
one ’pole’, and the Social Democrats (SPD and SPO respectively) the other. In Germany, the 
third party is a Liberal party (FDP), and in Austria, it is the Austrian Freedom Party (FPO).2 
In these ’two and a half party systems, two party governments (minimal winning coalitions) 
are most frequent, though in Austria the Socialists have also been in office alone when they 
obtained a parliamentary majority (and for this reason it is not a typical coalition system).
In multipolar bargaining systems, size differences between the relevant parties are 
relatively limited. The largest party usually obtains no more than about one third of the seats,
1 The authors also mention Luxemburg, but this country is not an unambiguous unipolar system, 
because the parties are fairly equal in size. To call this country unipolar because the Christian Socials 
have always been present in the government is confusing, as this is also the situation with the 
Christian Democrats in Belgium (except for the period 1954-58) and the Netherlands until October 
1994. There may also be doubt about the unipolar status of Iceland, given the presence of four 
’relevant’ (coalitionable) parties. In fact, in a later article, Schofield (1993) places Iceland within the 
multipolar category.
2 In Germany, the Greens passed the electoral threshold of 5 percent in 1983, and have been 
represented in the Bundestag since then.
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and absolute majorities reached by one party are rare. As a consequence, bargaining 
relationships may become complex, even if all kinds of constraints usually limit the number 
of viable coalitions. In unipolar or bipolar systems only real electoral shocks (or major party 
realignments) can cause ’disruptions’, whereas in multipolar systems bargaining relationships 
may be affected even by small changes in party size or shifts in the policy space. As Laver 
& Schofield argue, even awareness of the possible effects of elections may
make parties sensitive to anticipated election results and to detailed changes in policy
positions and thereby create continual incentives to renegotiate coalitions, making all
coalitions less stable (1990: 158).
Such incentives may exists not only in or before elections; coalition changes may also occur 
without parliamentary elections, a Jliegende W echsel, as the jargon has it. Examples o f  
multipolar systems (sometimes more accurately called fragmented) are Denmark after 1971, 
Italy, Iceland, Finland, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Israel since 1977.
The term ’multipolar’ however may be somewhat misleading if we consider the 
empirical processes of coalition politics, especially the forming of governments, in countries 
such as Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands. Typically, in these three countries, the Christian 
Democrats have long been, in Orwell’s famous phrase, ’more equal than others’. The way 
in which this has become clear is the (semi)permanence in office of the CVP-PSC in 
Belgium, the DC in Italy and the CDA in the Netherlands until 1994. This in itself is 
consistent with the bargaining systems approach in that these parties were in a central position 
in the policy space, if not necessarily for all the relevant dimensions at the same time. It is 
however precisely the centrality of the Christian Democrats that seems to contradict the 
representation of the system in these countries as being multi -polar. In the present context, 
therefore, the term ’multipolar’ is used to distinguish the aforementioned countries from other 
system types in a numerical sense, referring to the number and size of the relevant parties. 
The actual bargaining power of parties in ’multipolar’ systems may be more unequal than the 
limited size differences suggest. This in turn must be seen in relation to the positions o f  
parties on the relevant policy dimension(s), a point which will receive more attention later 
in this chapter.3
3 After the elections of May 1994, the Netherlands became more truly a multipolar system. The 
CDA suffered the largest electoral loss since the introduction of proportional representation in the 
Netherlands in 1917.
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The impact of the bargaining system on the formation and duration of governments
Government form ation
In multipolar systems, bargaining relationships generally are more complex than in unipolar 
and bipolar systems. This difference is likely to become manifest first of all in the way in 
which governments are formed. Typically, in multipolar systems, government formation takes 
more time than in unipolar and bipolar systems, and new governments often emerge only 
after several bargaining attempts.
Laver & Schofield assert that the number of failed formation attempts is an indication 
of the number of viable alternatives given bargaining relationships between the relevant 
parties (1990: 162). This variable was introduced by Strom, who defines a formation attempt 
in terms of the (different) parties involved and in terms of (different) fo rm a te u n  or 
informateurs accepting an instruction to form a coalition (1984: 224).
Both Strom’s definition and the assumption of Laver & Schofield however involve 
some ambiguity. The problem with Strom’s definition is that attempts at formation that are 
not followed directly by the installation of a new government need not be ’failed’ attempts. 
For example, if an informateur passes his or her instruction on to a fo rm a teu r , this in itself 
is not a failure, but may simply be a necessary step in the process of government formation, 
the fo rm a teur  being the prospective prime minister who conducts the allocation of cabinet 
portfolios. Things would be different if a form ateur returns the instruction and a new 
informateur is appointed, as this mostly means a deadlock in the negotiations. With regard 
to failed attempts as a measure of viable alternatives, we should realise that parties may also 
make attempts which are m eant, if not by all, to fail, for example to play off other parties 
against each other or to remove a particular party from the formation table. Certain political 
conventions may also play a part in this respect. In the Netherlands, for example, the biggest 
party or the party gaining most seats may receive an instruction to form a government, even 
if it is unlikely that it can motivate the other parties to join it in a coalition.
Instances of ’multiple’ formation attempts are essentially parts of a selection process, 
but not necessarily in the sense that with every additional attempt the ensuing government 
becomes less preferred. Often the reverse is true. The government formation process in such 
instances starts with individual parties or ’protocoalitions’, which first realign before the 
relevant criteria in the formation are met. These criteria may relate to the bargaining system, 
but also to other factors, such as different kinds of constraints. In this process, protocoalitions 
may fall apart, but they may also be extended to a parliamentary basis which is much broader 
than a simple majority. This has occurred in Belgium, Finland, Israel and the Netherlands.
Unless it takes place in a completely predictable manner, this selection process adds 
to the complexity of government formation in multipolar systems when compared to the other 
system types. In multipolar systems, it is quite common to have three formation attempts, and 
sometimes up to eight, as has been the case in Belgium, Finland and the Netherlands. In 13
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Italy, Israel and Denmark since 1971 this is more rare, but we should realise that in Italy and 
Israel the forming of new governments often involves a fliegende W echsel, in which one party 
leaves or joins the government without elections taking place.4
Government types
In unipolar systems (with the exception of Israel), the result of government formation is 
usually a single party government, a coalition of the minimal winning type or a coalition with  
minority status. Single party and coalition governments often alternate. In bipolar systems, 
this last type of coalitions is the predominant form of government. In an examination o f  
empirical patterns of governments, Laver & Schofield found that in both systems, except in 
Ireland, government coalitions are mostly connected on the left right dimension. These 
findings are presented in table 2 .1 .5
This contrasts with the situation in multipolar systems, in which more different types 
of governments occur, with coalitions often being unconnected  on the left right dimension. 
As table 2.1 illustrates, minimal winning coalitions that are not minimal connected winning 
(MW not MCW) are more frequent in multipolar systems than elsewhere. Further, coalitions 
which are surplus majorities but not minimal connected winning (surplus majority not MCW) 
are mostly not connected on the left right dimension in Belgium, Finland, Israel and Italy. 
This indicates that at least one other policy dimension must be relevant during the process 
of government building in these systems. Moreover, countries such as Belgium, Finland and 
the Netherlands show considerable variation in the party composition of governments, 
notwithstanding the continuity in office of the Christian Democrats in Belgium and the 
Netherlands. Finland stands out as a country with the highest ’turnover’ o f parties in office: 
between 1945 and 1992, there were as many as 22 differently composed governments.6
Government duration
The greater pain it takes to build coalition governments in multipolar systems tends not to
4 In Israel, no less than five different governments were formed between March 1990 and January
1992. In a way, these short lived governments themselves were formation attempts. This places the 
small average number of formation attempts in this country since 1977 in a different light.
3 Following the terminology introduced by Axelrod and referred to at the beginning of this 
chapter, a coalition is minimal connected winning but not minimal winning (MCW not MW) (or in 
other words a surplus majority) if the smaller and ’surplus’ parties are in its policy centre, with the 
bigger parties taking the flank positions. If a government is a surplus majority coalition but not 
minimal connected winning, this may mean that it is not connected on the left right dimension, but 
it also may be not minimal connected winning. Such a coalition thus consists of adjacent parties, with 
the smaller (and surplus) party or parties being on one or both flanks.
6 This calculation is based on Strom (1990: 251-252). In part, this high number of party 
configurations is due to party realignments.
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result in a longer life for governments in these systems. Laver and Schofield have put it this
way:
(...) coalition members in (multipolar) systems are far more likely to find themselves, 
once they have taken office, in a situation in which they suddenly develop incentives 
to unscramble the deal that forms the fundamental basis of the coalition (1990: 160).
The average duration of governments mentioned in table 2.1 also points in this direction; 
governments in unipolar and bipolar bargaining systems often last longer than governments 
in multipolar systems, including caretaker governments.7 Indeed, in Belgium, Finland, Israel 
and Italy, almost any type of government ends earlier than governments in countries such as 
Norway, Sweden, Austria and Germany.8 Both in Denmark and Israel, the average duration 
decreased when the bargaining system became less stable, though this decrease was limited. 
In Israel, governments have always been brief. Contrary to what is often assumed, however, 
government duration is barely reduced as the number of formation attempts goes up. This 
underlines that governments made after several attempts are not necessarily ’pathological’ 
cases, at least not if we use duration as an indicator.
The policy aspect enters the picture when considering the reasons why governments 
end. In unipolar and bipolar systems fixed elections are the primary reason for the dissolution 
of governments. In multipolar systems however (at least in most countries), dissolution is due 
to internal conflict within the coalition, especially within the government (Nousiainen, 1993: 
272). Anticipated elections and parliamentary conflict are also significant in multipolar 
systems. Anticipated elections may involve calculations made by one government party rather 
than confrontations between parties, and parliamentary conflict may involve external parties 
lining up against government parties, sometimes joined by part of the coalition itself. These 
two additional causes of government termination are important precisely in the countries 
where governmental dissension is less frequent, Denmark and Iceland.9 Thus, in multipolar 
systems coalition governments end because of pull factors (electoral prospects, viable 
coalition alternatives) and push factors (internal conflicts).
7 Here, we should note that the constitutional term of governments is not the same everywhere; 
it varies from 3 years in Sweden to 5 years in Italy and Ireland, white in most countries it is 4 years.
8 This can be inferred from the information provided by Laver & Schofield (1990: 152).
9 This is inferred from information provided by Budge & Keman (1990: 160-161).
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BARGAINING ON COALITION POLICY
One of the interesting things about the bargaining systems approach for the study of coalition 
politics is that it provides a context in which we may see both the players and the things of 
interest to these players, of which policy is of special importance. In this section, I focus on 
policy, or more specifically on policy bargaining between parties that attempt to form a 
government together. The unidimensional perspective mentioned in the previous section is 
a rudimentary way to envisage the relative policy preferences of parties and make predictions 
about the composition of governments, provided that parties take an interest in policy, and 
about the policy profile of coalitions. The empirical patterns of governments depicted in such 
terms however, suggest strongly that the one dimensional perspective lacks a certain amount 
of realism, especially in multipolar systems, where nearly half the number of governments 
(and more if we consider only coalitions) is not connected on the left right dimension. It was 
stated earlier that the origin of a party is often a particular societal cleavage, and precisely 
in multipolar systems the main parties are rooted in different cleavages. These cleavages are 
not necessarily traditional but may also be more recent. In the following paragraphs, I will 
speak of policy dimensions as abstractions of the different policy preferences that parties may 
have relative to each other. Although I consider bargaining relationships from a general, 
theoretical perspective, the discussion is of special relevance to multipolar systems.
Bargaining on coalition policy in a multidimensional policy space
We can obtain a model of the relative positions of parties in a bargaining system at a 
particular point in time by locating the policy positions of parties in a policy space. These 
relative positions may be expressed in terms of distances. Spatial approaches to government 
formation are usually confined to two dimensions, as it is difficult to make graphical 
representations of truly multidimensional policy spaces.10 Another concept is the core  position 
in the policy space, which is the multidimensional variant of the median position (the party 
which is in the median position on the relevant dimensions is the core party). While there is 
always a median party, there is not always a core party in a multidimensional bargaining 
system. The reason for this is that only a large party can be in the median position on all 
relevant dimensions at one and the same time, and even if this is the case, small shifts in the 
policy space by other parties may be sufficient to remove it from the median position (see
10 There are also nonspatial approaches to coalition politics, of which the saliency theory probably 
is the most distinct and important one. In this approach, it is not the positions of parties on policy 
dimensions that are compared, but the relative emphasis that parties give to particular subjects in their 
election manifestos, which is measured in terms of the percentage of text spent on these subjects. This 
approach is discussed further below.
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Laver & Budge, 1992 and Laver & Hunt, 1992, for a discussion of spatial theories o f  
government formation).
The salience o f  policy dim ensions
From a purely theoretical point of view, this representation of party relationships may b e  
logical and clear. In reality, however, not every dimension may be given the same w eight 
by the relevant parties. If one dimension is really generally salient, another may be m ore 
salient to one party than to a second party. The ’distance’ between two parties on this last 
dimension may be very different in the perception of each of these parties. Party A may fee l 
that party B is not too far away, while B may perceive the gap between A as unbridgeable 
in the next government formation. Such differences may also occur in a multidimensional 
context with more parties. This is illustrated in figure 2.1, which is based on an example 
given by Laver & Hunt (1992: 79).
Figure 2.1
The shape of the figure (circles or elipses) indicates the relative salience of the dimensions, 
and their size (surface) indicates each party’s bargaining flexibility. The larger the circle or  
el ipse, the more a party will be prepared to compromise, but never beyond a certain point. 
In this example, the willingness of parties to make concessions away from their ’ideal’ policy 
position (the points A, B and C) is always a matter of concessions on dimension X relative 
to concessions, or gains, on dimension Y.
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From the perspective of party A, C’s position is just within the range of what A 
considers acceptable for making a deal or compromise on the horizontal dimension; however, 
C will be much less prepared to bargain with A on this dimension. At the same time, the two 
parties are ’closer’ on the other dimension, something which is far more important to A than 
to C. In this situation, a package deal may be made in which A accepts a policy represented 
by a point close to C on dimension X, while C in return accepts a policy on dimension Y that 
is closer to A than to C. All kinds of variations are possible here, and party B may also be 
involved.
Interestingly, in a different, non-spatial, approach, Gregory Luebbert has developed a very 
similar argument with respect to government formation. According to this author, there is 
a limit o f  tolerance  in government formation:
The hypothesized limit (of tolerance) applies to the least favorable relationship that 
exists between the two parties within their entire set o f  relevant preferences. If the 
parties have convergent preferences on one issue and divergent ( . . .)  preferences on 
another, the bargaining relationship is divergent ( . ..) . The formateurs (o f one party) 
will always be willing to proceed to the limit o f tolerance, but not beyond it. The 
government that emerges is, in this view , a by-product o f the prevailing constellation  
o f  bargaining relationships and the systematically determined consequences that the 
formateurs find attached to different levels o f tolerance (1986: 65).
Several ways have been found to determine the salience of policy dimensions. Laver & Hunt 
(1992) have conducted a large scale expert survey in different countries. Before this, survey 
based research did not differentiate so clearly between parties, the results mostly being a 
picture of the ’generally salient’ dimensions in systems at large. The approach followed by 
Laver & Hunt has the advantage of providing a more differentiated picture of the policy 
space in a particular system, but there is a problem in that the picture becomes more difficult 
to draw the further into the past you go.
A different route has been followed by the Manifesto Research Group. In an extensive 
comparative content analysis of party programmes and published government declarations, 
country specialists have estimated percentages of party manifestos spent on particular issue 
dimensions. These ’dimensions’ were specified in advance. Actually, they were not really 
dimensions in the usual more or less abstract sense, but instead were distinct policy themes 
or ’domains’. On the basis of specific coding categories (these were variables representing 
related policy statements in the documents), twenty different policy domains were 
distinguished, regarding all areas of government activity. The percentages of text in 
manifestos or government declarations spent on these domains were seen as indicating the 
salience of these domains, either to individual parties or to governments (Budge, Robertson 
& Hearl, 1987; Laver & Budge, 1992). This approach however seems to be more useful to 
studying party manifestos than government policy documents, as in the latter case very
19
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important but controversial matters may be dealt with in just a few lines and conversely m an y  
words may be spent on subjects which are not the ones on which parties have profiled  
themselves, and which are of no real interest.
These general approaches are not only different in the way the salience of policy dimensions 
is estimated; they also differ on a more fundamental point, which is the question of w h at  
actually constitutes a policy dimension. As said before, a policy dimension is usually s e e n  
to represent a cleavage line within society. In many parliamentary democracies, traditional 
cleavages have stimulated the formation of political parties and subsequently party sp lits. 
Contrary to the manifesto project (in which dimensions were actually policy domains), th e  
more deductive approaches towards interparty relationships typically are based on su ch  
general conceptions of policy dimensions. Yet these conceptions often differ. As Laver &  
Hum put it: ’in an important sense, there are at least as many policy spaces as there are  
people interested in politics’ (1992: 67). The concept of multidimensionality does not h a v e  
one meaning, and the point to be emphasised here is that when speaking of policy dimensions 
X and Y, it should be made clear what exactly is meant by dimension X and what b y  
dimension Y. This is especially important if we realise that in reality parties may n o t  
negotiate over abstract notions but on concrete policy issues.
Types o f  bargaining relationships
Policy dimensions, or domains or issues, may thus be generally relevant or irrelevant, or b e  
important to one party but less important to another. Luebbert calls this last category 
tangentia l (1986: 62-63). Tangential issues, that is, issues which belong to dimensions that 
are tangential to two parties, may be dealt with in what is usually referred to as a process o f  
’logrolling’. Party A may accept B’s preference for, for example an increase in defence 
spending if B accepts A ’s preference for lower penalties for the use of soft drugs. W ith  
regard to the other possibilities, there may be either a complete ’silence’ or direct 
confrontation in coalition bargaining. The views of parties on generally relevant matters m ay  
be more or less compatible, or, in the terminology of Luebbert, convergent or divergent. I f  
parties have divergent preferences (Luebbert speaks of divergent bargaining relationships), 
arrangements made between parties may be either explicit or implicit compromises (ibid). 
Explicit compromises contain unilateral or mutual and substantive concessions. Implicit 
compromises are agreements to disagree, and these may take the form of procedural 
arrangements such as postponements or statements which are sufficiently general or vague 
so that no party will feel that its preferences are violated. Thus, explicit compromises commit 
the coalition parties to particular substantive policies, whereas implicit compromises contain 
commitments to certain procedures to be followed on the issue in question, or contain on ly  
vague and weak commitments.
The reasons why parties formulate either an explicit or an implicit compromise m ay  
vary. This may have to do with the nature, or definition, of issues, which may involve more
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or less compromisable viewpoints. If issues have a high ideological content, preferences may 
be incompatible, and substantive explicit compromises difficult to reach. Strategic 
considerations may also come into play, such as the commitment that a particular party seeks 
to prevent ad  hoc  legislative coalitions being formed with noncoalition parties. If such 
external threats exist, one or more prospective coalition parties may press for an explicit 
compromise to commit all coalition parties.
One reason why parties may be reluctant to make clear commitments is the existence 
of internal divisions within parties. General or vague arrangements may be seen to prevent 
an increase in intraparty divisions. Of course, parties facing such internal threats must first 
be able to convince the other parties that, on the issues in question, implicit compromises are 
to be preferred to explicit ones. When other parties press for more clear cut arrangements, 
internally divided parties are in an awkward position.
These points can also be illustrated graphically. Consider figure 2.2, which represents a 
somewhat more complex (but also more realistic) situation than suggested in figure 2.1. 
Suppose, that the parties B, C and D conduct negotiations to form a new government. Given 
the numbers of parliamentary seats of the parties, a coalition BCD would include the median 
parties on the X and Y dimension, which are party C (on X) and D (on Y).11 In this specific 
bargaining situation, distances between the positions of B, C and D are such, that the parties 
are likely to pay attention to both dimensions. This is because the smallest distances exist 
with respect to the most generally salient dimension (Y), while party positions with respect 
to the less important dimension X also are more remote. In the example, this can be seen in 
the small overlap in the parties’ respective areas o f tolerance. In this example, no convergent 
preferences exist between parties on either dimension (in graphical terms this would require 
that the ’ideal’ policy points of two or more parties on one dimension form an imaginary 
straight line that runs square to the dimension). Presumably, the less overlap in the areas of 
tolerance of parties, the less these parties will agree explicitly on issues. If there is no overlap 
at all, parties are unlikely to coalesce, but if, for reasons other than policy considerations 
alone, parties nonetheless conduct coalition negotiations, they may agree to disagree and 
formulate implicit compromises.
11 In this example there are 100 parliamentary seats. The median party can be calculated by 
counting from either side of the dimension until the median legislator is found, which in this case is 
the 50th seat (notice that this need not be at the middlepoint of the dimension, as this depends entirely 
on the positions of the parties). On dimension X, party A has 12 seats, B has 20 seats, and C 28, so 
that C controls the median legislator (12+20=32, so that the median legislator is the 18th seat of 
party C counted from left to right). To determine the median party on dimension Y, a similar 
procedure is followed counting from E downwards or upwards from F. Unless parliament consists 
entirely of unaffiliated individual MP’s, the concept of the median legislator does not mean that a 
single MP can be a policy dictator!
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The situation would be different if C for example started to give more weight to dimension 
X than to Y, and D changed its position on dimension Y inthe direction of the ’ideal point’ 
of party B. In this case, dimension X would become more ’tangential’, and bargaining 
become less of a confrontation between B and C. Party B would then be more prepared to 
give way on X, and party C on Y. Moreover, the policy positions of parties B and D on 
dimension Y would have become convergent. Bargaining in the new situation would be likely 
to take place bilaterally between B and D and between C and D.
In ternal a n d  external parties
The picture could still be made more realistic by not only taking into account the positions 
of prospective coalition parties, but also those of other relevant parties in the system. As a 
matter of fact, it would be rather exceptional if parties conducting coalition negotiations 
perceive themselves as always (that is, on all dimensions or issues) closer to each other than 
to any other relevant party in the system.
Consider for example party A in figure 2.2 above. Coalition BCD is still the point o f  
departure. On dimension X, party A is much closer to party B, in this last party’s perception, 
than any of B ’s partners at the bargaining table. Further, in the perception o f party D, an a d
12 Seat distribution: party A 12, B 20, C 28, D 20, E 10, and F and G, which are not relevant 
parties, both 5 (total number of seats =  100).
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hoc legislative coalition ABC on issues relating to dimension X could be a serious threat if 
the new government BCD takes office. What also becomes visible in the figure is that party 
A would have little chance of being included in a governm ent coalition with B and C or with 
B and D, as it is located well outside the compromise area of both C and D. In short, the 
threat of ad hoc  legislative coalitions with external parties may form an incentive for at least 
one of the prospective coalition parties to demand that firm commitments be made during 
government formation.13
The situation in government formation in the Netherlands in 1977 can be used as an 
empirical example. In that formation, the CD A and VVD had divergent positions on the 
abortion issue, which was salient to both. A compromise on the substance of the issue was 
out of reach. Instead, the CD A, the formateur’s party, came up with a procedural agreement, 
in which it was stated that the cabinet would try to submit a bill before 1 January 1979, and 
otherwise await a parliamentary initiative. In this way, the CDA committed the VVD to 
inaction and thus kept the party from forming a legislative majority on the issue with the 
PvdA and D66, the other relevant secular parties. Interestingly, this implicit compromise was 
reached initially between CDA, PvdA and D66 in an earlier failed formation attempt. The 
CDA had pressed for such an agreement for the same reason: the threat of a legislative 
coalition of the PvdA and D66 with the VVD.
The model presented above could of course be extended or modified in different ways, but 
the main points should have become clear by now. In a bargaining system in which different 
policy dimensions are relevant, the agenda during government formation may vary according 
to the parties which participate and the relative weights these parties give to different policy 
dimensions. Depending on the constellation of bargaining relationships, bargaining itself may 
be more or less difficult. Still assuming that parties care about policy during government 
formation, it seems reasonable to assume further that policy divergences especially are 
important when parties must decide whether or not they will join in a coalition. In election 
campaigns, the matters that parties use for profiling themselves will surely not all be the 
same, and this creates room to make deals on 'tangential’ issues. Yet, when considering the 
possibility of governing together, parties may pay attention explicitly or more implicitly to 
points of conflict. Since in multipolar bargaining systems there are many dimensions of party 
competition, such conflicts may also be frequent in coalition bargaining. This means that the 
scope of policy bargaining is likely to be broad, something which in turn will have an effect 
on the contents o f coalition agreements.
13 The same logic, in reverse, applies in situations in which minority governments seek external 
support. In these situations, the absence of 'close’ external parties on particular dimensions may be 
a threat to the coalition, in that it may not receive parliamentary support.
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COALITION POLICY AGREEMENTS IN WESTERN EUROPE
What is meant by a coalition policy agreement?
If policy and policy dimensions are concepts which can mean different things to different 
people, we must at least be clear about what we understand by coalition policy agreements. 
Both in theory and in practice, there is talk of party programmes or election manifestos, 
government programmes, government declarations, support agreements, and coalition 
agreements. What these programmes have in common is that they concern policy and exist 
in written form. Apart from the obvious difference between party programmes and 
programmes agreed on by two or more parties, differences between types of joint 
programmes can also be important.
A coalition agreement is an agreement made by two or more parties during 
government formation, not only before the government is sworn in, but also during the 
sequence of government formation, before the distribution of portfolios. There are many 
ways in which the process of coalition agreement formulation can be organised and the results 
may also differ, but the points just mentioned are distinctive when comparing coalition 
agreements with government programmes and government declarations. These last two types 
of documents are made officially by the new government, and may, to a greater or smaller 
extent, contain policies formulated by ministers themselves. They may be a re-edited version 
of the coalition agreement, as such containing no new substantive intentions. Government 
declarations are presented officially in parliament, read out by the prime minister. In  
countries such as Belgium and Israel this is part of a formal investiture.14
Thus, coalition agreements are made typically f o r  the new government, while 
government programmes and declarations are made by the new government. The latter may  
be largely a formality if coalition parties have drafted a coalition agreement. On the other 
hand, programmes or declarations may be the only programmatic basis of the government.
Support agreem ents and coalition agreem ents
Coalition agreements also differ from support agreements. The key distinctive element here 
is that support agreements are made between prospective government parties, not necessarily 
a coalition, and parties which remain outside the government. Support agreements are 
different from legislative coalitions formed on an a d  hoc  basis, in that the former are made 
before a government takes office, and are written down. As Kaare Strom has pointed out, 
support agreements are pursued primarily by minority governments to secure a fairly stable 
kind o f external support, but majority governments may also do this (1990: 61-66, 96-127).
14 Declarations also emerge in noncoalition systems such as those of Britain, Canada, and New 
Zealand, where they are usually based on the election manifesto of the party that takes office.
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Countries in which the former situation exists are Ireland and Denmark. Support agreements 
between majority governments and external parties have occurred in Israel and Italy. In 
Norway and Sweden, support agreements have been used by the Social Democrats to split 
the opposition when forming a single party minority government (Sarlvik, 1983: 145). 
Support agreements usually contain a limited number of matters on which commitments are 
made, but they may also be single-issue agreements with different parties.
Support agreements are made with external parties because these are needed to give 
the government a parliamentary majority on particular issues, while coalition policy 
agreements are made exclusively between parties that will participate in the new government. 
External parties may play an indirect role here, by forcing individual coalition parties to insist 
on firm commitments with their prospective partners, to reduce the threat of ad  hoc 
legislative coalitions with such external parties.
The occurrence of coalition agreements in different types of bargaining systems
Unipolar system s
As we have seen, Ireland, Norway, Sweden and Denmark until 1971 are systems in which 
single party governments are more frequent than coalitions, and the coalitions often have 
minority status. Only in Israel until 1977 were majority coalitions the rule. In Norway and 
Sweden, coalition agreements have emerged since the formation of ’bourgeois’ coalitions in 
the 1960s (Norway) and 1970s (Sweden). In Sweden, the coalitions of Social Democrats and 
the Agrarian party in the 1950s had a coalition agreement that committed the parties in 
particular in the area of socio-economic policy. Sometimes, coalition agreements are made 
before the parliamentary elections. In Denmark, coalition agreements have been elaborated 
by majority coalitions, and by minority coalitions that had formal support agreements with 
external parties (Thomas, 1982: 124; Strom, 1990: 95). Coalition bargaining in these 
countries is usually between the party leaders, with the parliamentary groups generally being 
consulted at the end of the negotiations. Sometimes, parliamentary area specialists are 
involved (Pesonen and Thomas, 1983: 79,91-92; Sarlvik, 1983: 126-127; KHA, 1983-1992).
In Ireland, changes of governments have for along time been alternations of single 
party and coalition governments. Though coalitions emerged earlier, a real coalition 
agreement was first issued in 1973, when Fine Gael and Labour took office together. In fact, 
as happens sometimes in Scandinavia, the agreement was drafted before the parliamentary 
elections (Cohan, 1982: 272). After 1981, however, actual policy negotiations were started 
only after the elections (one possibile reason for this is that pre-electoral pacts made between 
Fine Gael and Labour were followed by electoral defeats). By and large, Ireland seems to 
be a country in which party leaders conduct policy negotiations primarily to satisfy their 
respective rank and files, while electoral considerations may also play a part (Laver & 
Higgins, 1986: 173-177).
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In Israel, new governments have been required by constitution to present a policy 
programme since 1968, The formulation of coalition agreements, however, is not something 
that depends on constitutional provisions only. In fact, coalition agreements have been drawn 
up since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 (Peretz, 1979: 158; Arian, 1985: 
163). Until 1977, these agreements were typically produced in two stages: first. Labour, as 
the formateur’s party, presented a document containing policy priorities, that is, the party’s 
central demands, for the next legislative term. Next, negotiations with potential coalition 
partners were started, leading to both the government and the definitive coalition agreement 
(Seliktar, 1982: 303).
Thus, in unipolar systems, coalition government formation often implies the 
formulation of a coalition policy agreement, especially if the coalition parties control a 
parliamentary majority. With Israel forming an exception, negotiations on these agreements 
are usually fairly brief. We will see below that this is also reflected in the contents o f  
coalition agreements.
Bipolar systems
In both Austria and Germany, coalition agreements have been drafted since the early postwar 
years. In Austria, these documents have been published officially in the government gazette 
since 1956 (Dreijmanis, 1982: 251). The agreements issued during the period of the grand 
coalitions in the 1960s were lengthy (Schneider, 1966; Muller, 1994). In Germany, the 
Federal Chancellor was the first ’architect’ of the government who drew together the policy 
programme. In the 1960s, the parliamentary groups, or their leaders at least, became 
involved in the elaboration of what were coalition agreements in the actual sense. More 
rarely, agreements were drafted before the elections (Von Beyme, 1983: 26-33). Thus, in  
Austria and Germany, the writing o f coalition agreements is also part of political practice.
M ultipo lar system s
As we know, majority coalitions are the predominant form of government in all multipolar 
systems except Denmark. In this last country, the eight governments that emerged between 
1971 and 1992 all had minority status, and some but not all were cemented through a 
coalition agreement (Thomas, 1982: 124; KHA, 1982-1992).
Things are different in Iceland, where coalition agreements are formally issued i f  
coalition formation is successful, and the negotiations on these agreements are considered to  
be the decisive stage of government formation (Grimsson, 1982: 15-162). Attention paid to  
the coalition agreement seems to be at its highest when the two largest parties, the 
Independence Party and the Progressive Party, join each other in government (Grimsson, 
1982: 161; KHA, 1983-1992).
In Italy, coalition agreements have been part of political practice since the immediate 
postwar years. According to one author:
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Centuries of forensic and casuistic training assist in composing a written agreement 
on the program, consisting of formulas grandiose enough to impress public opinion 
and ambiguous enough to be accepted by every delegation (Marradi, 1982: 58).
Occasionally, parliamentary groups or party congresses go beyond their ratifying role and 
press for amendmends or block the negotiations (ibid, 58-59). Yet, policy negotiations are 
mostly not the most difficult part of government formation in this country. Often partly 
leaders formulate the ’grandiose’ and ’ambiguous’ formulas referred to in the citation above 
fairly quickly, and see to it that these also are approved by their respective parties.
In Israel since 1977 the main point of change has been that the drafting of coalition 
agreements came to be directed less by the Labour party, not only for the obvious reason that 
this party has not always participated in government, but also because it came to be less 
dominant when it did take office. Negotiations in Israel often last most of the period of 119 
days limited by constitution (Bara, 1992: 348). Yet, policy bargaining is depicted usually as 
being more pragmatic than in other countries with complex interparty relationships. One 
reason may be that, as argued more in general terms in the previous chapter, prospective 
coalition parties (Labour and/or Likud on the one hand and usually a number of small 
religious parties on the other) often take an interest in different policy areas, which means 
that bargaining often becomes a matter of ’portfoliology’ (Seliktar, 1982: 305; Bara, 1992: 
348).
The drafting of coalition agreements seems to be most rigorous in Finland, Belgium 
and the Netherlands. In Finland, coalition agreements began to be drafted in the early 1950s, 
and became more specific and detailed in the mid-1960s (Nousiainen, 1991). If, however, 
minority governments are formed, agreements are drafted less conscientiously (Nyholm, 
1982: 108). Gradually, the extraparliamentary parties have become more influential in the 
negotiations, at the cost of the parliamentary groups. Another important factor in Finland is 
the president, who has considerable power in the government formation process (Pesonen and 
Thomas, 1983: 86-88).
In Belgium too the story of coalition agreements started in the 1960s. Though it was 
already customary that a new government issued a policy declaration when taking office, a 
written agreement was first drafted in 1965. Since then, negotiations on a coalition agreement 
have been a crucial part of government formation, and the result is that lengthy agreements 
are the rule rather than the exception. Bargaining is usually between party delegations 
presided over by the leaders of the extraparliamentary parties. On really important and 
controversial matters, negotiations mostly take place between the party presidents. ’Formal* 
approval of coalition agreements typically takes place at an extraparliamentary level, usually 
at a party congress or special conference.
Finally, in the Netherlands, the first coalition agreement was issued in 1963. In 
contrast with the usual procedure in Belgium, Dutch coalition agreements are formulated by 
the parliamentary groups, or in any case by their leaders and an increasing number of area
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tspecialists. The agreement contains the substance of the government programme and indeed 
often forms a fa it  accompli for new ministers if these have not participated in the  
negotiations. The length of agreements has also increased, to some 29,000 words in 1989.
Thus, in multipolar systems the stage o f policy negotiations during government formation is  
nearly always concluded by the adoption of a coalition agreement. As this is also the situation 
in bipolar systems and in unipolar systems when majority coalitions are formed, the general 
conclusion may be that coalition agreements are more related to coalition governments than  
to the type of bargaining system in which these governments ensue. Let us next take a closer  
look at the contents of these agreements in different countries and see whether there are 
differences in this respect.
General features of coalition policy agreements
Coalition agreements may be brief and consist of some stray notes at the back of a cigar box , 
or be lengthy documents carefully divided into different sections, subsections and paragraphs. 
In countries such as Belgium, Israel, Finland and the Netherlands, it is quite normal that 
coalition agreements reach a length of fifty pages of written text. They may also contain 
different kinds of intentions, varying between very general goals and specific policies, and  
from vague intentions that nobody can disagree with to detailed compromises entailing 
substantive concessions.
Further, there may be variation in the scope o f coalition agreements. They m ay  
contain a limited set of issues relating to one or a few themes or policy areas, or deal w ith  
matters relating to many different areas. With regard to this last aspect, the 'dimensionality* 
of the policy space, which may be defined as the salience of several distinct themes or areas 
in interpany relationships, is relevant. Given that the forming of governments in multipolar 
systems is generally seen to involve more than one policy dimension, we may assume that 
the scope of coalition agreements in countries such as Belgium, Finland, Israel and the  
Netherlands is broad, and perhaps broader than elsewhere.
There is however a problem, in that information (certainly systematic information) o n  
coalition agreements is very scanty and this information is also difficult to obtain. This is  
especially the case for the agreements, as these are not always published. Though parts o f  
agreements or particular, politically important, arrangements are often leaked to the press, 
these are not more than fragments. In short, there are major practical problems if we want 
to make a more or less systematic analysis even of the general features of coalition 
agreements in different countries.
One way to cope with this problem is to consider what are called government 
programmes, which are usually published in most countries. Research has been carried out
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recently on these programmes by the Manifesto Research Group (Laver & Budge, 1992; 
another relevant study is that of Nousiainen, 1993). As we have found that coalition 
agreements emerge in all countries and form the basis of government programmes, we may 
use the available information on programmes for our purpose. When doing so, it is necessary 
to realise that government programmes, or the versions read out in parliament called 
declarations, may be ’censored’ with regard to details that are included in coalition 
agreements. This means that caution is needed when interpreting findings based on 
programmes.
Table 2.2 presents the estimated profiles of government programmes in the relevant 
countries for the period 1965-1990 (Iceland is excluded because this country was not 
considered in the aforementioned studies, and Denmark and Israel are indicated only as 
multipolar systems). Although variation is found within countries in this period, the profiles 
are estimated averages for the relevant period. The countries are classified into one of three 
categories relating to scope and into one of three categories with regard to the degree of 
specificity. (If the period before 1965 is also considered, the countries would be located at 
different positions, often in the first row and/or the first column in the table). This of course 
implies some simplification, but the aim here is to compare countries in a general manner.
Table 2.2
Scope and specificity of government programmes 
(estim ated averages for the period 1965-1990)
narrow
scope
medium broad
low Ireland
Sweden
Norway
degree of 
specificity mixed Austria Italy
Denmark
Germany
Israel
high Finland
Netherlands
Belgium
Party motivations and coalition agreements
Party motivations are an important factor which may, at least partly, cut across the distinction 
between types of bargaining systems. In the discussion of policy bargaining in the previous 
chapter, the assumption was made that parties take an interest in policy. Though there is no
need to suddenly drop this assumption completely, it may be more correct for one country 
than for another. Beside policy goals, parties may expect particular benefits from getting into  
office, such as control of patronage appointments, or parties may be oriented on increasing 
support in the electorate. In reality there will be a combination of benefits, in which o n e  
motivation may prevail, either for a short period or more permanently (Budge & Laver, 
1986; Strom, 1990b).
When relating the variation in specificity of declarations to the primary motivation of parties 
in the different countries mentioned in recent empirical research, it appears that countries 
with relatively general or mixed policy declarations are often the ones in which policy is n ot  
the primary motivation of a party, at least not during government formation. This is  
especially the case in Ireland and Italy, and somewhat less in Austria and Norway. In  
Germany and Israel, where declarations have a mixed character, parties tend to see policy  
strongly in terms of portfolios, or particular portfolios. Parties in Belgium, Finland, th e  
Netherlands and Denmark are usually characterised as being driven more directly by policy  
goals. This is also the case with parties in Sweden, a country in which declarations how ever  
tend to be relatively brief, neither broad in scope nor particularly specific (Laver & H unt, 
1992: 73; Laver & Budge, 1992: 414). Though Sweden is thus somewhat exceptional in th is  
respect, the point that stands out is that the three countries in which programmes are b oth  
broad and relatively specific (Finland, the Netherlands and Belgium) have multipolar system s.
The conclusion of this section is that coalition agreements occur in all countries w ith  
coalition cabinets, especially majority coalitions, and thus in all three types of bargaining 
systems. Once we start to consider the contents of coalition agreements, it is hard to d en y  
that there are considerable differences between countries and also between types of bargaining 
systems. The finding which stands out is that with the exception of Italy, countries w ith  
multipolar systems tend to produce more comprehensive and specific programmes than o th er  
countries. Though we must be careful with extending these findings on programmes t o  
coalition agreements, they are consistent with the general idea that in these countries p o licy  
is important to parties when forming and maintaining (or breaking) coalition governments.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In this chapter, we have dealt with three types of bargaining systems, with the governments 
formed within these systems and with coalition agreements and their general characteristics 
in the different types of bargaining systems. I have shown that multipolar bargaining system s  
are not only coalition systems (as are bipolar systems), but, and more typically, are a ls o  
systems from which coalition governments emerge after protracted bargaining, o fte n
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involving several formation attempts. These governments often deviate from the assumptions 
made in ’classical’ coalition theory. That is, they are often neither minimal winning nor 
contain parties which are each other’s neighbours on the traditional left right dimension. This 
suggests that interparty bargaining during the formation of these governments involves two 
or perhaps more policy dimensions.
Next, I focused on the element of policy in coalition bargaining in a multidimensional 
policy space, which is often found in multipolar systems. Not all dimensions that are relevant 
in a system will be equally important to parties involved in coalition bargaining, provided that 
parties are generally interested in policy in the first place. The implication for bargaining is 
that this involves not only, as Budge & Farlie (1983) have called it, ’direct confrontation’ but 
also ’selective emphasis’. Still, the competitive nature of interparty relationships in multipolar 
systems means that confrontations are likely to be frequent, and may even be decisive, during 
government formation.
A key question with respect to the subject of coalition agreements is whether the 
results of policy bargaining are also written down. Parties may carefully put on record 
everything they have dealt with (even if there have been no real conflicts among them), or 
they may see so many points of divergence that they do not have the courage to start drafting 
an agreement. Another, and perhaps even more fundamental, question is whether the 
assumption that parties want to deal with policy during government formation is always 
correct. These questions were dealt with in the final section, in which we saw that the points 
about policy bargaining are not made in an empirical vacuum. Coalition agreements emerge 
mostly when majority coalitions are formed, and they are most comprehensive and specific 
in countries where the policy space contains several dimensions, or themes or areas, which 
are typically multipolar systems. This is a matter of party motivation, but probably there are 
other reasons why in some countries parties formulate comprehensive and specific coalition 
policy agreements during government formation. In the next chapter I consider the rationale 
for formulating coalition agreements and the functions and effects of agreements during the 
life of governments.
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Functions and Effects of Coalition 
Policy Agreements
3
Policy negotiations between parties forming a government together are conducted to 
establish some form of agreement. Whether or not these negotiations are really 
substantive depends, among other things, on the extent to which the parties involved see 
differences in their respective preferences, the possibilities they see in government 
formation for dealing with these differences and, most fundamentally, the extent to which 
the parties are motivated by policy in the first place.
This chapter consists of four sections dealing with these points. Given the terra  
pacta  depicted in the previous chapter, a first important point to consider is what views 
on coalition policy agreements exist. These views have been distilled from the literature, 
especially comparative (European) politics literature. This forms the substantce of the first 
section. On the basis of these views, the possible functions of coalition policy agreements 
as intended by the parties are distinguished in section two. I discuss the possible empirical 
effects o f coalition agreements in section three, where three hypotheses on these effects 
are presented. Finally, I deal with a number of factors which may be relevant to the 
process of enforcing agreements, and which may thus form favourable or unfavourable 
conditions for the implementation of arrangements.
RITUAL DANCES OR REAL CHANCES: TWO VIEWS OF 
COALITION POLICY AGREEMENTS
The absence of systematic studies of coalition agreements to date may be the reason why 
rather different notions with respect to these documents may be found in the literature. 
The literature pays special attention to the comparative studies of coalition governments 
which have emerged since the early 1980s (for example: Browne & Dreijmanis, 1982; 
Bogdanor, 1983a; Pridham, 1986; Laver & Budge, 1992; Blondei & Müller-Rommel,
1993). Two general, but different views on coalition agreements can be found and these 
are considered in the following paragraphs.
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Bargaining on coalition agreements as a ritual dance
The first way of viewing policy bargaining could be called the ’sceptical’ view. From this 
viewpoint, parties use this stage in government formation merely to underline their 
willingness to form a government together and to show to their respective followers that 
they do so not entirely for nothing. Tyically, the price they ask is symbolical. Consider, 
for example, Luebbert’s statement:
What makes the talks so long, difficult and complex is generally not the lack o f  
goodwill among elites, but the fact that negotiations must appear the way they do 
in order to satisfy the members whose orientations are still largely attuned to the 
vocal, symbolic, and ideological aspects characteristic o f each respective political 
subculture. It is wrong to assume that, because interparty negotiations take a long 
time, much is being negotiated among the parties. Most negotiation in cases o f 
protracted government formation takes place between leaders and their followers 
and among rival factions within parties (1986: 52).
Luebbert sees parties as competition arenas for leadership positions as much as actors that 
are in competition with other parties. As the above citation illustrates amply, the author 
also sees party leaders primarily as policy usersy rather than policy seekers. In this view, 
coalition policy agreements, before anything else, are elaborated for intra-party purposes. 
It is also worth quoting what Laver & Schofield say about coalition agreements:
While such a document is unambiguously the immediate output o f coalition 
bargaining over policy, we must none the less be wary about its real political 
significance. It might, after all, be little more than window dressing (1990: 189).
Further:
There are several reasons why it is difficult to read a meaning into what appears 
on the face of it to be a fairly straightforward document ( . ..)  For example, parties 
with fundamental policy disagreements that none the less decide to go into govern­
ment together will not want to draw  attention to what divides them. Conversely, 
when there is clear agreement between parties on policy, they are likely to 
publicize this, however trivial the issue (...) Thus the published policy statement is 
a highly strategic document, the meaning of which is obscure to all but the most 
sophisticated of insiders (ibid: 191-192).
These notions are partly based on the work of the Manifesto Research Group referred to 
several times before. In work produced by this group, Laver & Budge also argue that 
published government programmes may not always reflect real government policy
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positions because they may be ’patched up hastily between party leaders more as a public 
relation exercise’ (1992: 410; see also Klingemann, Hofferbert & Budge, 1994: 33).
It is, however, the interpretation and understanding of coalition policy agreements by the 
’insiders’ referred to by Laver & Schofield which is important here. After all, these 
persons may also be the ones who are responsible for the elaboration and implementation
of coalition agreements.
Moreover, it remains to be seen whether, as Laver & Schofield assert, parties 
deciding to form a government together will avoid drawing attention to major policy 
conflicts existing between them and instead emphasise agreement on noncontentious or 
even trivial issues. Apart from the need for party leaders to ’temper’ their own office 
seeking drive to avoid alientation from their party rank and file, there is the problem o f  
policy conflicts among the parties. If parties do not immediately draw attention to policy 
disagreement in p ub lic , ignoring such a disagreement altogether when forming a 
government may be a form of selfdeception.
It remains true that there is considerable variation between party motivations in 
countries in which coalition agreements occur, but precisely because there is variation , it 
seems equally justified to say that in some countries parties do pay attention to policy 
conflicts, and approach bargaining on coalition agreements in a different way. Again, 
differences between the scope and especially the specificity of policy programmes point in 
this direction.
Bargaining on coalition agreements as a real chance
The second view of policy bargaining during government formation is more positive. In 
one of the earlier works on coalition governments, Browne & Dreijmanis conclude for 
instance that
the key process which determines the value of coalition membership is seen to be 
the negotiation of a more or less formal agreement or bargain specifying the 
general expectations which actors may have of one another as coalition partners.
Most authors agree that the primary concern of actors during these negotiations is 
to achieve an agreement which commits the government as a whole to a set of 
policies as similar as possible to their own policy positions. (...) In addition to 
establishing programmatic content to guide the behavior of cabinet coalition 
members, negotiation of a coalition agreement also provides the partners with an 
opportunity to establish the extent of their influence over the process of policy 
determination (1982: 349-350).
This is clearly a different view of bargaining on coalition agreements, though it must be
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said that the country chapters on which Browne & Dreijmanis base their conclusion 
contain little systematic evidence of a substantive role for coalition agreements during the 
lifetime of governments.
The work of Peterson, De Ridder, Hobbs, & McClellan (1983) and Peterson & De 
Ridder (1986) is more directly focused on the role of coalition agreements. In contrast to 
the argument of policy avoidance during government formation, these authors call 
government formation a policy making arena pa r excellence. In their view it is an 
’institutionalized extrainstitutional arena’ that forms an important stage in a cumulative 
process of policy making. The government formation arena is seen to have the advantages 
of an informal context, in which no restricting conventions or institutional structures, such 
as formal legislative and administrative procedures, impede decision making (ibid: 82; 
Peterson & De Ridder, 1986: 567).
One key aspect of the conception of government formation is that it not only forms 
the start of a process of policymaking in a particular coalition government, but also 
follows immediately after the end of the previous government. In a chronological sense 
this is obvious enough, but the more specific point that Peterson et al. make is that issues 
which cause the fall of a government often return on the agenda during the formation of a 
new government. This is not only an interesting argument, it is also illustrated by 
empirical cases taken from Belgium and the Netherlands. In this context, we may recall 
that policy conflict is the most frequent cause of government dissolution in precisely the 
countries in which government programmes are comprehensive and specific, which also 
are multipolar systems.
Though policy negotiations may take place simultaneously in different work 
groups, the process in the view of Peterson et al. nonetheless contains several moments 
for the evaluation of results. The authors put it this way:
As the agreement is negotiated the participants are faced on each issue with the 
continual threefold choice o f accepting terms, discontinuing negotiations or trying 
to improve terms through further bargaining; and those actors who are not direct 
participants in the negotiations are faced with continuous tactical choices 
concerning their relationship with the direct participants (1983: 72).
Finally, Peterson et al. have called coalition agreements reference documents for 
policymaking during the term of the government. As such these documents are seen to 
form at least part of the government agenda. More specifically, the agreement may
(1) indicate a range of alternative courses of action to be considered or specify a 
preferred alternative, (2) specify a framework to be filled in by the government at 
a later date, (3) indicate other procedures for reaching further agreement, (4) 
develop specific legislative proposals to be presented to the parliament or present 
i some combination of the above (Peterson et al., 1983 : 74).
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In more recent work, other aspects of coalition agreements have been highlighted. Blondel 
& Muller-Rommel (1993: 9) for example argue that during the negotiations on an 
agreement areas of potential conflict are reduced and eliminated, which may smooth the 
path of the government. This may be less because harmony prevails than because the 
coalition agreement constrains the scope of governmental action. Budge & Keman (1990: 
47) also argue that reaching agreement among parties is important because it reduces 
tensions and costs of internal negotiation and also averts the risk of conflict which may 
bring down the government.
In short, in the alternative view on policy bargaining during government formation, 
coalition agreements have a substantive meaning. This meaning may be substantive in the 
sense that agreements matter for policy decisions that the government is entitled to take 
formally once in office. This may be by mentioning the content of these policies, or by 
stipulating procedures for dealing with issues.
THREE FUNCTIONS OF COALITION POLICY AGREEMENTS
If formulating a coalition agreement is a ritual dance of parties before taking their seats at 
the cabinet table, there is little else to be said about why parties do this. If, however, 
parties see this process as a real chance to deal with policy, there may be more that 
drives them than an interest in policy.
Some more reasons why policy bargaining may be taken seriously
Other incentives for engaging in substantive bargaining seem to be both positive and 
negative. One possible reason that has been mentioned briefly is related to policy 
motivation, and regards 'inheriting’ policy conflict from outgoing governments, especially 
if the outgoing government broke down due to an internal policy dispute and one or more 
parties engaged in the formation of a new government participated in that government. 
These parties may want to pay particular attention to the issues contested before these 
return on the cabinet agenda. Countries in which coalition parties return to office together 
frequently after they could not agree and dismantled the government are Belgium, 
Finland, Israel, Italy, and Denmark since the early 1980s. Another point which lies in the 
sphere o f ’inheritance’ concerns the phenomenon of political testaments drawn up by 
outgoing ministers and containing claims in these ministers’ respective fields o f  
jurisdiction. The testament of the minister of Finance especially is considered to be
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important since cutbacks in government expenditure are high on the political agenda.
A more general factor is the existence of mutual mistrust between the relevant 
panies. Of course, in competitive parliamentary systems, parties will always display a 
certain level of mistrust towards each other. Mistrust in this sense is part of the game, 
and at least to an extent may be a matter of posture. Mutual mistrust however may also 
reach a higher level, beyond that stemming from electoral competition. Particular 
experiences may lead to increased mistrust; parties may also opt for strategies of 
polarisation, which they may do to strengthen their electoral basis. Provided that mistrust 
does not hinder the forming of a coalition in the first place, it may induce parties to pay 
special attention to the coalition policy agreement. In multipolar systems especially, 
mistrust between parties is increased by the salience of several different policy dimensions 
and the usually low level of electoral decisiveness; this is the extent to which election 
results work through in the composition of governments (see Strom, 1984). 
Comprehensive and especially specific coalition agreements may be seen as an expression 
of this mistrust.
Apart from policy goals, previously experienced policy conflicts and mistrust 
between parties, another factor (which in part may be a result of these factors) is the 
institutionalisation of government formation in countries where coalition governments are 
imperative. In countries where the parliamentary groups of parties see government 
formation as one of the points where they can influence coalition policy, expectations 
have reinforced the process of institutionalisation. In these countries, the drawing up of a 
coalition agreement has become so much a matter of course that it would take many by 
surprise if a new government took office without a coalition agreement. This may further 
be seen in part as a response to the demands of party rank and file, especially where 
internal party democracy implies a substantive role for the extraparliamentary party.
The combination of these different factors may induce parties to make a serious 
job of drawing up a coalition agreement. This is important, as the institutionalisation of 
government formation alone, for example, may explain why agreements have become 
lengthier and broader in scope, but this need not imply that specific and detailed 
arrangements are made. Moreover, though mistrust between parties may have increased in 
most countries in the last two decades, coalition agreements have become really specific 
documents only in countries in which policy is important during government formation.
On the basis of the two views of coalition agreements and the points discussed above, 
three possible functions of coalition agreements may be distinguished. These are functions 
ascribed by the parties or party leaders themselves. They thus can also be called the 
intended effects of coalition agreements (assuming that coalition parties have the same 
intentions at least in this respect) as distinct from their actual effects during the life of 
governments. 37
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The coalition agreem ent as a symbolic gesture
First, coalition agreements may have a sym bolic function. In a way, all coalition 
agreements may be considered ’symbolic’, in that they contain intentions, however 
substantive, which still have to be carried out by the government. In the present context, 
however, the term ’symbolic’ should be understood in a different way. To those involved 
in government formation, drawing up a coalition agreement may be a symbolic gesture. It 
may be such a gesture at an interparty level, with leaders just wanting to underline their 
willingness to participate in the new government. This situation has been referred to as a 
ritual dance. The agreement may also be a gesture at an intraparty level, and be used by 
party leaders to satisfy the party rank and file. As said above, party followers usually 
have certain expectations on particular policies, and these expectations are mostly a point 
of concern for party leaders, at least to the extent that meeting such expectations is 
necessary to be re-elected. When the parties, or party leaders, perceive policy 
negotiations in this way, coalition agreements will contain rather general goals that no one 
is likely to disagree with.
In short, coalition agreements have a symbolic function if they are written 
exclusively to bring coalition parties together in a government and to satisfy the party 
rank and file or the general public. The intended effects of such documents are none other 
than to do just this. Hence once the government has taken office, a coalition agreement in 
such cases is as valuable as a cinema ticket after the show.
The coalition agreement as a policy agenda
Following from the view of policy negotiations as a real chance and government 
formation as a policy making arena, parties may also see coalition agreements in terms of 
more substantive functions. Coalition agreements may be meant to predefine coalition 
policy, or more specifically to predefine the policies to be pursued by the new 
government. This may be called the agenda Junction. We saw that coalition agreements 
may be more or less comprehensive and more or less detailed, and this is also likely to be 
the case with the different parts of these agreements. Some parts may contain substantive 
and specific intentions, which we could call policy  predeterm ination , while other parts 
may contain mainly general goals or mention what matters are to be dealt with in the 
coming years. In that case we may speak of policy indication. We should however see 
this as a continuum rather than as a dichotomy, as in reality intentions included in 
coalition agreements may also take an intermediate form, without being really completely 
precooked decisions or only placing issues on the agenda. A measure of the degree of 
policy predefinition is the proportion o f explicit compromises relative to implicit 
compromises.
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The coalition agreement as an instrum ent for conflict prevention
Parties may make efforts to predefine coalition policy not only because they take an 
interest in policy, but also because they want to smooth the life of the government. They 
may try to prevent, as much as possible, controversial issues giving rise to political 
problems after the government has taken office. The third function, then, may be called 
the conflict prevention function .
In the coalition agreement of the Eyskens IV government in Belgium, formulated 
in 1968, the following was stated:
The present agreement regards exclusively those problems for which a basic 
agreement is considered indispensible. This enables the government to consider 
other possible problems in a calmer political climate (K H A , 1968: 419; author’s 
translation).
Consider also this fragment taken from the coalition agreement of the third Lubbers 
government in the Netherlands, issued twenty years later, in 1989:
Two major parties that want to form a new and cohesive coalition must first pay 
broad attention to agreements that bridge differences in viewpoints. Substantive 
and procedural arrangements form the point of departure o f  the government (TK,
1989-90, 21132/8: 4; author’s translation).
Coalition agreements may thus be meant to cement coalitions internally and streamline 
decision making within the government or the coalition at large. This may be either by 
providing procedures for dealing with particular controversial issues, or by piecing 
together substantive compromises. Here also, the result is a policy agenda which mentions 
intentions that must be implemented or elaborated during the government’s term. At the 
same time, the parties may also limit the scope of governmental action for the sake of 
peace and the continuity of the coalition. In this case, the coalition agreement is likely to 
mention that substsantive decisions will be postponed (issues of course may also be left 
unmentioned, but in that case it is difficult to speak of a conflict prevention function for a 
coalition agreement).
Coalition agreements may thus be formulated for different purposes, and for this reason 
they may have different functions for the parties involved. There is a certain hierarchy 
with regard to the three functions. This hierarchy represents the extent to which the 
agreement is believed to be instrumental to a substantive goal beyond government 
formation. At the lowest level, we find the symbolic function. If the agreement is meant 
to be largely symbolic, its purpose is to confirm that the parties are willing to form a 
government together. If the agreement is intended as a policy agenda, it may be
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instrumental to policy making by providing something between a general policy 
framework and a set of specific policies which can be implemented straight away. 
Finally, if the agreement is meant to prevent conflict on certain issues occurring or re­
occurring within the coalition, it may secure the continuity of the coalition at large.
This conceptual hierarchy does not however mean that the three functions can 
never occur together. If this is clear with respect to the agenda function and the conflict 
prevention function, it may also be the case with these substantive functions in 
combination with the symbolic function. Even if parties see important points of conflict 
and engage in negotiations on these points, they may at the same time draft paragraphs or 
even complete sections on subjects which are not very important to any of them, but 
nonetheless are incorporated in the coalition agreement to meet expectations from within 
society.
EFFECTS OF COALITION POLICY AGREEMENTS
It is one thing to formulate a coalition agreement with substantive intentions. It is a 
different matter, however, to implement such intentions. The question is whether the 
intended effects are the actual effects, or outcomes, of coalition agreements. In this 
section we deal with the possible empirical effects or outcomes of coalition agreements. 
Not all parts in coalition agreements, however, may be relevant in this respect. As said in 
the previous section, parties may include particular issues simply to meet expectations 
without caring too much about these matters. In following discussion the focus will be on 
controversial policy issues during government formation. Often such issues will also be 
key problems on the coalition formation agenda, though as said, parties may not give the 
same weight to all issues. The results o f bargaining on these conflictual matters are 
explicit or implicit compromises, that is, arrangements containing substantive concessions 
or general and procedural agreements.
To say that issues are conflictual however does not mean that the ’hot issues’ 
always divide a ll parties around the formation table, at least not if there are more than 
two parties. In a three party coalition, for example, there may be conflict over three 
issues, none of which is disputed among all three parties. Thus, policy conflict may be 
collective or semicollective. In reality, both types of conflict may occur next to each other 
during government formation, for example in different policy areas.
These points have important consequences for the way in which we envision coalition 
agreements and their possible effects during the life of governments. Certain parts of 
coalition agreements may have little to do with the uni or multidimensional character of
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policy bargaining. This is simply because not all issues will have been the object of 
bargaining among the coalition parties. Though this need not mean that what at first sight 
appeared to be programmes with a broad scope now have very different features, it may 
be that at least the intended  substantive effects of coalition agreements concern a 
relatively limited number of policy areas. Of course, all statements in coalition 
agreements which are ’doable’ may be elaborated and implemented. If however our 
concern rests with really important issues which dominate the government formation 
agenda and the way in which these are dealt with by the parties, we should focus on the 
effects of these central issues. This also means that when speaking of the functions of 
coalition agreements, we should do so at the level of arrangements on these issues.
When focusing on written arrangements, we must realise that these may not all be 
the results of bargaining on central issues. If controversial matters are left outside the 
coalition agreement (thus are not even mentioned) this is also a result, and indeed one that 
may be important. In such cases, the actual role of the coalition agreement as a policy 
agenda and a conflict prevention instrument is limited even before we have started to 
consider the effects of what is included in the agreement. This means that when studying 
empirical cases of government formation, such ’omissions’ should be taken into account.
Effects of explicit and implicit compromises
Policy conflicts may take different forms, and the results of bargaining on conflictual 
issues may also vary. The distinction made by Luebbert between explicit and implicit 
compromises is relevant at this conceptual level. Explicit compromises were seen to 
contain unilateral or mutual concessions on the substance of issues. Implicit compromises 
were agreements to disagree, which may consist of procedural arrangements such as 
postponements or statements which are so general or vague that none of the parties sees 
its preferences violated. Here, we may assume that implicit compromises emerge if 
central party values are at stake and issues do not regard quantities or cannot be defined 
in such terms. These issues will often be in the fields of what could be called ’immaterial’ 
policy: cultural, ethno/linguistic, and ethical questions. Explicit compromises are more 
likely to occur in the area of socio-economic policy, especially financial policy. In either 
case, it is important to realise that in the present context arrangements are relevant only 
in cases of manifest policy conflict among the prospective coalition parties.
Following from the ’policy’ and 'peace’ elements in the functions of coalition 
agreements, the effects or outcomes of the two types of arrangements may be seen in 
terms of the absence or recurrence of conflict among the parties and in terms of the 
implementation or nonimplementation of substantive or procedural arrangements. The 
four possible outcomes are logically (1) the implementation of arrangements without 
conflict, (2) implementation involving conflict, (3) nonimplementation and no conflict,
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and (4) conflict in combination with nonimplementation. It should be noticed that (3) and
(4) may mean that either substantive or procedural decisions are taken in deviation from 
the agreement, or that no decisions are taken at all.
Explicit compromises and the streamlining o f policy making
Explicit compromises may be seen as cases in which parties have engaged in policy 
predelineation, and to a certain degree of specificity. Given this relatively specific 
character of explicit compromises, which may also involve a fair amount of time and 
energy of the coalition parties, we might expect that government policy conforms to the 
contents of these compromises. Given that explicit compromises are the result of 
bargaining on controversial issues, another possible effect is that this implementation 
takes place without further, or new, party political conflict on the relative issues within 
the government or the coalition at large. This type of arrangement may be expected to be 
functional both in terms of policy and in terms of conflict prevention. Our first hypothesis 
is thus: explicit compromises are im plem ented  in a peacefu l w ay.
Implicit compromises and the recurrence o f conflict
If implicit compromises are formulated, negotiations have not resulted in a really 
substantive agreement. There may be very general or even ambiguous arrangements on 
the disputed matters, or procedural arrangements of some kind. In terms of policy, the 
effects of implicit compromises may become visible only after some time, if there are any 
effects at all. This is because actual policy must still be elaborated, or because no 
substantive policy is intended. Here, it is important to distinguish between arrangements 
containing general statements about issues which need to be elaborated before we can 
actually speak of policy, and procedural arrangements such as postponents of decisions 
which are meant to * freeze’ policy making. General arrangements may place particular 
issues on the coalition agenda, and be general rather than specific. Procedural 
arrangements may be meant to remove particular issues from the coalition agenda, for a 
short time or until after the next scheduled elections.
Expectations about the effects of these types of arrangements may also differ, 
though it is evident that both cases involve policy indication rather than predetermination. 
Hypothesis 2 is that procedural arrangem ents prevent the  recurrence o f  conflict w ithout 
leading to substantive po licy  decisions during the lifetim e o f  the  governm ent. The third 
hypothesis is that general arrangem ents do no t prevent the  recurrence o f  conflict and  fo rm  
the  basis o f  substantive and  fo rm a lly  approved  decisions less often than exp lic it 
com prom ises. The reason for expecting fewer substantive policy decisions is that conflict 
may paralyse policy making.
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Figure 3.1
Outcomes of explicit and implicit compromises 
(hypothetical)
conflict
no
explicit
compromise
procedural
arrangement
implementation yes 
(policy)
no
general compromise
yes
Figure 3.1 summarises the hypothetical outcomes of explicit and implicit compromises. 
This representation may also be used when examining the empirical effects of individual 
arrangements or arrangements in particular policy areas, and indeed for depicting 
successes and failures o f coalitions. With respect to procedural arrangements, one of the 
two types of implicit compromises, it must be noticed that these are placed at the negative 
end of the implementation scale on the understanding that implementation refers to 
substantive policy decisions; with respect to the observation of procedural (and 
nonsubstantive) arrangements, we may be more positive about the likelihood of 
implementation. General implicit compromises are placed in an intermediate position in 
the Figure because substantive results are expected to emerge less often than when 
compromises are explicit.
It must also be emphasised that the hypotheses are not based on what the parties  
see as likely effects, at least not in the way as parties were said to perceive the functions 
of coalition agreements. Instead, the hypotheses concern outcomes which are likely to 
occur if parties see bargaining on policy as a real chance. The difference between explicit 
and implicit compromises in this respect is a difference in the extent to which parties have 
reached substantive agreement on conflictual issues. Whether explicit compromises really 
reflect true consensus and implicit compromises do have a ’boomerang’ effect in terms of 
conflict is something that we can only tell after considering empirical cases of the 
formation and life of governments. 43
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ENFORCEMENT OF ARRANGEMENTS
Before considering such empirical cases, there are some other points to be made about the 
effects of coalition agreements. Arrangements will often not contain equal payoffs to all 
parties. If the relevant issues on which compromises were made during government 
formation are on the agenda, parties may begin to look differently at these compromises, 
that is, on their concessions. Though this need not mean that parties are suddenly 
unwilling to compromise at all, they may develop incentives to try to increase their 
payoffs from arrangements in certain areas. This raises the question of the enforcem ent of 
coalition agreements. What may cause arrangements to be observed or not and to be 
implemented or amended by the coalition parties?
Coalition policy agreements are sometimes called contracts. An important 
difference however is that coalition agreements are not binding in a legal sense. There is 
no independent judge who can enforce arrangements written down in a coalition 
agreement. Coalition agreements are formulated by parties, and these parties also have a 
strong hand in deciding whether or not these agreements are carried out.
Given the hypotheses on the effects of explicit and implicit compromises, the 
general idea is that explicit compromises are more ’implementable’ than implicit 
compromises, because in the case of implicit compromises (and especially in that of 
general arrangements) it may not be clear w hat exactly is to be observed and carried out 
in the first place. Even specific compromises resulting from extensive negotiations 
however, remain intentions and it seems difficult to maintain that these are entirely ’self 
policing’. The enforcement of arrangements may be seen in connection with moral 
commitments or with other forces facilitating (or complicating) the implementation of 
arrangements. Here, characteristics of coalitions and their composite elements may come 
into play, as well as the general economic context in which these coalitions must operate. 
Such characteristics may thus be favourable or unfavourable conditions for the 
implementation of explicit and implicit compromises.
Enforcement of arrangements as a moral obligation
It is often said that agreements are morally binding, especially in countries where 
extensive and relatively specific coalition agreements are customary. Vernon Bogdanor 
has called coalition agreements the constitution of coalitions. According to this author, the 
agreement must be honoured in good faith if the coalition partners are to maintain 
confidence in each other (1983a: 271). Indeed, the notion of moral obligation may even 
be found in the text of coalition agreements. The first written coalition agreements in the 
Netherlands (1963 and 1965) opened with a paragraph on what was called ’the nature and
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extent of commitments’. The agreement issued in 1963 for instance stated that
Beside the ’formal’ commitment, there is also the moral commitment, which is in 
the nature of the agreement and exists between the government and the affiliated 
groups in parliament (Handelingen Tweede Kamer, Buitengewone Zitting, 1963:
122; author’s translation).
Though not explicitly mentioned in the text of agreements, this kind of commitment 
certainly was also felt in more recent coalitions. As one Dutch minister recalled in 1986:
We promised to honour the coalition agreement. The only thing we really 
discussed in the government’s constituent meeting was the value of the coalition 
agreement (...) We all felt that the agreement was not something to be forgotten so 
easily (...) Indeed, some ministers always had the document with them (Van Tijn 
«Si Van Weezel, 1986: 62-63; author’s translation).
The problem with the principle of pacta  sunt servanda is of course that it is difficult to 
assess its empirical relevance. Even if the quotations above refer directly to party 
spokespeople who were involved in the drafting and implementation of the coalition 
agreement, we can only assume that moral principles played and continue to play a part. 
We may be sceptical about this, given the different forces which were seen earlier to 
guide parties during government formation. Related to this, the moral factor in itself has 
little potential for explaining outcomes, as it cannot be related to fa ilu res  in any 
meaningful way. After all, if we find that arrangements are not observed, it does not help 
us further to say that in such cases parties have broken a moral code, or that the moral 
element has been absent altogether. For these reasons, it seems better to take the moral 
aspect of commitments into account when dealing with empirical cases, but further deal 
with it as one among other possible factors.
Favourable and unfavourable conditions for the enforcement of arrangements
What other factors play a part in the enforcement process? Here, we may distinguish 
between exogenous factors such as the economic situation and factors which regard, or 
are characteristics of, coalitions and their composite parts. To an extent, these factors are 
those that in the literature on coalition duration are called ’events’, occurring as a result 
of the environment, and ’attributes’ of coalitions (Browne, Frendreis & Gleiber, 1984, 
1988; Strom, 1984, 1988; Warwick, 1979, 1993). With respect to coalition attributes i.e. 
to endogenous factors, we may further distinguish between the levels of the coalition, the 
parties, the government, and that of individuals. At the level of coalitions, reciprocal
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control between parties may influence enforcement positively. This factor may be 
considered together with a structural characteristic of coalitions, which is the number of 
parties. A second factor at this level is the presence of mostly informal coalition  
committees. At party level, internal un ity , which may be defined as the absence of 
internal divisions on issues in relevant policy areas, may be a favourable condition. At the 
level of the government, the presence o f  negotiators may facilitate the elaboration and 
implementation of arrangements. Moreover, the prim e m inister  may or may not be a 
guardian of the coalition agreement. Finally, the nature of p ersona l relationships may 
play a pan. Let us see how these factors may relate to the enforcement of arrangements.
The num ber o f  coalition parties and  reciprocal control
A principle or mechanism which may guide parties in their behaviour with respect to the 
coalition agreement is reciprocal control. If the moral factor is generally considered to be 
a positive inducement, reciprocal control seems to be based on negative incentives. In this 
context, reciprocal control means that one party refrains from breaking an arrangement, 
one that contains few payoffs, to avoid reprisals from one or more of the other parties on 
other arrangements, which may contain more payoffs for the first party. Coalition parties 
thus may be seen as each other’s hostages on the central issues in the coalition agreement. 
An additional disincentive to breaking arrangements unilaterally may be that it is likely to 
have consequences for government formations in the future. A party breaking 
arrangements may lose its credibility. The possible gains of breaking arrangements on 
certain issues may be smaller than the costs of becoming a party that is generally 
considered unreliable.
Reciprocal control, however, may not be equally effective in all situations. It may 
be related to a basic structural characteristic of coalitions, which is the number of parties. 
The assumption is that as the number of coalition parties increases from two to three or 
more, reciprocal control becomes more difficult to maintain (becomes less effective).1 
This may be so, even if during government formation issues are not always collectively 
conflictual. With three or four parties and thus greater complexity in bargaining 
relationships, an individual party may be tempted to call into question a particular 
compromise when expecting that the other parties will not agree so easily to their 
response. Perhaps, one of the other parties even supports the idea of renegotiating the 
relevant arrangement. This may be the estimation of each individual party, and the result 
may be a gradual erosion of the coalition agreement as matters are on the cabinet agenda. 
This process may go on until for one party the price becomes too high, forcing a coalition 
crisis. *46
1 The difference between two party and multiparty coalitions does not always correspond to 
the distinction between minimal winning and surplus majority coalitions; this is also the case when 
only considering majority coalitions.
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In two party coalitions, reciprocal control may be stronger. In the ’face to face’ 
bargaining relationship of two parties, retaliation seems to be a more serious threat. Only 
an external party could support a coalition party when challenging particular 
arrangements. This however is something to which the second party may react by making 
similar manoeuvres and by threatening a coalition crisis. An appetite for forming 
legislative coalitions with external parties may be reduced as a result. The only situation 
in which all this may not apply is if one particular party has the least payoffs on all 
issues. In this case, the party may have little to lose and try to increase payoffs, even at 
considerable risk. Such situations, however, are not likely to occur often, as parties which 
can only panicipate in a new government by conceding on all relevant issues may prefer 
to stay outside the government.
Briefly, in situations in which payoffs from coalition bargaining are unequal at the 
level of individual arrangements but not at the aggregate level, the mechanism of 
reciprocal control may be more effective in two party coalitions. The likely result is that 
in these coalitions the rate of implementation of arrangements in coalition agreements is 
higher than in multiparty coalitions.
Coalition comm ittees as alternative policy making arenas
Perhaps less ’fixed’ but still a potentially relevant factor at the level of the coalition at 
large is the presence, or absence, of coalition committees. Coalition committees are the 
informal part of the ’coalition apparatus’, the decision making structures ’below* but more 
typically ’above’ the level of the cabinet.
Coalition committees contain spokespersons, and often prominent members, from 
different sections of the parties, and they may vary in size. The exact composition will 
vary from case to case, and depends, in part, on the internal power structures within 
parties. Coalition committees should be distinguished from formal and informal cabinet 
committees and parliamentary committees, which are confined to the sphere of the cabinet 
and parliament. The most well known examples (and also the most formalised coalition 
committees) in the comparative literature are the ’Kressbonner Kreis’ in Germany (1966- 
69) and the steering committee during the periods of the grand coalitions in Austria 
(Mackie & Hogwood, 1985: 12-14).
If coalition committees are present, they may form an alternative arena of policy 
making and facilitate the resolution of conflict. This alternative arena may resemble the 
government formation arena, even if it is confined to particular policy fields. The 
assumption is that the presence of a coalition committee (or perhaps of more than one 
committee if the distinction between policy fields is relevant) is a favourable condition to 
the elaboration and implementation of arrangements.
Negotiators as m inisters with relevant portfolios
At the level of the government, we may distinguish between ministers who have
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participated in policy bargaining and ministers without this background. If the ’founding 
fathers’ of the coalition participate in the government and take portfolios in the areas in 
which bargaining has taken place, arrangements may be elaborated and implemented more 
easily, at least within the government. This is often the case if these ministers form the 
top of the cabinet (the prime minister and one or more vice prime ministers, for 
example). Such ministers may feel that their efforts were not in vain.2
Ministers who have not been a negotiator may see the coalition agreement as a 
package of fa ils  accom plis , and even if they are willing to carry out arrangements, these 
arrangements may not always be entirely clear or perhaps contain elements of which only 
the negotiators are able to give a more or less uniform interpretation. To ensure that 
ministers understand and/or accept the arrangements in their field of jurisdiction will not 
be easy, especially if these ministers see their job as one involving a certain degree of 
autonomy. On the basis of these points, we may assume that if negotiators obtain 
portfolios that are relevant to the central fields in which bargaining has taken place, this 
facilitates the enforcement of arrangements. Conversely, if ’outsiders’ take the relevant 
portfolios, this may decrease the likelihood of implementation of arrangements.
The prim e m inister a s  a  guardian o f  the coalition  agreem ent
In most countries, the formateur becomes the new prime minister. He or she may also 
have participated in policy negotiations in an earlier stage of the formation process. The 
prime minister is thus often an insider; but even without such a personal involvement in 
government formation, the prime minister may have the special task of streamlining 
cabinet decision making, by setting the agenda, for example, and keeping the coalition 
together by arbitrating in conflicts. This implies the role of a guardian of the coalition 
agreement.
The extent to which the prime minister may have a positive or negative influence 
on the enforcement o f arrangements is likely to depend on competences, on his or her 
role perception, and on the perception of payoffs from arrangements. If the prime 
minister was involved in policy bargaining and is fairly satisfied with the results, he or 
she may be expected to guard and guide the implementation of arrangements. The prime 
minister may be an activ is t, which means that there is direct personal involvement in 
deciding on the substance of policies, or be an arbitrator, a more procedural role 
concerning conflict resolution mainly (Blondel & Müller-Rommel, 1993: 14-15). These 
two roles, however, are not necessarily confined to the situation in which a prime 
minister wants to act as a guardian of the coalition agreement; activism may also take the
2 In some countries, negotiators may become ministers and at the same time take, or retain, a 
seat in parliament. This may facilitate enforcement, though we should realise that the 
parliamentary groups are larger, and thus are likely to include more ’outsiders’, than the 
ministerial section of the parties.
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form of proposing policies which are in contradiction to the agreement, and arbitration 
may be more oriented towards restoring peace in general than to putting ministers on 
track with the agreement.
Thus, it is the combination of the extent of prime ministerial support for the 
coalition agreement with the general role perception of the prime minister that may 
facilitate or hinder the enforcement of arrangements. The two extremes are here a prime 
minister who fully identifies him or herself with the agreement and actively participates in 
the translation of intentions into formal decisions, and a prime minister who resists 
arrangements and for this reason reacts rather than acts when matters relating to the 
agreement are on the cabinet agenda.
The internal unity o f  coalition parties
The above factors concern different sections of parties (parliamentary groups, ministers, 
party prominents outside the formal decision making bodies), and it must be realised that 
parties are certainly not always internally homogenous with respect to policy questions. 
During government formation, internal unity and discipline may still be fairly strong 
because the party’s bargaining position is at stake (unless weakening this position is what 
one group or faction is aiming at). Preserving such intraparty unity, however, may 
become less easy after the negotiations are concluded and the government is ready to take 
or has taken office. In countries where the internal rules of parties require that the results 
of formation bargaining are formally approved, usually at a party congress or a special 
delegates conference, internal party divisions may become manifest before the formal 
installation of the government.3 More or less institutionalised groups or factions especially 
may be relevant in this respect, as these are often led by party prominents, which means 
that internal discipline will not be so easy to restore. The assumption here may be that 
manifest internal divisions within parties in particular fields hinder the implementation of 
arrangements in these fields, while the absence of such centrifugal forces may be a 
favourable condition for enforcement.
Personal relationships
A factor which largely speaks for itself is the nature of personal relationships between 
party prominents, both within and outside the sphere of the government. As the moral 
aspect,however, this factor is difficult to assess empirically. Only cases of personal 
clashes which have become public (and have been recorded) allow us to say something
3 Party votes may not always be indicative of divisions on policy, as party leaders often throw 
their weight into the discussions at congresses or conferences, and may make votes on 
programmatic achievements into a son of miniplebiscites. In such situations, delegates or, if 
approval is to be given by the parliamentary group, parliamentary representatives may vote for the 
negotiation results as an act of loyalty to the party leader, so that actual policy differences do not 
become manifest.
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about the impact of personal relationships on the implementation of arrangements, which 
in such cases is likely to be negative. Generally ’good’ relationships between ministers 
and/or other party representatives may form a favourable context for decision making, but 
finding clear indications of the relevance of this factor, for positive outcomes, will be 
extremely difficult. We can only speak of personal relationships in a meaningful way if 
there are clear indications that these play a part. As said, this is most likely to be the case 
in connection with failures.
The economic context
Finally, a factor which often is seen to encroach the plans of governments is the general 
economic situation, or more precisely a deterioration of the state of the national economy. 
This factor may be relevant first of all to the implementation of arrangements in the field 
of financial/budgetary and socio-economic policy. The point is that arrangements in these 
fields may come to be considered out of date by all parties or by part of the coalition. 
This may be so especially if intentions are specific. The assumption is therefore that 
economic difficulties form an unfavourable condition for the enforcement of arrangements 
on financial/budgetary and socio-economic issues.
Figure 3.2 summarises the different factors which are assumed to influence the 
enforcement of explicit and implicit compromises, the possible conditions for success and 
failure. Here, of course, we must realise that the processes we will be dealing with are 
highly complex, in which relationships between variables are often not unidirectional. In 
the present context, no single factor is expected to be a sufficient or necessary condition 
for success. Moreover, we should realise that the terms ’success’ and ’failure’ may mean 
different things to different parties. In the present context, ’success’ and ’failure’ concern 
the question whether or not arrangements are elaborated and implemented and/or prevent 
interpany conflicts re-emerging. (Whether implemented arrangements are always 
percieved as a success by all coalition parties and the arrangements remaining dead letters 
as failure by all is a different matter.)
Further, if we speak of implementation, this is confined to the political sphere. 
Thus, we may speak of success if, depending on the contents of the relative 
arrangements, arrangements (procedural or substantive) are carried out and (in the case o f  
substantive arrangements) decisions are approved in the formal decision making 
institutions. For some decisions, governmental approval will be sufficient, but for others 
there may be the additional, and constitutional, requirement of parliamentary approval. 
This is most evident when decisions are incorporated in legislation.
A final important point to make at this stage is that we should realise that 
governments often do not last their full constitutional term in office. In some countries, 
this is the exception rather than the rule, and in a previous chapter we saw that these 
countries are the ones in which, since the late 1960s, coalition agreements have a broad
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scope and are relatively specific. Obviously, the premature end of a government also 
means the end of the story of the implementation of the coalition agreement, at least 
during the term of tha t government. The point to appreciate however, is that the cases 
which we must call failures may not all have been caused directly by coalition conflict. If 
conflict on one particular issue triggers the fall of a government, it may be that other 
arrangements did not give rise to problems, or perhaps were not even dealt with at all. 
Such indirect cases o f failure, which are substantive failures but not necessarily failures in 
terms of new conflict breaking out, must be distinguished from direct failures.
Figure 3.2
Factors influencing the enforcement of arrangements
coalition
level
party
level
tw oparty  coalition 
coalition com m ittees (present) 
internal unity (high)
governm ent negotiators as ministers (present) 
level
prime ministerial support (high) 
micro level personal clashes (absent)
macro level economic developm ents (positive)
implementation
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In this chapter we have dealt with the functions of coalitions agreements and with their 
possible effects during the life of a government. The emerging variation in general 
features of coalition agreements was found to be reflected in the literature, as far as 
existing coalition research has something to say about this subject. Negotiations on 
coalition policy agreements are either depicted as a ritual dance around the formation 
table, its purpose being to do little else than to demonstrate to the outside world that the 
parties have agreed to join each other in a new government, or they are viewed as having 
a more substantive meaning, which carries beyond the installation of the government. 
Party spokespeople may pay attention to policy before taking office because they care 
about policy. Other incentives are programmatic demands from within the relevant parties 
and especially, mistrust between parties. In multipolar systems, such mistrust may be
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reinforced by the ’multidimensionality' of interparty competition.
On the basis of these views, three possible functions of coalition policy agreements 
were distinguished. Party leaders may draw up an agreement for largely symbolic 
purposes; they may formulate some common and general policy intentions merely as a 
confirmation of their cooperation in a new government coalition. Alternatively, party 
spokespersons may engage in policy negotiations to predefine coalition policy, especially 
on important and controversial issues. If parties are so inclined, the coalition agreement 
may be meant to constitute (part of) the coalitional agenda and, still in the perception of 
the parties, have a conflict prevention function.
If coalition agreements are indeed formulated for substantive purposes, the actual 
effects of these agreements may vary. When examining these possible effects, we began 
by limiting our focus to those matters on which the parties are likely to direct most of 
their attention during government formation, the controversial issues. The actual scope of 
policy bargaining may vary from country to country and also between coalitions, but 
generally it seems to be broadest in multipolar systems, where several policy dimensions 
are generally salient during government formation.
This focus on arrangements made on controversial issues brought us to the 
distinction between explicit and implicit compromises, with respect to which three 
hypotheses were formulated. The first hypothesis was that explicit compromises, as 
substantive and relatively specific arrangements, are implemented without giving rise to 
new conflict. The second hypothesis was that procedural arrangements prevent the 
recurrence of conflicts, but do not lead to substantive decisions. The third hypothesis was 
that the elaboration of implicit compromises containing general and nonprocedural 
statements involves conflict and leads to substantive outcomes less often than when 
explicit compromises have been made.
These hypothesised effects of arrangements cannot be seen in isolation from 
favourable or unfavourable conditions to the enforcement of these arrangements. After all, 
whether general or specific, compromises cannot be expected to be entirely a matter of 
moral commitments. Favourable or unfavourable conditions for implementation were seen 
to concern characteristics of coalitions and their composite parts, as well as external 
influences. Put somewhat differently, the relevant factors concerned characteristics of the 
actors and the arenas in which these actors interact. The broader economic environment 
was also considered to be a potentially relevant factor.
These factors are called 'conditions', and this must be understood in the sense that 
they may influence the choices and behaviour of those engaged with the implementation 
of the coalition agreement. The enforcement problem must be seen in the light of the 
continuous temptation for individual parties to try to increase payoffs from arrangements. 
When considering these factors in empirical cases of coalition governments, and thus 
dealing with actual outcomes, the different favourable and unfavourabe conditions may 
form elements of an explanation of successes and failures. These successes and failures
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and the factors which may account for both types of outcomes are the central points of 
attention in the case studies to which we now turn.
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4Introduction to the Case Studies
In the preceding chapters we have moved from government formation and policy 
bargaining in general to bargaining on policy conflicts in government formation and its 
possible effects. It is now time to consider the way in which the questions with respect to 
arrangements on policy conflicts may be investigated empirically. This chapter contains an 
introduction to such an empirical investigation, which will consist of case studies o f  
coalition governments in the Netherlands and Belgium. First, I deal briefly with the 
approach that will be followed in these case studies. Next, I discuss the central features of 
coalition governments and agreements in the Netherlands and Belgium to provide the 
relevant context from which the case studies will be selected. Finally, we go into the 
selection and organisation of the case studies.
FROM POLICY CONFLICTS TO ARRANGEMENTS, 
AND FROM ARRANGEMENTS TO OUTCOMES
Given that parties focus on conflictual issues during government formation, such 
conflictual issues form the point of departure for our empirical investigation of the 
functions and effects of coalition agreements. It is important to distinguish m anifest 
conflicts from matters which are a po ten tia l source of dispute without however being 
discussed during government formation. This second category of issues will not be 
considered. In the present context, manifest conflict means that parties conduct 
negotiations on issues during government formation. As argued in chapter three, policy 
conflicts may become manifest in and after election campaigns, but they may also be 
’inherited’ from the previous government, especially if that government broke down over 
internal policy disputes. If conflictual issues are the ’input’ to government formation, 
arrangements on these issues are one sort of ’output’. I only consider arrangements which 
are written down and as such form the key elements in coalition agreements.
The central question in this study regards the effects of these arrangements, which 
take the form of explicit or implicit compromises. This question will be dealt with by 
examining the three hypotheses on the effects of explicit and implicit compromises. Do
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explicit compromises really function to prevent conflict and do they predelineate or indeed 
predetermine coalition policy? Are implicit compromises counterproductive in terms of 
conflict prevention and thus only conceal conflicts which re-emerge after the government 
has taken office, except when these arrangements take the form of procedural agreements? 
Further, is there empirical evidence for the assumptions made about the impact of 
coalition characteristics on the implementation of arrangements and for the assumptions 
about the influence of personal relationships and the general economic situation? These 
questions require that we consider the formation and functioning of coalitions in some 
detail, that is, that we look at arrangements in their relevant context. It may be possible to 
do this by conducting a limited number of case studies.
GOVERNMENTS AND COALITION AGREEMENTS IN 
BELGIUM AND THE NETHERLANDS
The most relevant countries given the points of interest presented in the preceding 
chapters are those which can be classified as multipolar systems. In countries such as 
Belgium, Finland, the Netherlands, and to a somewhat less extent in Israel and Denmark, 
parties see government formation as a real chance to start or continue bargaining on 
policy, which is typically ’multidimensional’. Most competitive multiparty systems 
display a certain level of interparty mistrust, but the higher complexity of bargaining 
relationships and the frequent occurrence of government dissolutions due to internal policy 
disputes in multipolar systems are likely to raise this level of mistrust in this type of 
systems. Multipolar systems were also found in countries where coalition agreements are 
most comprehensive and specific, a codification of mistrust. Thus, especially with respect 
to the aforementioned countries, the question of the effects of arrangements on policy 
conflicts is an important one.
Given the kind of questions to be dealt with when conducting empirical studies of 
coalitions, it is not feasible to consider more than five cases (coalitions). Even if what is 
of interest is first of all the effects of arrangements on policy conflicts in general, it is 
necessary to consider, at least to an extent, the cases as ’wholes’. Indeed, outcomes of 
particular arrangements may be influenced by outcomes of other arrangements. It is also 
important to realise this when trying to explain the successes and failures of particular 
coalition governments.
This constraint still leaves the choice of taking one case from each of the countries 
mentioned, or taking a limited number of countries and doing more than one case study 
per country. In the present study, the second option seems to be the best alternative. 
Although the five countries just mentioned have the same type of bargaining systems,
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sufficient differences remain to make an empirical study involving all these countries 
rather complex. More practical constraints also make it difficult to conduct case studies of 
governments in four or five countries. These constraints regard the availability and 
accessibility of information, first of all coalition agreements, which as said are not always 
published.
By confining the study to two countries, it is possible to compare outcomes of 
different agreements between these countries, as well as within them. Though considering 
two cases per country does not mean that these are ’representative’ (neither in general nor 
in particular for these countries), they may provide us with more empirical evidence or 
counterevidence for our hypotheses for these two countries.
The two countries on which I focus are the Netherlands and Belgium. In a recent study of 
coalition policy in the Netherlands, it is asserted that ’(agreements) now have a 
fundamental influence on nearly all important decisions that a government must take’ 
(Tops & Dittrich, 1992: 282). Agreements also receive broad attention in the media. In 
both countries, there has been debate over the status of agreements and even on the 
supposed tension between the practice of formulating agreements and parliamentary 
democracy. In one view, coalition agreements have drastically reduced the role of 
parliament (and certainly that of the opposition) in important matters (Neels, 1975; 
Bovend’Eert, 1988). For these reasons, questions on the functions and effects of coalition 
agreements seem to be especially important for the Netherlands and Belgium. The period 
from which the case studies will be selected spans 1965 to 1990 (though in the 
Netherlands the first written coalition agreement was produced in 1963).
Continuity and change in coalition politics
Belgium and the Netherlands are usually placed in the same tradition of the politics of 
accommodation, though both systems have become more polarised and politicised since 
the late 1960s. The emergence of coalition agreements in the mid 1960s may be seen as a 
symptom of the tradition of accommodation but may also be seen in relation to changes in 
the political culture. This is related to the former through the practice of negotiations 
between party prominents in an informal setting, often in secret (the classical study here is 
Lijphart, 1968). Peterson et al. (1986) called this the ’institutionalized extrainstitutional 
arena*.
Polarisation and politicisation have become manifest in different ways. At the level 
o f the bargaining system, open hostilities between parties have increased. In the 
Netherlands, the Social Democrats (PvdA) and the Liberals (W D ) have mutually 
excluded each other since 1959, while in 1967 the PvdA began to pursue a strongly 
polarising ’majority strategy’ to form an alternative to governments including the
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Christian Democrats (CDA, until 1980 KVP), which have been in uninterrupted office 
since 1918. In Belgium, the traditional party ’families* split into separate French speaking 
and Dutch speaking parties in the period between 1968 and 1978, while in the same 
period, the regionalist parties (the Flemish People’s Union, VU, the Rassem blem ent 
Wallort, RW, and the Democratic Front of Francophones, FDF, with its basis in Brussels) 
gained seats and became relevant in the coalition game. In the 1980s, the regionalist 
parties declined, especially the French speaking ones, and coalition politics increasingly 
came to be dominated by the Dutch speaking CVP and the WalIonian Parti Socialiste  
(PS), the two largest parties.
One crucial development is that policy bargaining during government formation 
became truly ’multidimensional’ duriing the 1970s, which, in the present context, means 
that parties had to deal with issues in several major policy fields where they have strong, 
and often conflicting, preferences. In Belgium, language and community issues appear on 
the agenda, and since the economic recession in the mid 1970s, financial and economic 
policy has formed a second and important area of interparty conflict. Though other 
matters do not appear to be permanently salient, subjects relating to the ’old’ religious 
cleavage (school policy and ethical problems such as abortion) have frequently emerged 
on the government formation agenda (De Ridder & Fraga, 1986: 386-388).
Financial and economic issues have also formed an important subject of interparty 
negotiations in the Netherlands. Other relevant subjects in this country have been policy 
on real estate, the media, nuclear policy, and, as in Belgium, issues relating to the 
religious secular divide (Maas, 1982).
Issues form these policy areas have thus been central to the negotiations during the 
formation of coalitions, and they may have been sufficiently divisive to make other 
coalitions unfeasible, or at least to have contributed to their unfeasibility. In the following 
paragraphs 1 consider briefly the general patterns of government formation and the results 
in both countries.
The process and products of government formation
In most parliamentary democracies, the process of government formation is preceded by 
elections. This however, has not always been the case in the Netherland and Belgium. In 
both countries, flie g en d e  Wechsel (coalition changes without preceding elections) have 
occurred, and while in the Netherlands this practice was abandoned in 1967, in Belgium 
such changes still occurred in the 1980s. The most extreme case was the year 1980, when 
four different governments held office. Typically, in both countries, the ’responsiveness* 
of parliamentary elections is low; relevant parties that gain seats do not take office more 
often than those losing seats. In fact, the reverse is even true. Pre-electoral coalitions are 
relatively rare. It hardly needs to be emphasised that these points will add to the
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complexity of government formation.
G eneral characteristics o f  the government fo rm a tion  process
The government formation process consists o f three stages, with policy negotiations often, 
if not always, following after a particular party combination is formed. The distribution of 
portfolios is always the final stage (Peterson et al, 1983; Laver & Budge, 1992: 415). In 
both countries, however, the party configuration sometimes changes during the discussions 
on policy, so that there may be some overlap between the two stages. This corresponds 
with our earlier finding that in multipolar systems governments often ensue after three or 
more formation attempts.
Not surprisingly, government formation in the Netherlands and Belgium takes 
months rather than days. Negotiations on the coalition agreement usually take more time 
than the other stages during government formation. In Belgium, the average length of 
government formation between 1945 and 1965 was 1.5 month, involving 2.2 attempts on 
average, and in the Netherlands this was 2.5 months, with 4.3 attempts. In the period 
1965-1990 in Belgium, when coalition agreements were issued, government formation on 
average lasted 2.5 months, with 3.5 attempts made to form the government. In the 
Netherlands, the length of the formation period increased, to 3 months, but the average 
number of attempts decreased to 2.81.
The differences between the periods before and after 1965 suggest that there is a 
relationship between the length of government formation and the emergence of written 
coalition policy agreements, but no clear relationship between agreements and the number 
of formation attempts (an inverse relationship exists in the Netherlands). Here, it is 
important to recall the point made in chapter two, which was that a second, third or any 
additional formation attempt does not always imply failure and a new start and/or a 
change of parties. It may also be simply a next step in the formation process (and thus not 
a restart), made when preparatory activities led by an in form ateur are completed and a 
fo rm a te u r , usually the prime minister designate, is appointed. Even the work o f an 
inform ateur may be predefined. In Belgium this is typically done by a m ediateur  (De 
Meyer, 1983: 192).
We should not, however, give too much emphasis to the variable of government 
formation duration in relation to coalition agreements, as much of what seems to be a 
straightforward relationship may disappear if individual cases are considered. In Belgium 
and in the Netherlands, there have been government formations that were protracted but 
resulted in relatively brief coalition agreements, and conversely there have also been 
formations during which, in a relatively short time (less than two months), extensive 
documents were produced.
1 As in chapter two, these figures are based on Strom (1990), with additional information 
derived from Keesings Contemporary Archives.
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The making o f  coalition agreem ents
Initially, the drafting of coalition agreements was largely the priviledge of party leaders. 
In the early 1970s parliamentary area specialists or other party spokespersons increasingly 
became involved in the negotiations. In the Netherlands, those participating in policy 
bargaining are usually parliamentary leaders and members of the parliamentary groups.2 
In Belgium, the primary negotiators are the party presidents, accompanied by other party 
prominents or specialists from different sections of the parties. These may, but need not 
always be, parliamentary representatives. In early 1988, for instance, there were 15 top 
negotiators and 70 other party spokespersons in Belgium (De Ridder, 1989: 186-187).
The form of the negotiations is usually determined by the inform ateur(s) or 
fo rm a teuris), or in Belgium occasionally by a mediateur. If there are two or more 
formation attempts, there are often different ways of proceeding. Despite the fact that in 
the low countries government formation is fairly institutionalised, both the procedure and 
style of the (in)form ateur(s) varies considerably from one government formation to the 
next. Initially, conflictual issues were identified first and when the parties had reached 
agreement on the agenda, these issues were dealt with sequentially. As the agenda became 
more substantive, and the number of issues increased, matters were dealt with more 
synchronously. This was made possible by setting up work groups, each dealing with one 
particular part of the agenda. Government formation accounts mentioned such work 
groups for the first time in the Netherlands in 1971, and in Belgium in 1972. More 
recently, the use of working-groups in the Netherlands has been combined with what is 
called a ’concentric approach’ (1982, 1986, 1989). In this approach, party spokespersons 
begin by discussing general policy areas, and in a following round of talks, teams of 
negotiators focus on the really ’tough’ issues.
Whatever approach is followed, the most important matters are usually dealt with 
by the party leaders themselves. These matters may be kept for the final round of 
negotiations, but sometimes they are dealt with first. In such cases, the issues are felt to 
be so important that reaching agreement is a condition for the viability of the coalition, 
and for further negotiations on other subjects; especially when specific issues caused the 
fall of the previous coalition, the parties tend to deal with these issues first, irrespective of 
the party composition of the new coalition (see tables 4.1 and 4.2). For example, in 1965, 
public broadcasting triggered the fall of a government of Christian Democrats and 
Liberals in the Netherlands, and the issue was given priority during the discussions for 
forming a new government. These discussions were broken off and restarted after the *59
2 These party leaders are not always parliamentary leaders in the true sense: in the case of 
incumbent parties, it is usually the most prominent minister (for one party this is the prime 
minister) who leads the party in the elections, and subsequently becomes the first party 
spokesperson during government formation. In the Netherlands, outgoing ministers may have a 
seat in parliament for a maximum of three months.
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Social Democrats left and the Liberals again took a place at the negotiation table. In 
Belgium, continuation of discussions on controversial issues during government formation 
is also the rule rather than the exception.
After the conclusion of negotiations, coalition agreements are submitted to the 
parties for approval. In the Netherlands, within some parties (CDA and PvdA), 
agreements are first submitted to the parliamentary groups of the coalition parties before 
they are discussed and voted on at a special party congress or by some other competent 
body. Within the VVD and D66, the extraparliamentary party plays a more limited role. 
This is different for all the parties in Belgium, where the usual procedure is that the 
extraparliamentary parties organise a congress or special conference for the discussion, so 
far followed by approval (if often not unanimous) of the coalition agreement. The texts of 
the agreement are usually available to individual members of the parliamentary groups, 
but there is no formal submission to these groups. The parliamentary groups at large enter 
the picture only in the official investiture o f the new government in parliament, where 
they vote on the government declaration rather than on the coalition agreement.3
In both countries, the proportion of ministers who have been involved in the 
negotiations varies between one third and two thirds. In the Netherlands, parliamentary 
leaders often become a minister, though only in 1971 and 1981 was this the case within 
most parties that took office. Party presidents in Belgium, as the most prominent 
negotiators, have entered the government less often. In part this may be because in this 
country the office of party president is generally seen to be highly important.
G eneral fea tures o f  coalition  agreements
Different coalition agreements have been produced by different party combinations, and 
the tendency towards more extensive and specific documents seems to be unrelated to any 
particular type of coalition or combination o f parties. In 1963, the first coalition 
agreement in the Netherlands in the view of prime minister Marijnen "was not a complete 
government programme’ (Handelingen Tweede Kamer, 1963: 70), but this changed in the 
1970s. Actually the first joint programme which was also called a coalition agreement was 
issued in 1971. This was when work groups were introduced into the negotiations 
(Bovend’Eert, 1988). Since the early 1980s, coalition agreements have become longer and 
more detailed than government declarations, which are presented officially in parliament. 
The average length of agreements in the 1960s was some 3,500 words, which almost 
doubled to about 6,500 words in the 1970s and further increased to nearly 20,000 in the 
1980s. The general characteristics of agreements in the Netherlands are given in table 4 .1 .
In Belgium, the agreements have become even longer in the same period,
3 In the Netherlands, new governments present a policy declaration in parliament, but no vote 
of confidence exists. Governments are considered implicitly to have the confidence of parliament
as long as a vote of no confidence remains absent.
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especially since the 1970s, when agreements had already reached a length of 12,500 
words on average. As in the Netherlands, in the view of prime minister Harmel the first 
agreement (which was the ’appendix to the government declaration) was ’not intended to 
be an extensive and detailed inventory of problems at the level of individual ministries’ 
(Parlementaire Handel ingen Kamer, 29 July 1965). Another similarity with the Dutch case 
is that the term coalition agreement was first used in 1972. Since then, in Belgium, 
agreements have often been referred to as 'coalition bibles’. In the 1980s, the average 
length of agreements further increased to some 15,000 words, but this excludes the 
exceptionally long document issued in 1988, which contained nearly 40,000 words and 
was nicknamed ’the gospel according to John-Luke’, after inform ateur Jean-Luc Deheane. 
Some general features of agreements in Belgium are presented in table 4.2.
The length of agreements alone, however, tells only part of the story. Another part is that 
coalition agreements have come to include explicit and implicit compromises on very 
diverse matters next to paragraphs incorporated to satisfy an increasing army of 
government formation lobbyists and the general public. A former Dutch inform ateur once 
noted that in the 1980s the formation files contained several thousands of letters and 
requests from interest groups and individuals.
When confining ourselves to the real policy conflicts in the period between 1965 
and 1990, some 5 to 10 main issues can be found. Often, and especially with regard to 
language and community policy in Belgium and financial and socio-economic policy in 
both countries, these issues in mm contained different points of conflict which were all 
dealt with. For these debated points, separate explicit and implicit compromises were 
formulated. Typically, these compromises not only contained general statements, but often 
also mentioned dates and quantities. Sometimes, even complete blueprints for draft bills 
were incorporated, as for example in 1980 in Belgium with regard to régionalisation, and 
in the Netherlands in 1986 for new legislation on equality. Examples of subjects of 
interparty bargaining include the setting up of representative bodies for communities and 
regions (Belgium), the granting of facilities for linguistic minorities (Belgium), control of 
the budget deficit, cuts in departmental spending, stimulation of employment, the public 
and private (religious) school system, abortion, nuclear policy, expropriations policy 
(Netherlands), and the introduction of commercial television (Netherlands) (De Ridder & 
Fraga, 1986; Maas, 1982; Keesings Historisch Archief, 1982-1990).
The duration o f  coalition governments and  the ’durability * o f  coaliton agreements 
In Belgium, alternations in the composition of coalitions have been more frequent than in 
the Netherlands. This is closely related to the shorter average duration of coalitions in 
Belgium. In the period 1945-1965, the average duration of governments (including 
caretaker governments) was 17 months In Belgium, against 27 months in the Netherlands.
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In the period 1965-1990, it was 15 months in Belgium and 24 months in the Netherlands,4 
As we have seen, in both countries the government formation process came to take more 
time and more attempts, but this clearly did not result in a longer average life for the 
governments. More frequently than in the past, however, Dutch governments lasted a full 
constitutional four year term, or nearly that term, in office. In contrast, in Belgium only 
two governments held office for the constitutional period of four years, but even these 
broke down before parliamentary elections were held.
The difference in duration between the two countries holds for all types of 
coalition governments (Laver & Schofield, 1990: 152-155). This means that the relative 
brevity of government life in Belgium is not only a matter of coalition attributes such as 
size (minimal winning versus minority and surplus majority) and party political 
composition, but must also be due to particular characteristics of the bargaining system 
which destabilise the coalitions once in office. The main structural explanation, and 
certainly the most common one among students of Belgian politics, is the manifestation of 
the language and community conflict as an extremely important policy dimension since the 
1960s, which as we have seen also led to drastic changes in the Belgian party system. In 
the Netherlands, there is no one particular policy dimension next to socio-economic and 
financial policy that has had such a lasting impact on coalition politics.
In both countries, governments often end because of internal disputes over policy 
and they have this in common with other countries that are designated multipolar and that 
have relatively short lived governments. In Belgium breakdowns on policy have been 
relatively more frequent when considering the entire postwar period. In the Netherlands, 
it is since 1965 that internal policy conflicts have formed an important reason for the end 
of governments (Andeweg, 1988: 136). Such breakdowns have also occurred with ’the 
finish in sight’ (after all, long lasting governments too may eventually break down!). In 
both countries, parties may thus not only be, as Warwick (1993: 19) has put it, be 
’pulled* out of office by opportunities for alternative coalitions from which they recieve 
higher payoffs, but often be, first of all, ’pushed’ out of coalitions because of policy 
conflicts. It must be noted that in Belgium and the Netherlands these policy conflicts have 
not always concerned arrangements made during government formation.
The practice o f formulating coalition agreements has thus not led to a longer average life 
for governments. Often, conflicts which triggered the fall of the coalition were over issues 
dealt with in the coalition agreement. Thus on average, the ’durability’ of coalition 
agreements is limited.
While all this is true if we consider agreements and the life of governments in a 
general way, my specific point of interest is the impact o f coalition agreements during the
4 As before, these figures are based on Strom (1990) and additional information in Keesings 
Contemporary Archives.
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life of governments. If an arrangement gives rise to new conflict which brings down the 
government, this is one effect (and of course an important one), but other arrangements 
may have different effects prior to such dramatic developments. It is only possible to say 
something about the effects of coalition agreements if the effects of all relevant 
arrangements are considered. These are the empirical questions that I deal with in the case 
studies.
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SELECTION AND ORGANISATION OF THE CASE STUDIES
Selection of coalitions
An important point to keep in mind is that this study is not intended as a formal test of 
one particular theory. Rather, it is an investigation, having an explorative character, of the 
effects of policy arrangements and factors which possibly influence the enforcement of 
these arrangements. Focusing on two of the eight normal governments in the Netherlands 
in office between 1965 and 1990 and two of the fourteen governments in Belgium forms a 
problem if our intention is to generalise. At least to a certain degree, governments are 
’unique’. Conclusions formed with reference to the selected coalitions will primarily 
regard these coalitions and cannot be taken as the truth about other coalition agreements in 
Belgium and the Netherlands, let alone coalition systems in general.
Moreover, such conclusions concern the outcomes of arrangements on policies 
which were seen as controversial during government formation, and this entails a specific 
focus on certain actions, and inactions, of governments, and excludes other matters. It is 
necessary however to try and achieve a situation where the cases chosen are not so 
extreme as to tell a story that is unlikely to apply in other cases. One way in which this 
may be done is by taking coalitions which lasted long enough that the elaboration and 
implementation of arrangements could be started up, for the translation of detailed 
compromises into pieces of legislation and their approval in parliament is something which 
takes time.
The first criterion of choice is, for this reason, that one of the two governments in each 
country must have run its constitutional term in office. If such a government is absent or 
cannot be selected for other reasons, the government to be selected must has approached 
atleast the ’normal’ (average) duration of governments in the country in the period 1965- 
1990. As stasted, this was 24 months in the Netherlands and 15 months in Belgium. The 
next criterion of choice is that one government must be short lived, by each country’s own 
standards, as such governments have been common in both countries.
Since it is my intention to consider coalition agreements with arrangements in 
several distinct policy areas, reflecting ’multidimensional’ bargaining, another criterion of 
choice is that the cases include different policy dimensions, with coalition agreements 
reflecting substantive negotiations on different policy dimensions, which here may be 
operationalised as distinct fields of policy. Notwithstanding the points made about the 
symbolic value of parts of extensive agreements, comprehensive agreements also often 
contain many more or less substantive compromises on key issues in different policy 
fields. Conversely, as we saw in the previous section, short agreements also often have a 
relatively limited scope, which was the situation in the 1960s but also occurred in later
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years. In 1973, no real coalition agreement was reached in the Netherlands, while in 
Belgium negotiations had a limited scope 1981 and in 1985. This third criterion thus leads 
to a more limited set o f cases for each country.5
Finally, the fourth criterion is the number of parties that are assumed to be 
relevant for enforcement. In chapter three, a distinction has been made between two party 
and multiparty coalitions. There is however a problem in that all relevant coalitions in 
Belgium have contained more than two parties, so that this criterion can only be used in 
the Netherlands, where several two party coalitions emerged after the CDA was formed in
1980. This means that I will consider one two party and three multiparty coalitions. A 
point to appreciate in this respect is that the number of parties is assumed to relate to 
outcomes of arrangements, and not to the duration of governments. I do not anticipate 
such a link in the selection of cases.
Following these criteria, I have chosen the Leburton (1973-74) and the Tindemans 
V (1977-78) governments of Belgium, and the Van Agt II (1981-82) and the Lubbers I 
(1982-86) governments in the Netherlands. These cases cover the entire period, with the 
Dutch coalitions following after the coalitions in Belgium. The Leburton government was 
a ’grand coalition’ composed of the three traditional party families (Christian Democrats, 
Socialists and Liberals). Only the Socialists were still officially a unitary party. This 
government was relatively short lived, as it lasted 12 months, so less than the average for 
the relevant period in Belgium. The Tindemans V government also controlled more than a 
simple majority in parliament as next to the Christian Democrats and the Socialists it 
contained two regionalist parties, the Flemish People’s Union (VU) and the Democratic 
Front of Francophones (FDF) which had Brussels as its electoral base. This government 
remained in office for 16 months, which is ’normal’ for a Belgian coalition in the relevant 
period. In the Netherlands, the Van Agt II government contained three parties, the CDA, 
PvdA and D66, and was the most short lived government of those chosen, with a life of 
only 8 months (this even was a postwar record, disregarding caretaker governments). The 
Lubbers I government forms a contrast in this respect, as this two party coalition of 
Christian Democrats and Liberals completed its constitutional term in office. The general 
features of these four governments will be discussed further in the respective chapters.
s It must be noted that the two Belgian governments which were in office between 1981 and 
1987 are interesting cases precisely because the coalition agreements were mainly on 
fmancial/budgetary and economic policy. The fact that the parties were able to place and keep the 
language and community problem on a backbumer for six years is remarkable. They did so not 
through bargaining on the problem but by removing it entirely from the agenda even before 
actually conducting policy negotiations in which absolute priority was given to financial and 
economic policy. This fonned the raison d'être of the Catholic Liberal coalitions. This ’peace’ 
lasted until the summer of 1987, when the language issue again came at the surface and triggered 
the fall of the government a few months later. Though this falls outside the scope of this study in 
which we only deal with written arrangements, it is an interesting example of a relatively 
successful cease fire on the community problem in Belgium.
68
Figure 4.1 summarises the criteria and the four selected cases.
Organisation of the case studies
Each case study is built up in similar way» containing an introduction, a section on
at least
'norm al' duration Tindemans V
Belgium Nether
multiparty
short duration Leburton Van A gt II 
(1 9 7 3 -7 4 ) (1 9 8 1 -8 2 )
Figure 4.1
Selected cases from Belgium and the Netherlands 
11970-1990)
(1 9 7 7 -7 8 )
lands
Lubbers I 
(1 9 8 2 -8 6 )
tw oparty
conflicts and arrangements, one on the outcomes of arrangemnets, a section devoted to
factors which may explain success and failure, and a conclusion.
The units o f  analysis
The units of analysis in the case studies are coalition agreements, or at least the relevant 
parts. Individual arrangements in the agreement are the subunits of analysis. Coalitional 
and government structures form the relevant context, which will be taken into account in 
each of the case studies, most clearly through the assumptions about the impact of
it is important to be precise about what I see as separate conflicts and what as 
compromises. The adjective ’manifest* in relation to conflicts is very important, as only 
these conflicts will be dealt with. In both countries, there is usually sufficient information 
about government formation to know what have been the central issues and conflicts 
during government formation.
These key issues in turn may contain different points of conflict. The community 
problem for example may contain different elements, which may also be dealt with 
separately, in sequence or simultaneously during the negotiations. Another example is 
retrenchment policy. Conflict on the size of the budget deficit, the distribution of cutbacks 
between spending areas or ministries, and on the way to realise cuts within one particular
characteristics of coalitions and their composite parts on the enforcement of arrangements.
O perational defin itions
As the focus in this study is on manifest conflicts and explicit and implicit compromises,
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area may be treated as separate conflicts, and the compromises made on these matters may 
be considered to be separate explicit and/or implicit compromises. Generally, the two 
extremes seem to be a package of intentions in different areas which are together called a 
compromise, and one individual and more or less 'doable’ statement. In the present 
context, policy conflicts are defined at an intermediate level, and regard individual issues 
or clearly separable elements of issues on which explicit or implicit compromises are 
made. This is not to say that these elements, or even issues, have always been completely 
unrelated in bargaining, but rather that their outcomes may be examined separately 
without violating the empirical reality that we are investigating. The consequence of this is 
that the number of explicit and implicit compromises will often be larger than the number 
of issues that were central during government formation.
Another point to stress is that by implementation of arrangements I understand that 
these were carried out or observed (in the case of procedural arrangements) or translated 
into substantive policy decisions (in the case of explicit compromises or general implicit 
compromises). An additional condition is that these decisions were approved within the 
formal decision making institutions. The implementation of arrangements announcing 
legislation may for example mean that a draft bill is only formulated and submitted in 
parliament (if this is what the arrangement says), but it may also mean that a bill is 
submitted and approved in parliament during the government’s term in office.
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The Leburton Coalition 
(1973-1974)
A FIVE PARTY COALITION
Interparty negotiations on a new government were started in November 1972. After the fall 
of the previous Eyskens V government, a coalition of Christian Democrats and Socialists, no 
new parliamentary elections were called (these had been held one year before, in November
1971). The Eyskens IV government had broken down on institutional reform, this being 
highly salient politically after the revision of the constitution in December 1970. This revision 
made the forming of cultural groups and regions possible within Belgium. Contentious issues 
during the previous government included facilities for French speakers in the area of Fourons 
(Voeren) at the Flemish side of the language border, the competence of the cultural councils, 
representing the communities of French speakers and Dutch speakers, and the forming of 
separate regions on the basis of article 107  quater of the constitution, with the delimitation 
of the boundaries of Brussels, the third region next to Flanders and Wallonia, being most 
controversial. The task the Eyskens V government undertook to solve was the elaboration of 
this article 107  quater. This proved to be a political minefield that the government was unable 
to survive. This made the parties involved realise that the only way left to carry out 
institutional reform was to form a ’national’ coalition containing all three traditional party 
families. Such a coalition would have a two thirds majority1, this being required for particular 
decisions on régionalisation on the basis o f article 107quater. Additionally, a simple majority 
was needed within each of the two language groups in the Chamber of Representatives. The 
winning criterion thus was not a simple majority but a qualified majority.
This numerical requirement did not however imply automatically that the three party 
families burned all their disagreements. The last time Socialists and Liberals were in office 
together (and without the CVP and PSC) was between 1954 and 1958. Government formation 
started with the formulation of a basic document on institutional reform (over which the 
previous government had broken down), to be presented to all the parties. This was to lead
1 The CVP and PSC together had 67 seats, the PSB-BSP 61, and the PW-PLP 34, with the 
Chamber of Representatives counting 212 seats.
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to a ’proto-coalition' to facilitate the negotiations on policy.
The formation process
The staring point of the formation process was thus the negotiations on régionalisation and 
institutional reform, carried out under the presidency of an inform ateur from the CVP, the 
largest party which had been instructed to form a new government. The discussions on this 
programme first were between the two incumbent party families, the Christian Democrats 
(which split into two separate parties in 1968) and the Socialists (which still formed one 
unitary party, be it with two language sections). The informateur carefully followed his 
instruction to focus on institutional reform, which evoked the reaction from the Socialists that 
there should also be a substantive programme on socio-economic policy. The CVP and PSC 
in turn demanded attention for school policy, about which the party families had also 
divergent preferences.
After three weeks, the informateur was succeeded by a fo rm a teu r , the French speaking 
Socialist Edmond Leburton. The Liberals now joined the discussions, which were however 
delayed because conflict existed over the position of Leburton. The Flemish Catholics were 
not ready to accept that this monolingual French speaker would be the new prime minister. 
After the Socialists had put the CVP under heavy pressure to accept this candidate (’accept 
Leburton or there will be new elections’), the CVP gave way, and it was only after this 
conflict was settled that the discussions on policy could proceed. With respect to 
régionalisation and institutional reform, the key issues were the status o f the Voer area on 
the language border, the elaboration of article 107  quater, and the tasks of the cultural 
councils. Other controversial issues placed on the formation agenda were economic policy, 
school policy, contraception and abortion.
To streamline the discussions and enhance the chances of substantive agreement, 
special work groups were established. These working-groups dealt with particular fields of 
policy and consisted of party delegations in which the party presidents were accompanied by 
parliamentary specialists. The delegations of the CVP and PSC also contained the party 
secretaries. Negotiations within the work groups were far from easy. Yet, arrangements were 
formulated on all major issues. After the work groups had presented their results, several 
sessions involving all negotiators were held. The parliamentary groups were consulted, but 
their role was little more than rubberstamping the results. On 19 January 1973, the coalition 
agreement was signed by the party presidents.
When the coalition agreement was discussed within the parties, support appeared to 
be anything but unanimous. There were considerable differences between the parties. The 
most positive were the PSC (94 % yes votes) and the Flemish Liberals (93 %), whereas the 
CVP and the PLP approved the coalition agreement with a much narrower majority of 60 %
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(the party president o f the PLP even voted against). The congress of the PSB-BSP was least 
enthusiast about the agreement; only 57 % gave their support (support within the the Dutch 
speaking wing, the BSP, was only 53 %). Thus, within the two largest party families, 
considerable dissension about the coalition agreement existed.
The final stage in the formation process was the distribution of portfolios, which in 
Belgium is not only a matter of dealing with party preferences, in this case the preferences 
of five parties, but also with the regional background of candidates and especially with 
language. Since 1970, the Belgian constitution requires that cabinets are composed of an 
equal number of French speaking and Dutch speaking ministers, to give language parity . 
Given these different criteria, it is not surprising that a large government ensued, containing 
not less than 22 ministers and 14 state secretaries.2 On 26 January 1973, after two months 
of negotiations, the Leburton government was sworn in. A few days later, the government 
passed the parliamentary investiture.
General features of the coalition agreement
The coalition agreement had an unprecedented length of some 19,500 words and was the first 
to deal with all major fields of policy. The document contained 18 different sections, in 
which intentions on such different matters as school policy, subsidies to the steel industry, 
allowances for war victims, institutional reform, energy policy, and ’morality’ issues were 
incorporated. CVP president Wilfried Martens commented that ’the agreement contains 
ideological points which were not previously included in a coalition agreement’. His 
counterpart from the Flemish Liberals also noted that ’the ethical and moral issues are not 
just mentioned but are really matters on which the parties have committed themselves’ (De 
Standaard, 22 January 1973; Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers, 1973: 581).
The most sizable part of the document was on financial/budgetary and socio-economic 
policy. During government formation, however, this field was given less attention than other 
issues. More time was spent on issues within the field of language policy which had triggered 
the fall of the previous government. There was also a protocol which mentioned procedures 
for decision making on several important issues.
Despite the time spent on policy discussions and the more elaborate programme which 
ensued, party spokespersons said that it was the vagueness of the arrangements that persuaded 
their party conferences to accept the coalition agreement, adding that they were not too 
optimistic about the government’s chances of success (De Standaard, 27 and 29 December
1972). Before going into the outcomes, however, 1 will first look at what arrangements were
2 On 23 October 1973, a reshuffle was made, in which some of the 22 ministers were replaced 
and 8 portfolios of state secretaries were abolished. The jurisdictions of some of the remaining 
ministers and state secretaries were extended.
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made during the government formation process.
CONFLICTS, ARRANGEMENTS, AND POLICY MAKING
From policy conflicts to arrangements
The government formation agenda consisted of rather diverse subjects. To begin with, several 
problems were ’inherited’ from the previous government (De Ridder & Fraga, 1986: 386). 
That government had broken down on the issues of facilities for French speakers in the area 
of Voeren (Fourons) on the Flemish side of the language border, the competence of the 
cultural councils representing the communities of French speakers and Dutch speakers, and 
the forming of separate regions on the basis of article 107 qua ter  of the constitution. The 
delineation of the boundaries of Brussels, which was to become the country’s third region 
next to Flanders and Wallonia, was a source of intense conflict between the French speaking 
and Dutch speaking parties. These matters could not be ignored by a government formed to 
carry out institutional reforms. Another conflict in a different area was over the position of 
religious schools, which had divided the Catholics and Socialists sharply. Given that these 
party families were the first to conduct government formation talks, this issue could also not 
be ignored. Next, the issues of contraception and abortion were raised by the Liberals, who 
had high expectations from a coalition where the secular parties (Liberals and Socialists) 
would be in a majority position. Finally, the parties dealt with items of socio-economic 
policy, which received less attention than the other issues.
Language po licy
Disagreement existed on the granting of facilities, especially educational, to the French 
speaking minority in the area of the Voer. This small area in the north east of the country 
consisted of six predominantly Dutch speaking municipalities in Flanders, containing a French 
speaking minority. These municipalities belonged traditionally to the Wallonian province of 
Liège, but in 1962 they were transferred to Flanders. Many residents in the Voer area 
however remained oriented strongly on the province and the city of Liège, and they had 
always opposed the transfer violently. The reverse situation existed in an area in the west of 
the country. The problem of the two areas on the language border, with the greater emphasis 
on the Voer area, had been on the agenda of successive governments, and had also 
contributed to the downfall of some of these, including the previous Eyskens V government.
The three traditional party families made an explicit compromise on the issue. It 
consisted of the granting of limited educational facilities to the language minorities in both
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areas, and the conditions for setting up schools were also eased. The parties expected that by 
formulating this compromise they had really settled the dispute, so that they could concentrate 
further on régionalisation and community policy (Luykx, 1973: 591).
A second issue regarded language parity in the administration of Brussels. A law 
passed in 1963 stated that after 10 years (so by August 1973), language parity must exist at 
the top of the administrations of the 19 officially bilingual municipalities of Brussels. The 
provision was heavily contested by the French speaking parties from the beginning. Precisely 
because the parity principle benefited the Dutch speakers, the CVP and PVV referred to this 
law during government formation. In the coalition agreement, it was stated that the 
government would be competent to take special measures to ensure that language parity 
would indeed be realised by 1 September 1973. This was an explicit compromise with a zero 
sum character to the benefit of the Dutch speaking parties.
Régionalisation po licy
In the constitutional revision of 1970, article 107 quater stated that there would be three 
regions in Belgium: Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels. The two previous governments had 
foundered on the specification of the different articles of the constitution, which were often 
compromises. More specifically, the manifest points of conflict were the composition of 
representative bodies for the regions, the distribution of state subsidies between the regions, 
and the status of Brussels as the country's official third region. These points were dealt with 
extensively by the party delegations.
The regional bodies The CVP advocated ’cultural autonomy’ for Flanders, which in the view 
of this party meant that the Flemish community and region should be one entity. This 
required a revision of the constitution. The other parties, and especially the French speaking 
ones, preferred that there should be separate representative bodies for the regions and 
communities. In the negotiations the CVP conceded on this point, the result being a 
postponement of the matter until after the term of the government (De Standaard, 5 January
1973).
The other points of discussion concerned the ’fleshing out’ of several constitutional 
articles. First, the parties agreed on a procedural arrangement mentioning deadlines for the 
submission of a bill by the government. A special parliamentary committee would examine 
the different articles of the bill. This committee was to be set up shortly after the government 
took office, and was to report before 15 July 1973, six months after the government was 
installed. To ensure the existence of a ’link between parliament and the executive’, ministers 
were expected to participate in the committee’s meetings.3 If the committee did not come up
3 Unlike in the Netherlands, ministers in Belgium may (and often do) have a seat in 
parliament.
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with substantive changes or counter proposals, the government’s bill would be submitted 
officially in parliament. This was to be before 15 October 1973. In that case, the 
parliamentary groups of the coalition parties were supposed to be loyal when the bill was to
be voted on.
More substantive intentions were included in what was called the ’scheme for the 
implementation of article 107 quater of the constitution’. This scheme contained the key 
elements for the bill referred to above and was binding, unless the coalition parties decided 
unanimously to modify it. The distinction made between a transitional and a definitive 
arrangement on representative and executive bodies was important. In the transitional stage, 
the Regional councils of Flanders and Wallonia were to be composed of 60 members, to be 
recruited from the provincial councils on the basis of proportional representation. The 
Brussels regional council was to be composed temporarily of the provincial councillors 
residing in the Brussels agglomeration. These arrangements were to last until the first 
parliamentary elections after 1 January 1977, the elections following after the end of the 
constitutional term of the government. These points together constituted an explicit 
compromise.
In the ’definitive’ arrangement, which was to be enforced after elections in 1977, the 
regional councils would be composed of the provincial representatives with a reduction in the 
size of the provincial councils. The Brussels regional council was to adopt the functions of 
the existing Brussels agglomeration council. These points together also formed an explicit 
compromise. The commitments on Brussels entailed important concessions from the PSC, the 
party which was relatively strongly oriented to Brussels.
Next, another explicit compromise incorporated in the scheme for the implementation 
of article 107 qua ter  was that the executive bodies (regional governments) of Flanders and 
Wallonia would be composed of 9 members, who were to be elected from within the regional 
councils on the basis of the majority system. Each province within the region was to be 
represented in this executive body. The Brussels executive body was to contain 5 members, 
two elected by the Dutch language group in the Brussels regional council, two by the French 
language group, and the chairman elected by the regional council as a whole (as the majority 
was French speaking, this post was likely to be obtained by someone from this group, though 
this was not stated explicitly). The arrangements for the three executive bodies were intended 
to be permanent; no distinction between transitional and definitive arrangements was made. 
The compromise entailed important concessions from the PSC and PLP (the parties with 
relatively strong electoral interests in Brussels), as these parties had demanded a two thirds 
majorty of French speakers in the Brussels executive. It was still a compromise, because the 
Dutch speaking parties had demanded complete language parity (De Standaard, 10 and 15
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January 1973).4 The agreement also contained an ’escape clause’ to apply in case of political 
problems. This stated that if the forming of the Brussels regional council, and thus of the 
language groups which were to be its constituent parts, proved to be impossible for political 
reasons, the Brussels executive would be elected by the French speaking and Dutch speaking 
groups of the existing Brussels agglomeration council.
Regional finances  Another point of conflict was the distribution of the Financial resources 
provided by the central government to the three regions. The specific point of contention was 
the set of distribution criteria. If population size was taken as the main criterion, Flanders 
would take the biggest share, whereas the criterion of area size would benefit Wallonia, the 
larger region.
An explicit compromise was made, which stated that one third of the subsidies would 
be related to population size, one third to area size, and one third to the average revenues 
from income tax in the last three years. These criteria were to be included in the bill on 
régionalisation (see above). This set of criteria, however, would be used only after three 
years, when the regional bodies took on a more permanent character. For the short term an 
exlicit compromise was made, containing a distribution 50 percent for Flanders, 40 percent 
for Wallonia, and 10 percent for Brussels.
Brussels: problem s o f  territory The third and most complex problem was delineating the 
boundaries of Brussels as the third region. Here, the lines of conflict also cut across the three 
traditional party families, and more between French and Dutch speakers than between 
Flamingants and Wallonians. Brussels is a largely French speaking city located within the 
Flemish region. The expansion of Brussels therefore implied a greater influence of French 
speakers in Flanders. In the perception of the French speaking Brüsselers, there was a 
Flemish carcan  (iron collar) around the city which hindered its ’natural’ expansion beyond 
the 19 municipalities which thusfar constituted the capital city Brussels. To the Flemish, 
Brussels was an ’oil stain’ which should be contained.
A procedural arrangement was made in which the issue was referred to the special 
parliamentary committee (which as said was to report to the government before 15 July
1973). The parties also formulated an ’insurance’ arrangement, which stipulated that in the 
case that the parliamentary committee was unable to agree, the Brussels region would 
coincide with the existing boundaries o f the agglomeration (the capital city Brussels). This 
arrangement was a major concession from the PSC and PLP.
Next, the Dutch speaking parties advocated the splitting up of the single Brussels 
electoral district into two separate districts. This would strengthen the electoral basis o f their
4 Article 108 ter of the constitution said that in the executive of the Brussels agglomeration, 
language parity was required. The present compromise, however, was for the executive of the 
Brussels region. This may illustrate the complexity of the issue.
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(Dutch speaking) candidates, and conversely reduce the influence of the French speakers. 
This was the reason why the French speaking parties (in particular the PSC) rejected this 
suggestion. The parties agreed imlicitly on this point by writing down that such a division 
would be considered only as part of a general electoral reform. The government would 
submit a bill ’to simplify and harmonise the different electoral laws’.
School policy’
School policy has traditionally divided the Catholics and secular parties. In the 1950s, the 
granting of state subsidies to private religious schools was high on the political agenda. After 
two successive governments, one a CVP-PSC singleparty government and the next a coalition 
of Socialists and Liberals, had pursued rather different policies in this area, a national school 
pact was signed by the three traditional party families in 1958. The pact meant the official 
recognition of private next to public schools, including a system of subsidies for both types 
of schools. It became increasingly clear however that the school pact had not entirely 
resolved conflict, as the Catholics came to feel that private schools were deprived of 
sufficient financial resources and were also discriminated against in this respect. Because of 
this, the CVP-PSC again placed school policy on the agenda.
New negotiations were to lead to a revision of the school pact, to be prepared by a 
new national school p ac t committee. This committee was to be composed of ministers, 
members of the parliamentary groups, and the presidents of the traditional parties. As such, 
it was a committee which cut across the boundaries of the formal decision making bodies. 
The CVP and PSC demanded that the school pact of 1958 be ’stretched up’ as much as 
possible, while the Socialists especially, advocated minimal changes, certainly if these would 
involve higher spending on private schools.
The parties reached agreement on a number of arrangements which were mostly 
explicit compromises. First, it was agreed that wages of clearical teachers would be 
increased. The CVP had demanded the abolishment of all (perceived) discriminations against 
religious teachers compared with teachers at lay schools. The compromise stipulated that 
wages of religious teachers ’not living in a religious community’ would be increased to a 
level equal to the wages of officially licenced teachers. For those teaching at primary or 
nursery schools and living in a religious community, a term which was left unspecified in the 
text, wages were fixed at 60 percent, increasing to 70 percent of the normal wage after 15 
years of duty. With regard to secondary schools, the school pact provisions of 1958 remained 
valid, which meant that religious teachers would obtain the minimum wage, with an increase 
of 15 percent after 15 years.
Next, arrangements were made with regard to the size of different funds for public 
and private school construction and modernisation, A general plan on school construction was 
to be elaborated within six months by the government. The contents of this plan were left 
open. The size of a new general fund for school construction also was left undecided. Both
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arrangements were thus implicit compromises. More clear commitments were made on a fund 
benefiting public schools, which would consist of annual grants of 3 billion Bfrs., to be 
supplied by the national government over a period of ten years. A procedural arrangement 
on financial resources in the long run stated that the national school pact com m ittee was to 
make a ’technical study’ of the funds required in the long term, the results of which were to 
be presented before 30 June 1973. Further, a fund would be set up for annual credits for 
private schools. The CVP and PSC had demanded 5 billion per year, but the result of 
negotiations was an implicit compromise in which a largely symbolic amount of 180 million 
was mentioned, to ’underline that the parties have committed themselves’ to create a real 
fund for private schools. On this matter too, the school pact committee was to elaborate on 
the coalition agreement before 30 June 1973. Finally, there was an explicit compromise on 
the conditions for the repayment of loans contracted by private schools. Such loans were to 
be repaid within fourty years, and the interest percentage would be that of the capital market 
minus 1.25 percent.
Socio-economic policy
Though in the negotiations priority was given to régionalisation and school policy, manifest 
differences on socio-economic policy existed which were subsequently dealt with. First, the 
panies disagreed on pensions for the coming years. The Liberals demanded a general increase 
in pensions, but the Socialists opposed such an increase if other sources of incomes, 
especially social benefits, were not increased. An explicit compromise was made on the issue, 
which announced that after a transitional period of three years, pensions (of employees) 
would become 75 percent for families or 60 percent for singles of the average wage in the 
private sector. Pensions for the self employed would be increased each year, to begin in 
January 1973.
Another issue was state intervention in the economy, in particular in industry. In the 
previous government, state activities had expanded, something which the Liberals were 
against during government formation, demanding a more limited role of the central 
government in this field of policy. Once at the bargaining table, the PVV and PLP asked for 
clarification about rumours of a secreat agreement between the PSB and the Iranian state oil 
company (NIOC) on a large oil refinery project in the province of Liège, a troubled industrial 
area. The central question was whether or not the outgoing government had committed itself 
on this issue, something which in the eyes of the Liberals violated the conventional norm that 
controversial decisions are not taken when a government has caretaker status. The parties 
agreed implicitly on the issue. In the coalition agreement, it was stated that the government 
would be ’selective’ in initiating or stimulating economic activities, and would focus on those 
specific industries where initiatives were not being taken by the private sector. Such 
industries were to become public organisations. With regard to the oil refinery project, the 
agreement said that the government would await the results o f the study.
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Ethical questions: contraception and  abortion
Two final controversial matters were the ’morality’ issues of contraception and abortion. Both 
issues were placed on the agenda by the Liberals, with support from the Socialists. With 
regard to contraception, the negotiators of the CVP and PSC were prepared to concede. An 
explicit compromise was made, which announced that the government would issue legislation 
to provide free contraceptives. This legislation was to be approved before the end of the 
government’s term in office.
On abortion, however, agreement appeared more difficult to reach. Abortion was 
prohibited, with the two Catholic parties preferring to maintain the status quo. The Socialists 
and Liberals on the other hand argued strongly in favour of a more liberal policy on abortion, 
to take it out of the sphere of criminal law. The parties only agreed implicitly on the issue. 
Existing legislation on abortion would be revised before the end of the government, but the 
way in which this was to be done was left open.
Table 5.1 summarises the types of arrangements made on issues in the relevant fields of 
policy.
Table 5.1
Arrangements in Leburton coalition agreement
type of arrangement
explicit procedural general
policy field
language policy 2 - - 2
régionalisation policy 7 3 1 11
socio-economic policy 1 - 1 2
school policy 3 1 3 7
ethical questions 1 - 1 2
(total = 24) 14 4 6 24
Arrangem ents and  policy making
Given the hypotheses, the presence of explicit compromises in the areas of school policy, 
language and régionalisation policy should lead to more successes in these areas than in other 
areas, especially in terms of conflict prevention. Was this the actual outcome? In this section 
I consider the outcomes in terms of conflict and implementation.
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Socio-economic po licy
The explicit compromise on pensions was implemented without problems. A bill containing 
an increase in pensions of employees by 8 percent and, for subsequent years, the linkage of 
pensions to the economic trend was submitted to parliament and approved in March 1973 
(Luykx, 1973: 596). A bill on pensions for the self employed was also submitted in 
parliament and approved without delay. The first responsible minister (a Liberal) declared 
enthusiastically that he was ’proud to have realised the relevant intentions in the coalition 
agreement’ (De Standaard, 24/25 March and 16/17 June 1973).
A 'term inal ’ event: the IBRAMCO project With regard to the issue of state intervention in 
industry, the parties had formulated only general statements. On the specific issue o f the oil 
refinery project near Liège it was stated that no decisions would be taken until the results of 
a study on the profitability of the refinery were known. The Liberals were even assured that 
no further steps had been taken. Shortly after the government had taken office, it became 
clear that, during the term of the previous government, the PSB-BSP and the National Iranian 
Oil Company (NIOC) had started preparations for building an oil refinery in the province of 
Liège (Wallonia), under the name IBRAMCO (Iranian Belgian Refining and Marketing 
Company). Within this organisation, the PSB-BSP controlled the Belgian seats on the board 
of directors.
The relevant paragraph in the coalition agreement was discussed at length within the 
government as well as in parliament. In May 1973, a motion was adopted in the Chamber 
of Representatives, saying that the government was committed to the agreement and was to 
communicate its precise intentions before 12 June 1973 (KHA, 1973: 321-322). On that date, 
the government did indeed make a statement on the issue, but it refused to go into the most 
delicate points. In October, prime minister Leburton emphasised that no decision would be 
taken before the study on the project was completed (KHA, 1973: 704).
At the same time, the conseqences of the first oil crisis began to be felt in Belgium. 
In the view of the Socialists, the decline of heavy industry in Wallonia was an argument for 
the building of the refinery. The problem however was that Belgium was not the only 
possible partner in the project, and this was a reason for the NIOC to set a deadline of 15 
January 1974. The CVP and PVV and PLP maintained their reservations against the project. 
On 16 January, one day after the deadline had passed, a compromise was reached within the 
cabinet. The NIOC however, withdrew from the project, and when this withdrawal was 
confirmed, the ministers of the PSB-BSP resigned. On 19 January 1974, the prime minister 
tendered the resignation of the whole government (KHA, 1974: 56-57).
School Policy
On 28 February 1973, a protocol committing the parties to revise the school pact was signed 
by the national school pact committee. The committee was divided into four work groups
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which were to report on 20 June 1973 (De Standaard, 1 and 27 March, 10 May 1973; Luykx, 
1973: 601).
Religious com m unities In June, conflict broke out within the government on the interpretation 
of the phrase ’religious teachers living in a community’, which was left unspecified in the 
coalition agreement. In the view of the Socialists, a religious community consisted of 3 
members, but the CVP and PSC argued that the minimum was 9 members, which would 
mean that fewer teachers would fall into the special wage regime for religious teachers, and 
receive only a certain percentage of the wages of lay teachers in public schools. Agreement 
could only be re-established after painstaking negotiations. The government fixed the size of 
religious communities at 6 members; the difference was thus split (De Standaard, 7-27 June 
1973).
School funds: who gets what, how  and when?  Conflict also resurfaced when the different 
implicit compromises on school funds were elaborated. According to the PVV, the state 
school fund (3 billion Bfrs. annually) was to be used only for the modernisation of existing 
state schools. For the construction of new  state schools, the general fund for school 
construction of both public and private schools was to be used. This interpretation meant that 
claims on the general fund would increase. CVP president Martens rejected this 
interpretation, as in his view the consequence was that this would leave less financial means 
for the construction and modernisation of religious schools.
Preferences also differed on the size of the other funds. Substantive compromises were 
reached after extensive discussions in the school pact committee as well as within the 
government. First, the fund for private schools was fixed at 3 billion a year. The conditions 
for credit remained those mentioned in the coalition agreement. This fund and the general 
fund for school construction would be placed under the supervision of a special ministerial 
committee presided over by vice prime minister Leo Tindemans (CVP) until the end o f 1973.
Meanwhile, the school pact committee was to carry on which the elaboration of a 
general plan, on which the parties had only committed themselves to conclude discussions 
before July 1973. This was postponed until 1 January 1974, and if on that date the plan was 
still not completed, all funds would be blocked until presentation of the plan (De Standaard, 
27 June 1973; Luykx, 1973: 602-603).
These points were all elements of a new bill, which was approved in parliament in 
early July 1973. Only the general school plan continued to divide the parties, which led to 
another postponement until 31 March 1974 (De Standaard, 12 December 1973). Discussions 
on the plan were suspended when the government fell in January 1974. Still, in this field, the 
outcomes of the implementation process may be called a success, be it more in terms of 
implementation than in terms of conflict prevention. 82
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Language po licy
The expectation that the compromise on the Voer and Comines enclaves was a workable one 
turned out to be largely correct. In the spring of 1973, the points mentioned in the 
compromise were implemented, and in early May, a new governmental decree took effect 
(KHA, 1973: 571).
In April 1973, the government submitted a bill to parliament containing special 
competences for the minister of Internal Affairs to accomplish language parity in each of the 
19 officially bilingual municipalities of Brussels (in most of these municipalities, the vast 
majority of the population was French speaking). Though the PSC and PLP had great 
difficulties with this bill, as with any policy based on the parity principle applied in Brussels, 
the bill was nonetheless approved in parliament in June, and parity was accomplished as 
agreed over in the following months (De Standaard, 25 and 28/29 April 1973; 1973: 605- 
606). Thus, at least on these issues, the coalition agreement was instrumental to policy 
making and the prevention of conflict.
Régionalisation p o licy
What was the outcome of arrangements in the area of régionalisation, given that the 
government lasted only one year? A point that needs to be realised here is that what we 
consider in retrospective was not all foreseen by the parties themselves. Even if the 
premature end of the coalition is likely to have been related to developments in other areas 
(in that this may have decreased the willingness of parties to accept concessions or losses on 
issues, up to a certain critical point), the end of the coalition is likely to have been anticipated 
only shortly before the government fell. Another point to remember is that several intentions 
had a shorter time horizon, such as the procedural arrangements mentioning deadlines (July, 
September, and October 1973).
The regional bod ies  The coalition agreement contained a commitment to refrain from 
initiating a constitutional revision. This element in the agreement was observed, as no 
proposals in this direction were made. Another procedural arrangement which was carried 
out was the setting up of a special parliamentary committee on régionalisation, in which 
members of the parliamentary groups took a seat, including the presidents of all coalition 
parties except the CVP and the PSC. Spokespersons from the Democratic Front of 
Francophones (FDF) and the Walloon Rally (RW) were also invited to be present, without 
however participating actively in the discussions.
The committee had four months to advise the government on what in the coalition 
agreement was called the ’scheme for the implementation of article 107  q u a ie f  as 15 July 
1973 was the deadline mentioned in the agreement. Despite the frequent meetings of the 
committee, no agreement could be reached on an alternative for the scheme mentioned in the 
coalition agreement (Luykx, 1978: 650).
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Thus, the government now had to translate the points in the regionalisation scheme 
into legislation. This, o f course, implied that there was to be agreement within the coalition 
also on the points that were left unspecified during government formation. In July, conflict 
broke out on the composition of the regional councils during what was called the definitive 
stage of regionalisation (after the parliamentary elections in 1977). The consequence of this 
conflict was that little progress was made in the drafting of the legislation, which according 
to the coalition agreement was to be ready by mid October 1973. In October and November, 
several proposals were made and discussed, but differences between the parties were not 
removed (Luykx, 1978: 650; KHA, 1973: 703-704).
Discussions on the regional executive bodies also involved conflict, despite the explicit 
compromises which had been made on them. The composition of the Brussels executive 
especially appeared to divide the parties. This was a direct consequence of the earlier conflict 
on the Brussels regional council (De Standaard, 12 December 1973; Luykx, 1978: 650).
At the end o f the year, the government gave 15 January 1974 as the new date for the 
submission of the bill on regionalisation (the coalition agreement mentioned October 1973). 
Due to lasting conflict, another postponement was inevitable, and the fall of the government 
meant that the issue had to be shelved until the next government formation.
Regional finances  A very similar story can be told with respect to the issue of regional 
finances. In October 1973, prime minister Leburton was still declaring that the government 
would observe the coalition agreement on the point of the distribution ratio for financial 
resources provided by the central government (KHA, 1973: 704). When the arrangement was 
finally to be turned into legislation, however, the PSB and the PSC and PLP began to 
question the weighing of criteria mentioned in the compromise. Things were still undecided 
when the government fell.
The boundaries o f  Brussels The Brussels problem not only comprised political institutions 
but also, and indeed first of all, the delineating of the boundaries of the Brussels region. 
These were new problems, but there also was the problem of language, which had become 
salient in the 1960s. The parties had made several arrangements during government formation 
on these matters, mostly of the implicit type.
The special parliamentary committee working on regionalisation was unable to find 
a solution to the geographical aspects of the Brussels problem. This meant that the status quo 
(Brussels boundaries coinciding with the agglomeration of 19 municipalities) would be 
maintained. The PSC and PLP however, were no longer prepared to support this 
arrangement, and the consequence was a deadlock within the government which still existed 
when the government fell. On the issue o f the Brussels electoral district, agreement was also 
to be (re-) established by the parties engaging in the formation o f a new government.
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Contraception a n d  abortion
With regard to contraception, the coalition agreement stated that the government would draft 
legislation containing measures to liberalise the supply of contraceptives. In June 1973, such 
a bill was drafted by the cabinet committee on ethical problems. The bill was approved in 
parliament just before the summer break (De Standaard, 29 June and 6 July). Thus, the 
explicit compromise in the coalition agreement on this issue was carried out without giving 
rise to new political problems.
Things were different with respect to abortion, which was placed on the agenda but 
was further left undecided. In February 1973, the presidents of the CVP and PSC declared 
that their parties would accept abortion only on strictly defined medical grounds (De 
Standaard, 1 March 1973). Somewhat later, the Liberal minister of Justice completed a first 
draft, in which abortion was allowed under several strict conditions. This first draft was 
discussed in the ministerial committee for ethical problems, and would be submitted in 
parliament only if all coalition parties really agreed to do so (De Standaard, 23/24 June and 
5 July 1973). When the draft was discussed, the Socialists objected that the bill contained too 
many restrictions, and decided to introduce a private member’s bill. This bill however 
recieved little support from the Liberals (De Standaard, 8, 14 and 19 November 1973). The 
result was that neither the government’s draft nor the private member’s bill were dealt with 
in parliament before the end of the government.
SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF THE LEBURTON COALITION
Explicit and implicit compromises were related to the hypotheses on the effects or outcomes 
of these types of arrangements. The first hypothesis was that explicit compromises, 
arrangements containing relatively clear cut and ’doable’ intentions, streamline decision 
making within the coalition. The elaboration of general implicit compromises, however, was 
expected to be attented by conflict between the parties. Only procedural arrangements were 
expected to reduce conflict potential effectively on the relevant isues within the coalition. 
Table 5.2 presents the outcomes of the three types of arrangements, and also shows in which 
fields these outcomes occurred.
Table 5.2
Outcomes of arrangements in Leburton coalition agreement
Type of arrangement
explicit procedural implicit-general
Outcome
elaborated/implemented
(no conflict)
not elaborated/implemented
4 (Ian,so-ec,eth) 2 (reg) (6)
(no conflict)
elaborated/implemented
2 (reg) (2)
(conflict)
not elaborated/implemented
3 (scho) 1 (scho) 2 (scho) (6)
(conflict) 5 (reg) 1 (reg) 4 (all) (10)
(14) (4) (6) (24)
Ian = language policy scho = school policy eth = ethical issues
reg = régionalisation policy so-ec = socio-economic policy
The streamlining effect of explicit compromises
Logically there were four possible outcomes o f arrangements. One possible outcome was that 
explicit compromises were carried out without conflict. This happened with the two 
arrangements on language, the intention to accomplish language parity in the higher echelons 
of the Brussels administration and the compromise on facilities for language minorities on the 
language border, with the arrangement on pensions and with the intention to liberalise 
legislation on contraception.
Next, there were explicit compromises which did not provide a source of new conflict 
within the coalition but were not implemented. This was the outcome of two arrangements 
on régionalisation, the arrangement on the regional councils in the transitional stage and that 
on the regional executives of Flanders and Wallonia, which were turned into texts for the bill 
on régionalisation which could not be submitted due to the premature end of the government.
Third, three explicit compromises gave rise to inter-party conflict but nonetheless 
were implemented, an outcome which was typical of arrangements on school policy. The 
result was the submission of a bill on school policy and its subsequent approval in parliament, 
just before the summer break at the end o f June 1973.
This forms a contrast to the outcomes o f most arrangements on régionalisation, which 
appeard to generate rather than prevent conflict and were also not implemented. Especially 
with regard to Brussels, the coalition parties were in a permanent state of conflict, in which
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rthe coalition agreement was used by the parties for their own purposes.
These findings provide only limited evidence for the hypothesis that explicit 
compromises are implemented peacefully. This was the outcome of only four of the fourteen 
explicit compromises. When considering the policy and conflict element separately» this type 
of arrangements appears to be more functional in terms of policy predefinition than in terms 
of conflict prevention.
The freezing effect of procedural arrangements
Procedural arrangements were most important in the area of régionalisation. One arrangement 
was meant to remove a point of controversy» a constitutional revision, from the agenda, 
which was also the actual outcome. Another procedural arrangement was more general and 
regarded the way in which régionalisation policy would be dealt with by the coalition parties 
(a special parliamentary committee would be formed to consider different aspects of 
régionalisation). Despite this arrangement being carried out immediately after the government 
took office, the parliamentary committee itself appeared to be unable to establish agreement 
on matters which were referred to it, such as delineating the boundaries of Brussels. Finally, 
with respect to school policy, a procedural arrangement in which certain matters were 
delegated to the school pact committee was carried out as it had been written down. In short, 
procedural arrangements made by the parties in the Leburton coalition were mostly 
implemented, though they actually functioned to prevent conflict in only two of the four 
cases.
The boomerang effect of general implicit compromises
The outcomes of implicit compromises of the general type were either implementation 
preceeded by conflict, or conflict as the single outcome. This means that before anything 
else, general implicit compromises led to new conflict, which confirms the hypothesis. Two 
arrangements on school policy, relating to the general fund for school construction and the 
fund for private schools, were elaborated successfully by the government and the national 
school pact committee and turned into legislation in a relatively short time. In fact, the only 
important ’promise’ on school policy that was not kept was the elaboration of a general 
school plan, which actually was scheduled for mid July 1973 and had to be deferred when 
the government fell in January 1974, and due to the fall o f the government, the revision of 
the school pact also had to be left to the next government.
Conflict as the single outcome was also more typical of general implicit compromises, 
and emerged in different fields of policy. As well as the arrangement on the general school
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plan mentioned just above, no decisions were taken on the Brussels electoral district and on 
abortion, on which two bills were proposed, both uncompleted and supported by only part 
of the coalition. Finally, conflict over state intervention in industry, which concentrated on 
the IBRAMCO issue, led to the fall of the government. These outcomes are conform the 
expectation that general compromises are elaborated and implemented relatively less often 
than explicit compromises (1:3 against 1:2).
Why did the Socialists withdraw from the government? Here, it is important to 
consider the relative gains and losses the coalition parties made during the process of policy 
making. The PSB-BSP made important concessions on different matters (school policy and 
language policy), and this may have meant that the costs of remaining in office were expected 
to exceed the benefits, especially in the view of the powerful Wallonian Labour Federation. 
Another reason why the party withdrew from the government may have been that the 
regionalists, led by party president André Cools, feared electoral punishment in the future 
for implementing a regionalisation programme that did not enjoy the full support of the voters 
in Wallonia (remember that the coalition agreement was approved by a narrow majority 
within this party). The longer the government lasted, the more the voters were expected to 
be driven into the arms of the more radical Rassem blem ent W allon  (Rudd & Pijnenburg, 
1988: 56-57). This may also explain why, after the resignation of the government, the PSB- 
BSP was the only traditional party pressing for elections.
Table 5.3 summarises the outcomes of all arrangements in terms of conflict and 
implementation. The relevant arrangements in the coalition agreement were clearly more 
functional in terms of policy delineation than in terms of conflict prevention (1:2, against 
1:3). Policy delineation has however certainly not always been policy ’predetermination’. 
Sometimes, an issue was only placed on the coalition agenda, and substantive policy decisions 
followed only after further negotiations had taken place within the government or elsewhere. 
Other arrangements contained no substantive intentions but rather procedures for dealing with 
issues, or for not dealing with issues during the term of the government.
Table 5.3
Success and failure of the Leburton coalition
implementation 
+ —
conflict
+
6 2 
6 10
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FACTORS EXPLAINING SUCCESS AND FAILURE
How can we explain the successes and failures of the Leburton coalition? A number of 
favourable and unfavourable conditions for success was discussed in chapter 4. These 
conditions concerned the coalition and its component parts as well as the broader economic 
environment. The underlying assumption was that parties seldom receive equal payoffs from 
individual arrangements and that arrangements are not self enforcing. Next to the moral 
principle that agreements must be honoured, enforcement was also seen in terms of mutual 
control, which may be weak or strong. The different factors were seen to strengthen or 
weaken these enforcement mechanisms and facilitate the implementation of arrangements.
An obvious but no less important point is that many arrangements in the Leburton 
coalition agreement were not implemented because the government fell long before the end 
of its constitutional term. Here, it is important to distinguish arrangements where the content 
had already been changed before the end of the government from arrangements which had 
not been changed or were not yet fully elaborated (or perhaps had not even been dealt with). 
Though the government fell after conflict on an issue which was dealt with in the coalition 
agreement, the relationship between the fall of the government and unimplemented 
arrangements in the second category is less direct, despite the fact the most of these 
arrangements had also given rise to conflict. As the aim of this section is to find which 
factors may help to explain outcomes, 1 will exclude the arrangements which, in this sense, 
are likely to have had ’ambiguous’ outcomes (two explicit and three general implicit 
compromises, leaving 19 arrangements). Of the remaining 19 arrangements, 12 were 
elaborated and implemented successfully.
Table 5.4 shows whether or not each of the factors is associated with outcomes in the way 
that was assumed (predominant outcomes in each of the fields are given). A ’strong’ 
association means that variables were associated in more than two thirds of the cases, while 
a 'weak' association stands for a relationship in less than half of the cases. These criteria of 
course are arbitrary, and it must also be realised that we are dealing with a small number of 
cases. The purpose of table 5.4 is just to indicate the associated variables.
There were two arrangements on language policy and two on socio-economic policy, 
one of which triggered the fall of the government. Since this was a dramatic case of failure, 
I consider this to be the predominant outcome in this field. The arrangements on language 
policy both were implemented. With regard to ethical questions, there were two 
arrangements, of which one, on contraceptives, was implemented successfully, and the one 
on abortion has been excluded from this part of the investigation.
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Table 5.4
Association between factors and outcomes in the Leburton coalition5
policy field
language
factor
régionalisation school socio­
economic
ethical
coalition size 0 0 0 o 0
internal party unity 0 - + o +
negotiators in government o - + + o +
prime ministerial support 0 -- 0 o +
coalition committees 0 - + + - -
personal relationships n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
economic situation n.a. n.a. n.a. - n.a.
key to symbols:
+ + or + direct association with success 
~ or - direct association with failure 
o no direct association found
n.a. not assessed (no clear indication of presence or absence of factor)
The information in table 5.4 indicates that internal unity or disunity within parties and the 
presence or absence of negotiators in the government are associated relatively strongly with 
the outcome. Other factors are likely to have played a part, if  at all, on a more a d  hoc  basis, 
though this need not mean that the factors were of only marginal importance. Let us consider 
each of the factors somewhat more closely.
Coalition size and reciprocal control
The assumption was that multiparty coalitions have more problems with enforcement than two 
party coalitions because there are fewer possibilities for reciprocal control. The impact of the 
number of parties however was not seen to be so strong that outcomes are total failure or 
total success. Instead, either success or failure was assumed to preva il.
In the case of the Leburton multiparty coalition, failure was not predominant, at least 
not if we use the frequency of types o f outcomes as an indicator. 12 of the 19 arrangements 
were implemented. Does this mean that reciprocal control was strong, notwithstanding the 
presence of more than two parties? It is important to realise that the coalition was really 
successful only in the area of school policy. In other areas arrangements were implemented 
less often, or hardly at all. Perceived thus, reciprocal control seems to have played only a
5 See the appendix for more detailed findings on the Leburton coalition.
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limited pan as an enforcement mechanism, or perhaps more precisely: only up to a certain 
point in time.
Here, we may recall my basic assumption that parties mostly do not obtain equal 
payoffs from arrangements, though a certain balance will exist at the level of the coalition 
agreement as a whole. This situation was seen to form a disincentive to cooperate during the 
implementation of arrangements. In the case of the Leburton coalition, all parties expected 
payoffs from the set of arrangements in the government’s first half year. The approval of 
legislation on school policy just before the summer recess in 1973, however, seems to have 
been a critical point. After this, the CVP became increasingly reluctant to cooperate on 
arrangements where, especially by a group within this party, fewer payoffs were expected 
and major concessions had been made during government formation. The consequence was 
that within the PSB-BSP in particular impatience grew about the realisation of intentions in 
other fields. For this party, the costs of remaining in office began to exceed the benefits, up 
to the critical point where the decision was made to withdraw from the government. Thus, 
problems with enforcement seem to have been due to differences in payoffs from individual 
arrangements and to the structure of the agenda and the general disbalance in the distribution 
of payoffs in the government’s first half year.
The internal unity of coalition parties
An implicit assumption with respect to the previous factor was that parties are unitary actors 
in coalition politics. This may, however, have been less true in fields in which groups within 
the parties had manifest differences in policy preferences, especially if the groups were 
represented at the top of the party. In other words, internal unity or disunity of parties may 
have also influenced implementation positively or negatively.
A general indicator of intraparty divisions on policy can be found in the results of 
party votes on the coalition agreement. Within the two largest parties, the CVP and the PSB- 
BSP, support was 60 percent or less. The traditional ’divisions’ within the CVP and PSC are 
those between the factions of labour, fanners, and the middle class, but at least with respect 
to the relevant parts of the coaliton agreement, no major conflicts between these factions were 
found. What seems to have been more important was an division beginning to emerge 
between regionalists and unitarists within the CVP and the PSB-BSP. Within the CVP, Leo 
Tindemans, the vice prime minister, represented the unitarist group, while the leader of the 
regionalists (some called themselves ’Flemish federalists’) was party president Wilfried 
Martens. The Socialists were not only divided along language lines, there was also a division 
within each language section, especially within the French speaking section where prime 
minister Edmund Leburton represented the unitarists and party president André Cools led the 
regionalists. Within the Liberal party family, divisions in the same field existed between the
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Wallonian and the Brussels section (the leader of the Brussels wing of the PLP had voted 
aganst the coalition agreement).
The presence of divisions was mostly associated with failure (régionalisation), and 
absence of divisions with success (school policy), with the exception of the arrangements on 
language policy and the fall of the government as the most important outcome in the area of 
socio-economic policy. The factor of internal unity is likely to have made a difference when 
arrangements were on the coalitional agenda, though certainly not in all instances; especially 
with respect to failure in the field of régionalisation, it may be noted that the government 
contained many ’unitarists’ (the prime minister, vice prime minister Tindemans), whereas in 
the extraparliamentary parties the regionalists were in a stronger position. This may also be 
a reason why no agreement could be reached in the special parliamentary committee, which 
contained representatives from different party sections.
Negotiators as ministers
One factor that was assumed to be a favourable condition for success was the presence of 
negotiators in the government, who could guard the implementation of arrangements and, 
given their background, interprete general arrangements more easily than outsiders. This may 
be seen to relate to enforcement as a moral principle, but more pragmatic motives may also 
play a part.
This factor appears to be associated with outcomes in the same way as the previous 
factor. The deviant cases are again success in the area of language policy and the failure of 
the IBRAMCO project, despite the activities of the minister of Economic Affairs (BSP), a 
former negotiator. The presence o f negotiators in the area of education and the absence in 
the area of regionalisaton may have contributed to sucess and failure, but the outcomes of 
processes in the areas of language and socio-economic policy must be due to other factors.
Prime ministerial support
Did the prime minister Leburton make a difference, either positively or negatively? Edmund 
Leburton was a monolingual French speaker, whose candidacy had been controversial. The 
consequence was that the authority of the prime minister was not accepted automatically by 
all parties, certainly not by the CVP. This reduced the prime minister’s potential influence 
on policy making irrespective of his preferences and activities.
Prime ministerial support for the coalition agreement varied rather strongly between 
the different policy areas. Leburton seems to have pursued party policy actively only in the 
area of socio-economic policy (the IBRAMCO project), and that without success. Conversely,
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the role of the prime minister seems to have been rather limited during the process of 
implementing arrangements on school policy» nor does it seem that success in the area of 
language policy can be attributed to active prime ministerial support. Leburton’s passive role 
in the frequent conflicts on régionalisation policy seems to have been more related to 
outcomes. Leburton had always been suspicious of the arrangements in this area. These 
points lead to the conclusion that the role of the prime minister seems to have been confined 
to that of contributing to failure during the process of turning arrangements on régionalisation 
into legislation.
Coalition committees
Coalition committees have been seen to facilitate the elaboration and implementation of 
implicit and explicit compromises as alternative (’extrainstitutional’) policy making arenas, 
and to be complementary to the factor of ministerial background. Coalition committees are 
defined as informal committees containing spokespersons from different sections of the 
coalition parties» thus not formed exclusively of ministers.
The Leburton government had been in office for one month when a school pact 
com m ittee was set up to elaborate the arrangements on school policy and translate these into 
texts for a bill. The party presidents and the responsible ministers had seats in this 
committee, as well as spokespersons from other sections of the parties.6 In the case 
description we have seen that the school pact committee was active in elaborating 
arrangements and in settlling recurrent conflict. Thus» together with other ’favourable’ 
conditions (negotiators as ministers and no intra-party divisions), the committee factor is 
likely to have contributed to success in this field.
The specia l parliam entary committee on régionalisation  was another coalition 
committee, in which (despite its name) not only members of the parliamentary groups but 
also ministers and party presidents (who, to be sure, in most cases had a seat in parliament) 
participated. Discussions within this committee however foundered over conflict, so that the 
government had to translate the arrangements on the regional institutions into legislative texts.
Thus, only in the area of school policy does a coalition committee seem to have 
contributed positively to the elaboration and implementation of arrangements. Other informal 
structures within and outside the government, if these existed, did not facilitate the 
enforcement of arrangements. As successes were reached in other areas in which no coalition 
agreements in the actual sense were operative, this case study suggests that this factor is not 
a necessary condition for success.
6 Though initially also members of the opposition parties were invited, the committee increasingly 
became a policy making arena for the coalition parties.
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The economic situation
Next comes a factor that often is seen to encroach on the plans of decision makers, the 
economic situation. The oil crisis which became manifest in the autumn of 1973 increased 
the financial problems of the national government, but it also induced the Socialists to press 
harder for state initiatives in industry, the IBRAMCO project being an important political test 
case. With respect to this issue and to the arrangement on pensions, however, the economic 
situation does not appear to be related to outcomes as expected, because the arrangements on 
pensions were implemented while the IBRAMCO project failed. Rather than economic 
developments in general, it actually was an event emerging from the environment, the 
withdrawal of the Iranian government from the project, that caused the failure, which 
subsequently triggered the fall of the government.
Personal relationships
Finally, what can we say about the nature of personal relationships in relation to the 
enforcement of the coalition agreement? Though there was conflict on the candidacy of 
Edmund Leburton for the office of prime minister, no major personality clashes were 
manifest that might have formed an obstacle to the enforcement of the coalition agreement.
CONCLUSION
The coalition of three party families was formed to flesh out the constitutional articles on 
régionalisation, for which a two thirds majority in parliament was required. Though in theory 
this majority could also be formed on a more a d  hoc  basis, mistrust among the parties meant 
that issues of régionalisation were considered too delicate to be treated as free issues. This 
mistrust induced the parties to formulate explicit and implicit compromises on different 
aspects of régionalisation where conflict was manifest. Though we have not based our 
argument on the a  p rio ri assumption that large coalitions involve more policy conflict during 
government formation than smaller ones, such conflict was paramount during the formation 
of the Leburton coalition. Party preferences differed on school policy, on ’ethical questions*, 
on socio-economic policy, as well on language policy and régionalisation. In the first field, 
the division was mainly between the Socialists and the Catholics. Conflict was more general 
in the two other fields. The coalition agreement of the Leburton government thus contained 
arrangements on socio-economic policy, ethical questions, school policy and on policy with
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Uregard to the language communities and régionalisation. These arrangements were mostly 
explicit compromises (14 of the 24 arrangements). Implicit compromises were either 
procedural (4) or contained general intentions (6) which needed further specification.
The relevant parts of the agreement do not appear to have been really instrumental in 
preventing conflict on issues debated during government formation. Conform the hypothesis, 
general implicit compromises gave rise to conflict much more often than explicit 
compromises. The fall of the government after one year was also due to an issue over which 
the parties had only compromised implicitly, though certainly in this particular case the type 
of arrangement is not likely to have made the difference between success and failure.
The arrangements were only partly functional for policy making. This was to be 
expected of general implicit compromises and procedural arrangements (as these did not 
contain substantive intentions), but explicit compromises were expected to have more positive 
outcomes (50 percent were implemented). Generally, the relevant parts of the coalition 
agreement indicated rather than really predetermined coalition policy. Often, further 
negotiations were necessary before policies could be approved by the government and in 
parliament. What I have called failures (i.e., no formally approved policies) may be seen as 
part of a process which continued beyond the end of the government. Indeed, during the 
formation of the next government, the central issues were those left uncompleted or 
undecided by the Leburton coalition.7
The mixed outcome may be accounted for by different factors. The absence of manifest 
divisions within the parties and the presence of negotiators in the government are likely to 
have facilitated the enforcement of arrangements on the public and private school system, 
whereas in the area of régionalisation the presence of divisions and the absence of negotiators 
from the government seem to have been relevant as unfavourable conditions. The rather 
limited support o f the prime minister may also have played a part. With respect to other 
fields, however, there are no indications that prime ministerial support or opposition, if 
manifest, made a real difference to outcomes. There is also no evidence of strained personal 
relationships contributing to failure.
Coalition committees seem to have played a part, in a positive way, only in the field 
of school policy. Though régionalisation was also dealt with in a coalition committee, 
discussions in this committee failed entirely, and subsequently policy making was shifted to 
the government (which also was unable to turn arrangements into uniform legislation). 
Further, economic developments did not appear to relate to outcome in the way assumed, but 
it was a ’critical event’ from the international environment (the withdrawal of the Iranian 
government) which provided the immediate cause of failure in one field and led to the *95
7 See table 4.2 in chapter 4 for the issues which were central in successive government formations 
and those which brought down governments.
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collapse of the government.
In conjunction with the above factors, reciprocal control as an enforcement mechanism 
seems to have been weakened, not so much by the multiparty character of the coalition as by 
the structure of the coalition agenda after the summer of 1973. Within the CVP, willingness 
to continue with the implementation of arrangements decreased after legislation on school 
policy and income policy was formally approved. This was especially so within the 
government section of this party, which like the other parties contained few negotiators in 
the field of régionalisation, while the unitarists were strongly represented. As it became clear 
that the coalition committee on régionalisation policy could not agree, the government became 
more important in the implementation process. The PSB-BSP, and especially the strong 
extraparliamentary party, became increasingly impatient about the implementation of 
arrangements on régionalisation and issues of socio-economic policy. When the Socialists lost 
on the IBRAMCO issue, new elections may well have been felt to be the only way to avoid 
further losses.
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T h e  T i n d e m a n s  V  C o a l i t i o n  
( 1 9 7 7 - 1 9 7 8 )
A FIVE PARTY COALITION
Parliamentary elections were held on 17 April 1977. These elections were called after the 
dismissal of the Walloon Rally (RW), the Wallonian regional party, from the Tindemans IV 
government (CVP, PSC, PVV, PLP, RW) and the apparent impossibility of extending this 
government en route with the Socialists. The elections brought gains to the Catholic CVP and 
PSC, which together obtained 80 seats. The Liberals remained stable, and the RW went from 
13 to 5 seats in the Chamber of Representatives. Thus this first case of government 
responsibility being held by a regionalist party was punished severely by the voters. The still 
officially unitary PSB-BSP, the main opposition party, gained a few seats, but this time was 
clearly smaller than the CVP and PSC combined. The largest regionalist party was the 
Flemish People’s Union (VU), with 20 seats.
Given this pattern of numerical strength, the leaders of the two largest parties, CVP 
and PSB-BSP, declared that they wanted a new agreement on regional and community policy. 
This time, both had the intention of preparing a revision of the constitution, which then could 
be carried out in the next legislative term.1 The parties involved in the discussions on the new 
agreement were expected to participate in that next government. According to the CVP, 
which would be the formateur’s party, the Socialists were needed to be sure of a broad 
government majority including in Wallonia. This was necessary to have sufficient support 
(and shared responsibility) for the retrenchment policy, which was considered urgent. Perhaps 
even more importantly, Socialist support was indispensible to meet the requirement of a 
qualified and special majority for the approval of legislation based on constitutional article 
107 quater on regionalisation.2 As we saw, the Leburton coalition had made no progress on 
regionalisation, and the following governments led by Tindemans had not been able to
1 For a constitutional revision, parliament must be constituant, which requires a special declaration 
by the outgoing government before the elections. The recently elected parliament was not constituant.
2 That is, a two thirds majority in parliament and at the same time a simple majority in each of 
the two language groups.
97
complete the ’article Î 0 7 quater project’. The preference of the outgoing prime minister Leo 
Tindemans was a coalition within regionalist parties. Most parties however had a different 
view.
The formation process
A few days after the elections, CVP prominent Leo Tindemans recieved an instruction to 
form a new government. The most important first move in the process of coalition building 
was however made by the president of the PSB André Cools, who presented a ’questionnaire’ 
to the Liberals to which this party was to respond within 24 hours. The actual intention of 
the Socialists was to remove the Liberals from the negotiation table, and the ’ultimatum’ had 
this effect. As the CVP, PSC and PSB-BSP together had only a narrow two thirds majority, 
the Socialists preferred an additional party. Given the exit of the Liberals, this could only be 
a regionalist party. The problem with this was that the partipation of one such party was 
against the wishes of the form ateur , who actually wanted no regionalists in his new 
government, but was also questioned by the rest of the CVP and the French speaking wing 
of the Socialists, as in this case regional ’disbalance’ would occur. In other words, two 
regionalist parties had to enter the government. The requirement of language parity in the 
cabinet was also relevant in this respect. This had formed a constitutional constraint on 
coalition formation since 1970.
The fo rm a teu r  made a procedural proposal to start with discussions on régionalisation 
policy, which were to result in a written agreement that was ’as specific as possible’. 
Tindemans also suggested that the VU and the Democratic Front of Francophones (FDF) 
should accept the agreement before really becoming the third and fourth coalition parties. 
Thus, as in the formation of the Leburton government, policy negotiations and the forming 
of the actual coalition did not take place in a fixed sequence of stages, but rather were mixed. 
Presentations in which government formation is seen to follow several stages are therefore 
not entirely realistic (Hearl, 1992: 415). Be this as it may, the dilemma for the fo rm ateur  was 
that conducting negotiations on régionalisation with these parties would make an agreement 
more difficult to reach, whereas w ithout them it was highly uncertain whether such an 
agreement would recieve their support. Not surprisingly, the regionalist parties were very 
reluctant to make commitments under the conditions proposed by the fo rm a teu r . The 
procedure on which eventually agreement was reached would be that the five parties would 
discuss the general points first, with negotiations on controversial matters following later.
Most of the discussions were held in plenary sessions but in utmost secrecy. Party delegations 
were composed of the party presidents and one or two parliamentary representatives. On 
several occasions, the spokespersons of the Flemish and Wallonian parties met separately. 
As in the formation of the Leburton coalition, the parliamentary groups were not involved
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in bargaining; their role was largely confined to voting for (and approving) the formal 
investiture of the government.
The formation process took six weeks, of which only two and a half were actually 
spent on the coalition agreement, with most attention going to regionalisation policy. The 
coalition agreement was approved at the party conferences at the end of May. Support varied 
considerably, though not as much as in the case of the Leburton coalition. Within the PSB- 
BSP, support was almost unanimous (96 %), whereas within the CVP 75 % of the delegates 
approved the results. Within this party, however, party president Martens had to first give 
a general explanation of the text (Luykx & Plate!, 1985: 695). The party council of the PSC 
adopted the agreement with a majority of 84 percent, while within the two regionalist parties 
support was limited to 67 and 71 % respectively. For these parties it was the first time that 
compromises on key issues were made to enter office. On 3 June 1977, Tindemans’ fifth 
government was sworn in. A few days later the government was formally approved in 
parliament.
General features of the coalition agreement
The coalition agreement was less comprehensive than that of the Leburton government (some 
12,500 words). The agreement consisted of two separate documents. The first document 
contained intentions with respect to régionalisation and became known as the Egm ont p a c t, 
after the name of the palace where it had been negotiated. The pact was signed by 12 
negotiators and the formateur. The second document contained arrangements on socio­
economic policy.
The Egmont pact was a relatively detailed document, more detailed than the section 
on régionalisation policy in the Leburton agreement. The first paragraph of the pact stated 
that the coalition parties were committed morally to the intentions on constitutional reform 
and the implementation of régionalisation. As the present government could not cany out 
such a constitutional reform, this meant that the pact was to commit not only the present 
government, but also the fo llow ing  one. Prime minister Tindemans preferred to remain 
realistic, and declared that the agreement could mean ’both war and peace’ (Luykx & Platel, 
1985: 697).
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CONFLICTS, ARRANGEMENTS, AND POLICY MAKING
From conflicts to arrangements
Regionalization p o licy
Regionalisation policy was the first issue that was ’inherited* from the previous government. 
More specifically, direct confrontations between the prospective coalition parties took place 
on the composition and competences of the regional bodies, the financial resources of the 
regions and the decision making bodies of the language communities. Further subjects of 
manifest controversy were the implementation procedures, the role of the provinces, and the 
boundaries of Brussels. As in the agreement of the Leburton government, a distinction was 
made between transitional and ’definitive’ arrangements. Generally, the positions of the 
traditional parties had not changed much since the time of the Leburton government, which 
as we saw had achieved little in this area.
The regional bodies  With regard to the composition of the regional bodies, the parties agreed 
that after a transitional period, the regional councils of Flanders and Wallonia would consist 
of directly elected representatives. The size of these regional councils was to be the same as 
the number of parliam entary  representatives elected in the respective region. The Brussels 
regional council however was to consist o f twice the number of parliamentary representatives 
from Brussels. Within the Brussels regional council, the so called alarm  bell procedure  could 
be started. This benefited the Flemish parties, as these formed a minority in Brussels. There 
was also to be French speaking and Dutch speaking cultural committees in Brussels, which 
were to be elected by the two language groups within the Brussels regional council. This 
arrangement also mentioned further details on these points, for example on the election 
procedure, and as such formed an explicit compromise.
Another explicit compromise was formulated on the executive bodies of Wallonia and 
Flanders, the regional governments, of which the members were to be elected by and from 
within the regional councils. The Brussels executive body was to consist of a maximum of 
seven members, including at least two Dutch speakers. This meant that the principle of 
language parity (an equal number of French speakers and Dutch speakers) would not be 
upheld. This constituted an important payoff for the Francophone parties, in particular the 
FDF.
R egional com petences and  finances  With respect to regional competences, a detailed explicit 
compromise was reached. The Brussels regional council would take over the existing 
competences of the agglomeration council, which would be abolished (Luykx & Plate1, 1985:
700).
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With regard to the financial resources of the regions, party preferences differed most 
on the distributional aspect and on the possibility of the regions levying their own taxes. 
Again an explicit compromise was made which stated that regional taxation would be 
introduced, be it only in the 'definitive’ stage of régionalisation, so not during the term of 
the government which was being formed. Further, subsidies from the central government to 
the regions were to be distributed in the following manner: 1/3 in proportion to population. 
1/3 in proportion to area, and 1/3 in proportion to direct taxes. Here it appeared that not only 
party positions had remained largely the same, but also the results of bargaining, as four 
years earlier essentially the same arrangement had been hammered out. These subsidies 
would be linked to the annual increase in the national budget.
The community bodies A next issue was the composition and competences of the bodies 
representing the language communities. Régionalisation was a problem of territory and 
economic decentralisation, while the problem of the communities concerned language and 
cultural matters. With respect to the composition of the community bodies, the parties 
reached an explicit compromise which stated that the community councils (which thusfar were 
called cultural councils) would come to consist of the regional representatives of Wallonia 
and Flanders respectively, including also the members of the French speaking and Dutch 
speaking language group in the Brussels regional council. This implied that there would be 
an overlap in the membership of the community councils and the regional councils. Yet, the 
two bodies would have different competences. This was a major concession from the VU and 
a group within the CVP that had preferred a complete merger of the regional and community 
councils in Flanders.
An explicit compromise was also reached on the executive body of the communities. 
This body was to contain two members, elected 'by and from within' the community 
councils, but they were supposed to come from different regional councils, with one always 
coming from the Brussels regional council. With regard to the language communities in the 
Brussels region, a special procedure was thought out. Each of the 19 municipalities in 
Brussels was to set up two 'community committees’, of which the members were to be 
elected in municipal elections (the exact size of the committees was left open). The 
committees were to advise their respective municipalities on matters belonging to the 
competence of the communities (cultural matters), and they also were to control the expenses 
of the communities within the municipalities.
Community com petences and finances With regard to the competences of the community 
bodies, a particularly thorny issue was the definition of the 'matières personalisables*, matters 
next to the cultural affairs on which the communities already had competence. This extension 
was to increase what was called the 'cultural autonomy’ of the communities. Such autonomy 
was strongly desired on the Flemish side, but the French speaking parties, especially the
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PSB, wanted to maintain several ’transferable* tasks, such as health, at the level of the central 
government. The reason for this was mainly financial. The PSB conceded on this issue, the 
result being an explicit compromise stating that competences, also on health, would be 
attributed to the communities.
Financial resources were, as before, to be provided by the central government, the 
point at stake now being a new distribution ratio. The main difference between the parties 
on this point regarded the relative weight of population size as a criterion. The Dutch 
speaking parties would benefit from more emphasis on this factor, whereas the French 
speaking parties demanded that more weight be given to area size. On this point an explicit 
compromise was also reached which stated that in the new distribution of subsidies resources 
would depend for 2/3 on population size, and for 1/3 on area size.
Implem entation procedures and transitional arrangem ents Most of the arrangements 
mentioned in the above paragraphs were meant to be implemented after a revision of the 
constitution in a next parliamentary term. Negotiations were also undertaken on the regional 
and community bodies during a transitional period. The parties made an explicit compromise 
containing several different elements. Three bills would be drafted, which were to be 
submitted in parliament ’as soon as possible’. The first bill regarded the implementation of 
article 107 quater  o f the constitution. The second bill was on the extension of cultural matters 
to the ’matières personalisables’ mentioned before. The third bill was to modify existing 
legislation on language in administrative affairs.
The first bill was politically important, and was to contain a chapter on the ’definitive’ 
arrangements, to which the condition of a constitutional revision was linked, and a chapter 
on several transitional arrangements. These transitional arrangements would remain valid 
until the new regional councils and executives were set up, and in any case expire one year 
after the next parliamentary elections. During this transitional stage, the regional councils of 
Wallonia and Flanders were to consist of members of the national parliament. The Brussels 
regional council was to be composed of representatives and senators from both language 
groups in parliament. Further, regional financial resources in this stage would consist entirely 
of subsidies from the national government.
Provinces a n d  subregions  A next point on the formation agenda was the future status of the 
provinces and the setting up of subregions. Disagreement existed on whether these subregions 
were to exist next to the other administrative entities, cr were to replace the provinces. In 
an explicit compromise it was stated that subregions would be set up after the transitional 
stage of régionalisation; the role of the provinces would be reduced. The main conceding 
parties on this issue were the PSC and FDF.
The boundaries o f  the  Brussels region  Delineation of the Brussels region was kept for the
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final round of negotiations, to avoid that no agreement on regionalisation would be reached 
at all in case of persistent disagreement on the issue. The French speaking parties stood for 
unconstrained expansion of Brussels, and at the very least an extension of the facilities for 
French speakers in the municipalities in the Brussels periphery, whereas the Dutch speakers 
spoke of a Brussels ’oil slick’ which had to be contained, and for this reason they wanted to 
limit the new region to the 19 officially bilingual municipalities. More specifically, the FDF 
and PSC demanded the annexation of six municipalies with facilities for French speakers 
(these were located in the Flemish province of Brabant, an important geographical and 
political fact) as well as of four separate districts on the periphery of the agglomeration.
On this final issue the parties also reached an explicit compromise. This compromise 
was based partly on an agreement made several years earlier, but which had never been 
implemented. It included the possibility for French speakers in the six peripheral 
municipalities and in several other areas to take out fictituous domicile (a ’subscription’) in 
one of the 19 official municipalities of Brussels. In doing so, they obtained the right to vote 
in the elections of that municipality, and also partly obtained the same rights and duties on 
administrative, judicial and fiscal matters as the ’official’ Brusselers. The government was 
to decide on the duration of this right. A second element of the compromise contained the 
extension of facilities for the French speakers in the six municipalities to the cultural and 
personal matters defined earlier in the arrangement on the community councils. This 
subscription right and the extended facilities for French speakers (referred to as ’inhabitants’ 
or ’minorities’) were acquired at the price of status quo on the boundaries of Brussels, which 
thus remained limited to the agglomeration of 19 municipalities. A third element was the 
division of the Brussels electoral district. This division thusfar had been blocked by the 
French speaking parties, for example during the formation of the Leburton government in 
early 1973.
Socio-economic p o licy
Though the parties intended to deal less with the details of socio-economic policy, there were 
some issues on which conflict became manifest. These issues were the budget deficit, the 
coupling o f wages and social benefits to economic development, employment policy, and state 
intervention in industry, which divided mainly the two traditional party families, the Christian 
Democrats and Socialists.
To begin with, the Socialists demanded extra taxes to decrease the budget deficit. This 
demand was rejected most firmly by formateur Tindemans himself, who even threatened to 
withdraw if tax increases were considered seriously (De Standaard, 17-25 May 1977). 
Negotiations on this matter resulted in a general implicit compromise.
Another demand of the Socialists was that wages and social benefits be linked directly 
to the index of consumer prices. The other parties gave way on this point, which was written 
down in the coalition agreement. Less clear cut were intentions on employment policy. Here, 103
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■the PSB-BSP wanted an employment plan, which met with considerable scepticism from the 
CVP. A general implicit compromise was formulated, which was to be elaborated by the 
government.
Finally, as in the Leburton coalition, the Socialists and Christian Democrats disagreed 
on state intervention in industry and in the banking sector. The Flemish Christian Democrats, 
including formateur Tindemans, were suspicious of Socialist attempts to increase state control 
in these areas. On this point of contention the parties got no further than formulating a 
general implicit compromise, stating that the government would be active in different sectors 
of the economy ’on the basis of equality with the private sector’.
Table 6.1 contains a summary of the arrangements made on issues in the two fields where 
bargaining took place. *
Table 6.1
Arrangements in Tindemans V coalition agreement
type of arrangement
explicit procedural general
policy field
régionalisation policy 12 _ - 12
financial/budgetary policy - - 1 1
socio-economic policy 1 - 2 3
12 3 15
Arrangements and policy making
Regionalisation p o licy
One month after the government had taken office, an amendment of an ’Act on a provisional 
set up of the regional bodies’ (1974) was approved in parliament. The amendment was 
necessary to make the act compatible with the coalition agreement. In the coalition agreement 
a bill for the transitional stage of regionalistion was announced, giving an outline of the 
proposed bill. Parliament also approved a bill in which the elections of the Brussels 
agglomeration council were suspended. This bill was based on the intention in the coalition 
agreement to abolish the agglomeration council, the functions o f which were to be taken over 
by the Brussels regional council (KHA, 1977: 457).
The coalition agreement contained three bills which were to encompass the elements 
of the Egmont pact. One bill was to comprise the extended list o f cultural matters, concerning 
the communities, and one covered the use of language in the administration. The third bill
104
Iregarded the implementation of article 1 0 7  quater of the constitution containing the setting 
up of three regions. What was the government’s performance with regard to these three bills?
In the late summer of 1977, the government begun to translate arrangements in the Egmont 
pact into first drafts. Soon, a difference of interpretation occurred on the meaning of the 
arrangement for the subscription right for French speakers in the Brussels periphery. 
According to one of the state secretaries of Institutional Reform, De Bondt (CVP), the 
subscription right was meant to be used only once in the near future. This interpretation was 
heavily contested by the PSC and FDF. In their view, the agreement contained no indication 
of a time limit, so that the subscription right should be seen as a permanent right. Thus, 
conflict arose over an explicit compromise which at the time of government formation was 
seen as being fairly clear cut and unambiguous.
More conflicts occurred. One conflict was on the future status of the subregions, on 
which an explicit but still not very specific compromise had been formulated. Another 
conflict regarded the community committees in the Brussels municipalities and their 
functional equivalents in the periphery. More specifically, controversy existed on the size of 
these committees and on the distribution of subsidies between the two language groups in the 
municipalities. Third, the arrangement on the composition of the regional executives was seen 
to need further elaboration. Here, one problem was that the French and Dutch version of the 
same arrangement appeared to give rise to different interpretations (KHA, 1978: 53-54). 
Thus, turning the Egmont pact into draft bills first required exegesis of the document.
From one pact to the next, but not to legislation In September 1977, a special committee was 
set up, containing the party presidents, some other spokespersons from the parties, the two 
state secretaries o f Institutional Reform, and the prime minister, who would chair the 
committee’s meetings. This informal group was called the ’editorial committee’, and was to 
interpret the arrangements and ’fill in the possible gaps’ in the Egmont pact (KHA, 1977: 
707). Policy making was thus transferred from the formal decision making bodies to an 
informal arena. The expected result of the committee’s meetings was that the bill on 
régionalisation could be submitted in parliament without further delay (Brassine & Mabille, 
1978: 9-11; KHA, 1977: 742-743).
Though most party presidents continued to declare that the Egmont agreement was to 
be implemented ’loyally and correctly’, and Tindemans emphasised that the parties had 
committed themselves to refrain from making other proposals not just in one but in two  
parliamentary terms, the discussions soon took on the character of new negotiations, and 
lasted four months. The result was a new document referred to as the Stuyvenberg pact 
(Platel, 1978: 448, 454). At the end of February 1978, the document was ratified by the 
cabinet, with parliamentary approval following one month later (KHA, 1978: 199).
The Stuyvenberg pact contained extended and often more specific arrangements on 105
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matters which had given rise to conflict. Next, the government again faced the task of 
translating intentions into texts for the draft bill, which came to be known as bill no. 461. 
This was done for the arrangements for the transitional period first, for which no revision 
of the constitution was required. As before, discussions were painstaking, especially over the 
community committees in the six municipalities around Brussels, the subscription right, and 
the decision making procedures in the Brussels regional executive. Only after frequent 
interventions by what was called the ’junta’ of party presidents, referring to the key role of 
these party leaders in the process, was the drafting of bill 461 completed. In early July, the 
bill was approved by the cabinet and subsequently submitted to parliament. In the Chamber 
of Representatives, the bill was examined by a parliamentary committee chaired by Wilfried 
Martens (who was party president of the CVP and an MP). In fact, nearly the whole ’junta’ 
took a seat on the parliamentary committee (Brassine & Mabille: 13).
The parliamentary committee, however, was unable to proceed in line with the time 
schedule. First, at the end of July, the Council of State (a constitutional advisory body of the 
government) gave negative advice on several articles in bill 461. Indeed, the Council of State 
even declared some articles unconstitutional, notably those based on the rather complex 
compromises over Brussels. The reactions of the party leaders were rather different. Prime 
minister Tindemans preferred to follow at least the main lines of the advice, but PSB 
president Cools suggested ignoring it. In his view, the will of the party presidents was no less 
respectable than the constitution. This pressure had effect, as the cabinet decided not to 
engage in a reformulation of the articles in question, at least not in the short term. This 
however did not lead to consensus within the parliamentary committee, which appeared to 
be unable to vote on a First part of the bill (KHA, 1978: 553).
An article containing the possibility of a de  fa c to  merger of the regional councils and 
community councils was heavily disputed. The problem was that such a merger, which would 
be considered only in the Flemish case went beyond the what was written in the Egmont- 
Stuyvenberg pact, but was mentioned explicitly in the bill. The French speaking parties 
insisted that this article was amended. Again, the party presidents met and formulated a 
compromise in which the possibility of joint meetings of the Flemish regional and community 
councils was included, as long as these meetings would not be in Brussels (De Standaard, 5- 
11 September 1978). At the end of September, the parliamentary committee approved the 
amended bill, so that plenary discussions could be started.
This ’prefixed’ agreement within the committee, however, did not prevent a group 
from within the parliamentary party of the CVP starting to make objections to several articles 
in the bill, and it obtained the sympathy o f the prime minister, who had never shown great 
affinity for the Egmont and Stuyvenberg pact. The group decided not to support the bill as 
long as it contained elements which the Council o f State had called unconstitutional. This was 
a problem, as the government was not competent to revise the constitution during its term. 
When Tindemans refrained from restoring discipline within his party, the French speaking
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ministers threatened to withdraw from the government. On 11 October 1978 the party 
presidents of the PSB, PSC and VU also attacked the prime minister, who reacted by 
tendering his resignation and causing the fall of the government.
Financial and  socio-econom ic policy
In contrast to the Egmont pact, arrangements in the fields o f financial and socio-economic 
policy were mostly general implicit compromises.
In the government’s first half year in office, socio-economic policy was elaborated and 
implemented in accordance with the coalition agreement, and without real political 
difficulties. The Socialists, who had made most demands but had to satisfy themselves with 
rather general arrangements, even declared themelves to be ’highly satisfied’ with socio­
economic policy (KHA, 1977: 678).
Problems however began to rise in early 1978, when the government was confronted 
with a massive ’gap' between the initially estimated budget deficit and the actual deficit, 
which appeared to be 65 billion Belgian francs instead of 24 billion (KHA, 1978: 136). 
Decisions to give financial support to several industries in Flanders and Wallonia were made 
in line with the coalition agreement, but the parties had difficulties in agreeing on 
retrenchment policy. The government had announced a bill on economic and budgetary 
policy, which was to be submitted in parliament before the end of May 1978. To the prime 
minister, this was important enough to declare that the government could only remain in 
office if parliament approved the bill without delay, but first of all, consensus was to be 
reached within the government. The ministers of the CVP (among whom the minister of 
Finance and the prime minister) stressed that cutbacks in expenditures were to have priority, 
and that taxes were to decease rather than increase. The state secretary of the Budget (also 
CVP) asked for far reaching special discretionary powers (pouvoirs spéciaux) for the 
government to take measures without first awaiting parliamentary approval. The PSB-BSP, 
and also the VU, opposed special powers for budgetary policy, and declared that economic 
reforms and the extension of state control in several sectors of the economy should have more 
emphasis in governmental policy. Moreover, the FDF and the French speaking Socialists 
insisted that the bill on economic and budgetary policy be submitted to parliament together 
with the bill on régionalisation, which in the eyes of the prime minister was ’pure blackmail’.
These disputes almost led to a government crisis. According to prime minister 
Tindemans the Socialists were not sufficiently cooperative, and on 14 June 1978 he tendered 
the resignation of the government, which was however not accepted by the King. The prime 
minister was instructed to resolve the conflict, which was also the preference of the party 
presidents, to whom régionalisation was sufficiently important to continue to support the 
coalition. The conflict was resolved in a joint meeting of the cabinet committee on economic 
and social policy and the party presidents, in which it was decided that the bill on economic 
policy would be submitted and approved in parliament before the summer recess. The bill
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on economic policy was submitted, in two separate parts,, to parliament, where it was 
approved at the end of June, just before the summer break. The two important elements in 
the bill were several initiatives and measures in the sphere of public investments and state 
control in different sectors of the economy, and the delegation o f pouvoirs spéciaux (special 
powers) to the government. The first element contained gains to the Socialists, and the second 
to the CVP (KHA, 1978: 425-426; Luykx & Platel: 712-713).
SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF THE TINDEMANS V COALITION
Let us consider the outcomes in the light of the hypotheses on the effects of explicit and 
implicit compromises. Table 6.2 summarises the outcomes of explicit and implicit 
compromises.
Table 6.2
Outcomes of arrangements in Tindemans V coalition agreement
Outcome
elaborated/implemented 
(no conflict)
not elaborated/implemented 
(no conflict)
elaborated/implemented
(conflict)
not elaborated/implemented 
(conflict)
key to symbols'.
so-ec = socio-economic policy
reg = régionalisation policy
Type of arrangement
explicit implicit-general
1 (so-ec) - (1)
5 (reg) - (5)
- 3 (fin,so-ec) (3)
6 (reg) - (6)
(12) (3) (15)
fin *= finanal/budgetary policy
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The streamlining effect of explicit compromises
Explicit compromises were almost never implemented without conflict, or indeed were not 
implemented at all. Only one of the twelve arrangements of this type was implemented when 
the government broke down in October 1978. This was the arrangement on the link between 
wages and social benefits to the consumer price index, on which no conflict re-occurred. All 
other explicit compromises were not implemented, either because conflict paralysed the 
implementation process or because, in a more indirect way, the premature end of the 
government prevented this. The conclusion must thus be that developments in the Tindemans 
V coalition provide no evidence, rather provide counterevidence, for the hypothesis that 
explicit compromises are implemented peacefully.
Though this conclusion stands, it should be noted that a number of explicit 
compromises had at least streamlined policy making within the government before matters 
were discussed in parliament. These arrangements included the composition and competences 
of the regional councils and the community councils, as well as regional finances. That these 
arrangements eventually remained unimplemented in the way defined in this study was due 
to the breakdown of the coalition after conflict on other points.
Co veil (1982: 457) has argued that it was the symmetry of the agenda after the 
resolution of problems on socio-economic policy (summer 1978) that meant that a crisis 
became inevitable. Over Brussels especially, there was direct confrontation between the 
parties, in which the most desired goals of one party were the most resisted concessions of 
the other. Dissent within the CVP formed an extra complication. For the ’dissenting’ group 
within this party, for whom prime minister Tindemans felt sympathy, coalition breakdown 
was not the worst possible outcome. Elections would delay régionalisation, and such elections 
were also expected to benefit the CVP, which could then attack the VU for having ’sold out’ 
over Flemish interests.
The boomerang effect of general implicit compromises
Though in the first half year o f the government’s life, financial and budgetary policy was 
determined without real political difficulties, things changed in the government’s second half 
year. At stake was legislation on budgetary policy and on the regulation of state intervention 
in different sectors of the economy, about which only general statements were included in 
the coalition agreement. A governmental crisis could be resolved only with the help of the 
party presidents. ’Guided’ by these party presidents, the government reached agreement on 
legislation, which was eventually approved in parliament. Thus, in the field of financial and 
socio-economic policy, substantive successes were reached, with the parties remaining within 
the general framework set in the coalition agreement. The occurrence of conflict is in line
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with the hypothesis on general implicit compromises» but the relative success in terms of 
substantive policy decisions, when compared with outcomes of explicit compromises, was not 
expected.
Table 6.3 gives the general outcomes in terms of conflict and implementation. Failure was 
somewhat more frequent in terms of non-implementation than in terms of conflict (11/15 and 
9/15). It is important to realise that the figure shows frequencies. I have not weighed policies 
or arrangements which were or were not implemented, nor have I differentiated between 
more and less intense conflicts.
Table 6 .3
Success and failure of the Tindemans V coalition
implementation 
+ —
conflict
+
1 5 
3 6
FACTORS EXPLAINING SUCCESS AND FAILURE
What might explain successes and especially, the failures of the Tindemans V coalition in the 
process of implementing the coalition agreement? Which factors relating to the coalition and 
its composite elements played a part? What was the impact of general economic 
developments? I deal with these questions in this section. As in the case of the Leburton 
coalition, we should begin by noting that a number of arrangements (6 of a total of 15, and 
all explicit compromises) remained unimplemented because of the premature end of the 
government, without conflict on these arrangements being the direct cause of breakdown. It 
is important to distinguish these arrangements from the others when examining the impact 
o f factors which were assumed to be favourable or unfavourable conditions for 
implementation.
Table 6.4 shows whether factors were associated with outcomes o f arrangements in the way 
as was assumed. Remember that the association was considered ’strong’ if it represented at 
least two thirds of the cases, and ’weak’ if  it represented fewer but not less than half the
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number of arrangements. Except for the factor of coalition size, differentiation has been made 
between the relevant fields of policy. As we are dealing with even fewer arrangements than 
in the previous case-study, extreme caution is needed when interpreting the table. Obviously, 
the data presented are insufficient for statistical analysis.
Table 6.4
Association between factors and outcomes in the Tindemans V 
coalition, per policy field3
policy field
factor
coalition size
régionalisation
o
financial
o
socio-economic
o
internal party unity - + + + +
negotiators in government -- + + + +
prime ministerial support - + + + +
coalition committees o 0 0
personal relationships - n.a. n.a.
economic situation n.a. 0 0
key to symbols:
+ + or + direct association factor with success 
-- or - direct association factor with failure 
o no association found
n.a. not assessed (no indication of presence or absence factor)
Coalition size and reciprocal control
The first factor that was assumed to be unfavourable was the multi-party character of the 
coalition. From the perspective of individual parties, limited payoffs from particular 
arrangements in combination with lower expectations of ’punishment’, and perhaps even 
support from one or more other parties, were assumed to increase the temptation for parties 
to ignore partly or completely the commitments they had made during government formation.
In the present case, however, there is only a weak association between coalition size 
and outcomes (of the 9 arrangements considered in this section, 5 were not implemented). 
This suggests that the number of parties as a general factor has had only a limited impact on 
reciprocal control within the coalition, and in the fields of socio-economic and financial
3 See the appendix for the detailed findings on the Tindemans V coalition.
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policy other factors are likely to have strengthened this enforcement mechanism. In this 
respect, it should be noted that in the fields of financial and socio-economic policy conflict 
was mainly between the two traditional party families, especially the CVP and the PSB. The 
CVP, or more precisely the prime minister, ’blackmailed’ the PSB-BSP by threatening a 
crisis if no substantive policies were approved before the end of the parliamentary year in 
1978. Conversely, the PSB demanded loyalty to the joint, and often specified, intentions in 
the area of régionalisation, which however required more time to be turned into legislation, 
a situation that was unfavourable to the Socialists but left this party no other choice, at least 
not for as long as it underwrote the Egmont-Stuyvenberg agreement.
The internal unity of coalition parties
Did internal divisions exist within the coalition parties, and if so, did these contribute to 
failure? The CVP increasingly became divided on régionalisation, with a ’unitarist’ wing led 
by prime minister Tindemans competing with the ’federalists’ with the party president 
Martens as the first spokesperson. Martens had been prominent in the drafting of the Egmont 
and Stuyvenberg agreements (remember that support within this party for the coalition 
agreement had been far from unanimous). The officially still unitary PSB-BSP was also 
divided on régionalisation (the party split soon after the fall of the government).
All outcomes in the different fields of policy appeared to be associated with the 
presence or absence o f internal divisions in the way assumed. In the case descriptions we saw 
that internal divisions within the CVP had an impact on policy making, and these are likely 
to have contributed to failure in the field of régionalisation and community policy. This is 
in contrast to the situation in the field of socio-economic policy, where no intra-party 
divisions on coalition policy became manifest, even if there were factions within the CVP and 
PSC.
Negotiators as ministers
Did the presence or absence of negotiators in the Tindemans V government make a 
difference? Most ministers who were competent on matters of régionalisation policy were not 
involved in the negotiations during government formation. This was also the case with the 
two state secretaries o f Institutional Reform, of whom one (CVP) was even a spokesman of 
a local branch of the CVP which had voted against the Egmont pact (De Ridder, 1982: 270). 
Only in the area of financial and socio-economic policy were ministers negotiators. One of 
these, the minister o f Economic Affairs Willy Claes (BSP), was party president until his 
appointment as a minister.
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This at least suggests that ministerial background made a difference in the process of 
implementation, though it is difficult to be precise about the impact of this factor, and we 
should realise that failure did not always occur in the government but also in the 
parliamentary and extraparliamentary arena.
Prime ministerial support
The prime minister played different roles in the enforcement process. He guided the 
elaboration of the coalition agreeement in the field of socio-economic policy, with success. 
If perhaps not an activist in the sense of making substantive proposals, he certainly facilitated 
the elaboration of the coalition agreement, and even threatened a crisis to speed things up. 
This contrasts rather sharply with his role in the area of régionalisation policy. As a 
form ateur , Tindemans already spoke of the Egmont pact as a ’party president’s pact’ which 
he signed with reluctance (De Ridder, 1982: 133). Later, he often called in the help of the 
party presidents, and even proposed to lay the drafting of legislation in their hands. Though 
he did not approve of the fact that the party presidents were so clearly holding the cards on 
policy making, this behaviour resulted directly from his unwillingness to bear responsibility 
for the régionalisation programme, which he called unconstitutional and in his view went 
against the interests of the CVP in the national political institutions. If perhaps not entirely 
a matter of ’rational calculation’, his decision to tender the resignation of the government 
may also be seen in this light. In short, prime ministerial support for or opposition to the 
coalition agreement is likely to have been a relevant factor in explaining success, and 
especially failure.
Personal relationships
Personal relationships were seen to play a part only as manifest personal clashes between 
party prominents, given the difficulty of assessing the impact of good personal relationships. 
In the case of the Tindemans coalition, tensions between prominents seem to have been 
relevant. The prime minister’s manoeuvres during the last days of the government cannot be 
fully understood without considering personal relationships. Generally, there was a good 
admosphere within the ’club’ of party presidents. Things however were different between 
several ministers and party presidents; there was strong antagonism between the prime 
minister and PSB president André Cools, and this is likely to have contributed directly to the 
breakdown of the coalition (De Ridder, 1982: 206).
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Coalition committees
One of the remarkble things about the Tindemans V coalition was the presence of a ’junta1 
of party presidents. This group became manifest during government formation. According 
to one author, the party presidents, who had negotiated the Egmont pact in absolute secrecy, 
had become alienated from the rest of their party, even from those within the party who were 
’ministrable’ (De Ridder, 1982: 138; 1989: 109-122).
The paradoxical situation in the Tindemans coalition is that successes occurred in the 
fields in which coalition committees, containing spokespersons from different party sections, 
do not seem to have played a part, whereas the transfer of policy making to such informal 
committees did not prevent failure being the definitive outcome. It was after discussions were 
shifted to the parliamentary arena that conflicts began to escalate. There, the party presidents 
also lost control of the process. In short, developments in the Tindemans V coalition do not 
provide clear evidence for the assumption that the presence or absence of coalition 
committees contributes directly to success or failure.
The economic situation
Finally, did the economic situation influence parties in dealing with arrangements in the areas 
of financial and socio-economic policy? The troubled state of the national economy was 
generally acknowledged. Intentions however were mostly general, so that further negotiations 
were necessary and as we have seen these involved interparty conflict. This conflict arose 
around policies which were difficult to integrate; the CVP demanded cutbacks and the 
Socialists pressed for financial injections for troubled industries and for an active employment 
policy. The role of economic developments seems to have played a part in the process of 
elaboration but, despite conflicts occurring, not in the negative way assumed. This factor 
rather had a positive effect on implementation.
CONCLUSION
For a five party coalition, the scope of bargaining during the formation of the Tindemans V 
government was relatively limited. The main reason for this seems to be that policy in the 
area of régionalisation formed the raison d 'ê tr e  o f the government. Moreover, two of the five 
parties, the regionalist VU and FDF, profiled themselves mainly in this area. At the same 
time, it is important to realise that the scope of bargaining says little of the intensity of
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conflict and, as a consequence, about the difficulty of reaching a substantive agreement.
The two main fields of policy dealt with during government formation, socio­
economic policy and la question communautaire, also dominated the agenda of the Tindemans 
V coalition once in office. In this sense, the coalition agreement very clearly constituted an 
agenda for the government. The relevant arrangements however did not prevent conflict re- 
occurring. With respect to policy the conclusion must be that the process of implementation 
got stuck at the stage of parliamentary discussion, and it was there that the coalition broke 
down on regionalisation policy, in particular over the Brussels issue. The relevant parts in 
the coalition agreement were thus mostly not instrumental in preventing conflict (only 6 of 
the 15 arrangements did not give rise to new conflict), and still less to assisting policy 
making (only 4 arrangements were implemented).
When considering the relatively limited successes of the coalition, a factor that seems 
to have played a part is the general economic situation, which induced parties to take the 
elaboration of general arrangements seriously, even if this meant that conflicts on priorities 
broke out. Next, with regard to characteristics of the coalition and its composite elements, 
the absence of manifest divisions within the coalition parties (even though factions existed) 
and the presence of negotiators in the relevant fields are likely to have contributed to success 
in the areas of financial and socio-economic policy. There were also indications that the 
support of the prime minister, who gave great weight to decisions on financial and socio­
economic policy, was a relevant factor. Indeed, if the multiparty character was assumed to 
reduce the possibilities for mutual control as an enforcement mechanism, the prime minister 
seems to have effectively blackmailed the PSB-BSP by threatening a crisis to increase this 
party’s willingness to cooperate.
It seems to be more than a coincidence that failures occurred precisely in the areas 
where negotiators were absent, the traditional parties were internally divided and the position 
of the prime minister varied between halfhearted support and open resistance to the coalition 
agreement. To this, we may add that personal relationships between several prominents who 
played an active role in the area of regionalisation policy were becoming highly strained. 
Gains and losses made in this area weighed heavily on all coalition parties, and contrary to 
the situation which existed when decisions on economic policy were made, no party was in 
a position to enforce cooperation, nor was the prime minister willing to do this.
Though the party presidents were very prominent here, their mostly informal actions 
were not sufficient to guide legislation on regionalisation through parliament. Coveil (1982) 
has argued that differences between informal and formal policy making arenas were 
important. After informal discussions during government formation and later during the 
Stuyvenberg negotiations were completed, the agreement had to be implemented by the 
formal decision making bodies. There, support for the coalition agreement eroded rapidly or 
indeed was limited from the start. In the parliamentary arena, the sense of an opportunity 
within the CVP to give the Flemish People’s Union a blow in elections may also have formed
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a reason why this party increasingly became intransigent, with the prime minister refusing
to cooperate. 6
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7T h e  V a n  A g t  I I  C o a l i t i o n  
( 1 9 8 1 - 1 9 8 2 )
A THREE PARTY COALITION
!
The three largest parties all lost votes in the parliamentary elections of 26 May 1981. A 
term in opposition for the PvdA had not proved to be an asset for this party, as it lost 
nearly 20 percent of its seats (from 53 to 44) and became the second party after the CDA, 
which took 48 seats with only limited losses. Importantly, the incumbent CDA-VVD 
coalition, which had managed to complete a four year term in office, lost its majority. 
The ’winners’ in the elections were the Democrats 1966 (D66), who went from 8 to 17 
seats. This brought the party into an important position during government formation.
In the Netherlands, there is a general consensus that governments must be majority 
governments, thus a new party combination had to be formed. Other constraints reduced 
further the number of possible or viable alternatives (Tops & Dittrich, 1992: 286). The 
public refusal by D66 to participate in a government consisting of the CDA and W D  was 
important in this respect. The party had announced this before the elections and persisted 
in its refusal afterwards. As a coalition including the VVD and the PvdA was unlikely 
due to party political constraints; the PvdA excluded co-operation with the VVD, and for 
this reason the only two viable alternatives appeared to be a coalition of the CDA and 
PvdA, or one formed from the CDA, PvdA and D66.' The former would be minimal 
winning, the latter a surplus majority coalition. In either case, the Christian Democrats 
and Social Democrats would become coalition partners. Thus, as the biggest party, the 
CDA this time had no alternative but to cooperate with the PvdA.
In this respect, the experiences of these parties in office and during government 
formation in the preceding eight or so years were relevant. From 1973 till 1977, the 
PvdA and the KVP and ARP (two of the three parties which merged to form the CDA in 
1980) had participated in a government (the Den Uyl government) which eventually broke 
down over an internal dispute just before the end of the four year constitutional term. In *17
1 The theoretical possibility of a coalition between CDA, VVD and the small right wing 
(religious) parties was not considered a viable alternative by either the CDA or the W D.
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the following government, the CDA and PvdA made no less than six attempts to form a 
government, but without success. After protracted bargaining between the two parties, the 
Party Council of the PvdA voted against government participation. Within a week, a 
CDA-VVD government (the Van Agt I government) was formed. Both these experiences 
greatly increased the mistrust between the two parties. The distances perceived between 
the policy preferences of the PvdA and CDA on financial and socio-economic policy were 
also seen to be much larger than those between the CDA and VVD. Together, these 
factors meant that during the formation of the Van Agt II government the negotiations on 
a coalition agreement were likely to be anything but easy.
The formation process
Of the two coalitional alternatives, the three party option was preferred most by the CDA 
and the PvdA. Though the PvdA and D66 had not formed a real pre*electoral coalition, 
both parties had stated publicly that they preferred joint participation in the new 
government. The PvdA recognised that D66 could not be ignored because of its electoral 
victory. To the CDA, inclusion of D66 meant a decrease in the relative weight o f the 
PvdA within the government. Thus, formation talks between CDA, PvdA and D66 were 
started at the end of May.
The first point on the agenda was the question of who would be the new prime 
minister. Normally, the largest party may claim the office of prime minister, in this case 
the prime minister would again be a Christan Democrat. This was also emphasised by the 
two informateurs (both CDA) who presided over the discussions. The outgoing prime 
minister Dries van Agt, however, was not attractive to the other parties who had some 
difficulties with accepting him. They declared that they had provlems with the ex-prime 
minister of a centre right government who now was supposed to become the leader of a 
government with an entirely different signature. Moreover, the personal relationship 
between Van Agt and the leader of the PvdA, Joop den Uyl, was anything but close. 
Only after lengthy discussions was agreement reached on this matter. D66 accepted Van 
Agt finally, followed by the PvdA in early July. The in form ateurs promised the PvdA that 
this concession would be compensated for in the distribution of cabinet portfolios.
By this time (early July), policy negotiations had started. Contary to what had 
been common during most of the preceding formations, the issues were not dealt with 
consecutively but, as the inform ateurs called it, the approach was now ’concentric’. This 
meant that more general discussions on several fields o f policy would be held first, 
followed by negotiations on the really salient and controversial matters that had emerged 
during the first round.
This approach to policy negotiations did not prevent the PvdA from presenting 
firmly six demands (strijdpunten). These were taken from the party’s election manifesto.
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These points regarded (1) a decrease in differences in incomes, (2) no decrease in the 
spending power of the lowest income groups, (3) equal opportunities for men and women, 
including individualisaton of incomes, (4) elaboration of a plan for the creation of 
300,000 jobs, (5) the closing down of the two nuclear power stations in the Netherlands, 
and finally (6) dropping four or five of the six existing military nuclear tasks, and 
renouncement of the deployment of cruise missiles in the Netherlands. For the PvdA, an 
agreement on these issues was a conditio sine qua non for government participation, but 
unlike in 1977, it had not declared these matters to be ’unnegotiable’.
This last point was important, as the six issues were in some cases not only salient 
to the PvdA. The points relating to economic and defense policy were also highly salient 
to the CD A and D66. Another issue that was generally important was secondary school 
reform. Given these points, bargaining on coalition policy was thus likely to take place in 
a 'multidimensional' policy space. The issues relating to economic and financial policy 
were often 'compromisable', while the other issues seemed less so.
The relay race o f  informateurs and  form ateurs
After a first round of negotiations, PvdA-leader Den Uyl requisted a third inform ateur  
from within his party. This third informateur was Ed van Thijn, the second person after 
Den Uyl in the parliamentary group. In the second round of negotiations, a document was 
produced, which in turn would form the basis of further negotiations. These started in 
early August, with the appointment of two form ateurs (one from the CDA and one from 
the PvdA). Usually, with the appointment of a fo rm a teur  the process of government 
formation has reached its final stage, with the fo rm a teu r  becoming the new prime 
minister. Despite this and given the fact that now there were two form ateurs , it soon 
became apparent that the parties were not yet ready to adopt the results of the negotiations 
on policy. Different groups and organisations form within society were also rather 
negative about what were called the 'results of the programme discussions'. In the view 
of the National Bank, the new government could not afford to spend money on an 
employment plan but instead should start by making drastic cutbacks in expenditure. Van 
Agt and the financial specialists within the party’s parliamentary group referred the 
Bank’s statements when making a number of additional demands on financial and 
economic policy and by doing so they called into question the compromises reached 
thusfar. The other two parties, however, were very reluctant to accept these new 
demands. In fact, the parliamentary groups of the PvdA and D66 were ready to confirm 
that the programmatic conclusions formed a sufficient basis for the three party 
government.
Within the parliamentary group of the CDA, there was also support for the 
agreement. When an internal vote was held, a substantive minority appeared to support 
the agreement and thus, by implication, rejected the additional claims made by their own 
party leader. Others voted against the agreement only out of loyalty to Van Agt. Van Agt
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reacted by withdrawing from being his party’s first spokesman during the negotiations. 
On the 24th of August, he was replaced by by Ruud Lubbers, the former inform ateur and 
second man after Van Agt in the parliamentary group. Van Agt however, remained a 
candidate for the office of prime minister.
The rejection of the results by the majority of the parliamentary group of the CDA 
caused the fo rm ateurs  to conclude that their attempt to bring the parties closer had failed 
and therefore they returned their instruction to the Queen. The next day, an inform ateur 
form the CDA was appointed. This in form ateur  immediately focused on the conflictual 
points. By the end of August, the parties reached agreement on these points so that 
finally. Van Agt could be appointed fo rm axeur , with his main task being the actual 
forming of the government. The CDA and PvdA would each have 6 seats in the cabinet, 
and D66 would have 3 seats. The three party government was sworn in on 11 September
1981.
Several rounds of bargaining were needed before the final text of the coalition 
agreement was accepted by the parties. These negotiation rounds were certainly an 
’invisible politics’ process, as little was made public. Even the three parliamentary groups 
were not informed continuously and completely.
General features of the coalition agreement
The coalition agreement consisted of some 14,500 words, but it was not one single 
document. It consisted of what were called the ’results o f the programme discussions’ and 
a number of supplementary ’programme conclusions* arrived at in a later stage of the 
negotiations. The scope of the agreement was broad, including ten main fields of policy. 
These were the fields on which the first round of discussions in the ’concentric’ approach 
had been held. The agreement clearly reflected the general procedure followed by the 
successive in form ateurs and fo rm ateurs; the documents produced later did not contain new 
issues.
If a closer look is taken at the content of the agreement, few really specific and 
’doable’ statements are found. At in an early stage of the negotiations, the inform ateurs 
had noted that the length of the different paragraphs did not relate to the political 
significance of the subjects dealt with in these paragraphs. ’Sometimes, few words were 
needed for important questions and many words for less important matters’ (HTK, 1981, 
17000/2: 5). As we will see, this would have different results with regard to the extent to 
which policy conflicts were really resolved during the government formation process.
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CONFLICTS, ARRANGEMENTS, AND POLICY MAKING
From conflicts to arrangements
Socio-economic a n d  financia l policy
During the formation, financial and socio-economic policy was important both because of 
the deteriorating economic situation and because the three parties had profiled themselves 
rather differently in this field during the election campaign. The second reason was the 
most important with respect to the issues on which actual bargaining would take place. 
During the negotiations, the focus was on cutbacks in expenditures, the budget deficit, 
elaboration of an employment plan, income and tax policy and investment regulation.
The budget deficit and  cuts in expenditures Though the three parties did not show large 
differences in their preferences with regard to the budget deficit in the long run, dissent 
remained over the goals for 1982 and 1983. PvdA leader Den Uyl refused to go further 
than committing his party to an attem pt to reduce the deficit in 1982 and 1983. CDA 
leader Van Agt insisted on a commitment from all parties to realise a decrease by 1 
percent in 1982 and 1 percent in 1983. On this point, D66 was closer to the CD A than to 
the PvdA.
An explicit compromise on this matter was formulated, containing an intention to 
decrease the deficit by 1 percent in 1982 and in 1983. This entailed a payoff to the CDA, 
and D66 also stated that it was satisfied with the arrangement. This compromise however 
mentioned nothing about the second half of the government’s term (1984-1985).
The next, and closely related, point was the size of cuts in government 
expenditure. CDA leader Van Agt demanded cuts of Dfl. 4.5 billion in 1982, which were 
also to be mentioned explicitly in the coalition agreement. Both the PvdA and D66 
rejected this claim. According to D66, fixing exact amounts was something that should be 
left to the new government. The PvdA linked the matter to its central point of concern, 
the employment plan, on which the discussions had still not led to concrete results. Here, 
the CDA made concessions, as neither Van Agt’s claim of 4.5 billion (this was 
nicknamed his ’dowry*) nor any other specific amount of cuts for 1982 was mentioned in 
the coalition agreement. Agreement was reached only on the amount of cuts for the whole 
period, which would be 9.5 billion, but this had not been the major point of dispute. 
Thus, only an implicit compromise could be reached on the problem of the size of cuts. 
The relative paragraph further said that the emphasis on cuts would cover the first half of 
the government’s term in office.
A distribution ratio for cutbacks in the main sectors of governmental spending was 
also included. These sectors were social security (mainly the responsibility of the ministry 
of Social Affairs & Employment), health (ministry of Health), public sector wages
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(Internal Affairs) and other departmental spending. This cutback ratio was 3:1:3:2 for the 
four sectors respectively, and it regarded the whole four year period. It was also stated 
that new policy could only be developed if it did not involve claims for extra money. 
New expenses were to be compensated for by cuts elsewhere. In the view of Van Agt, 
these points in the coalition agreement formed ’an extra lock on the door’, to prevent the 
PvdA from steering towards increases in spending ’for particular purposes’. Yet, the 
points were sufficiently general to leave doubt as to whether the door was actually closed 
or still open.
A Final point covered the level of rates and taxes, which according to the CD A 
should be stabilised at the level of 1980. The PvdA’s preference was to make an 
exception for expected revenues from anti-fraud policy, higher costs of public services, 
increases in gas prices and especially, spending on employment. The CD A advocated a 
broader definition, and firmly rejected the exception of spending on employment, which 
in the view of the Christian Democrats would make the whole intention a farce. 
Negotiations on this point resulted in an arrangement in which it was stated that the level 
of rates and taxes would be fixed at that existing in 1981 (this was 62.1 percent of the 
national income; corrected for revenues from gas sales, it was 55.1 percent). The first 
points mentioned by the PvdA (anti-fraud revenues, costs of public services) were also 
incorporated into the coalition agreement, but not the last two (gas prce increases and 
spending on employment). This in effect meant an important constraint on any plans in 
the sphere of employment policy. This arrangement was an explicit compromise 
containing concessions from all the parties, if not concessions o f equal size.
The em ploym ent p lan  Rapidly growing unemployment meant that all three parties had 
declared that reducing unemployment was to be one of the new government’s central 
goals. The results of bargaining over financial and budgetary policy have already shown 
that there was clearly less consensus over the way to reduce unemployment. As said, one 
of the key issues, and part of the new government’s raison d ’être for the PvdA was an 
employment plan, a typical piece of Keynesian policy adopted by a Social Democratic 
party. CD A and D66 agreed to mention in the agreement that such a plan would be 
developed, but the CD A refused to make any further commitments. The arrangement was 
thus an implicit compromise, which mentioned that an employment plan would be 
elaborated within 4 months after the government had taken office. Despite being a 
minimal result, placement of the issue on the agenda of the government was just 
acceptable to the PvdA. No clear intentions were formulated on the financial resources, 
an obviously crucial point.
Incom e and tax  p o licy  The CD A and PvdA further disagreed over developments for 
lowest incomes, referred to as the ’minima’, in the coming years. According to the PvdA, 
the ’minima’ should be protected against any decrease in spending power, a promise from
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their election manifesto. In the view of the CD A, the most that could be done was to keep 
the decrease ’as limited as reasonably possible’. On this issue, an explicit compromise 
was reached, which stated that the spending power of the minima would decrease by no 
more than 1 percent each year; in comparison, for the highest incomes, estimates stood at 
minus 4 percent per year. This arrangement thus contained a concession from the PvdA 
but also a commitment for the CDA and D66. If other intentions agreed on between the 
parties and general economic developments allowed this, the government would give 
’special attention’ to financial protection of the lowest income group. No absolute 
guarantees were given however. In the arrangement no exact definition of the ’minima’ 
was given; the CDA had advocated a narrow definition and the PvdA a broad one. The 
intention to maintain what was called the coupling mechanism between wages and social 
benefits was an expicit compromise and thus more clearly committing. This in mm 
entailed a payoff to the PvdA, although it was not percieved as a really important 
concession by the CDA. Precisely for this reason, and because for the other items mostly 
vague intentions had been written down, the CDA was the most satisfied with the results 
of bargaining over income policy.
Another conflict was over fiscal policy with regard to mortgagees. The conflict 
had two elements. One element concerned the maximum of fiscal provisions for 
mortgagees in the present fiscal system (the parties set different maxima, an expression of 
different preferences with regard to graduation in taxation). As a conflict over 
contingencies, this could be settled by an explicit compromise in which the difference was 
split, indeed split exactly. The other element concerned the setting up of a new system 
where fiscal facilities would be independent of income. Not surprisingly, the PvdA 
opposed the introduction of such a system, as it was seen to increase differences in 
incomes. D66 tended towards the position of the CDA. An implicit compromise was 
formulated, in which decision making on such a system was left to the government.
Investment regulation  A final issue within the field of socio-economic policy was the 
introduction of, or actually the tightening of, investment regulations. This issue was 
placed on the agenda by the PvdA. In the view of this party, stricter directions, especially 
in the housing sector, were needed to ensure investment, which in turn would stimulate 
employment. Both the CDA and D66 were reluctant to engage in further regulation of this 
field, and the spokespersons of the CDA demanded that, to avoid the Social Democrats 
developing false hopes, the coalition agreement should staste clearly that no plans for 
legislation on this matter existed. The definitive arrangement on this matter however, 
provided neither this ’clarity’ nor any concrete ’hints* to the contrary. As such, it was an 
implicit compromise.
N uclear energy po licy
With regard to the issue of nuclear energy, the parties had rather different positions. The
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CDA preferred to keep the two existing nuclear power stations in operation» and await the 
results of a national discussion on (nuclear) energy before deciding on the building of 
other stations. In contrast, both D66 and the PvdA advocated closing down the two power 
stations and abandoning plans to build new ones.
Typically, a largely procedural arrangement was formulated. This was typical in 
the sense that in the Netherlands, as in many other countries, nuclear policy was a 
position issue, and together with the uncertainty which surrounded nuclear energy in 
general, agreeing to disagree by asking the advice of external experts was an obvious way 
to appease the conflict at the political level. This is precisely what happened. It was 
decided that a committee of independent experts should study the effects of closing down 
the two nuclear power stations. This study was to be completed within 6 months. Next, 
the government would define its position, and present this in parliament. A second 
implicit compromise regarded new nuclear power stations. Here, it was agreed that the 
government would not deal with the question of new nuclear power stations.
Nuclear weapons p o licy
The issue of the deployment of cruise missiles was highly confiictual in the Netherlands. 
The prenegotiation positions of the PvdA and CDA especially were different, if not 
outrightly incompatible. This was mainly because the PvdA rejected deployment 
unconditionally (the key issue in their election manifesto, next to the employment plan). 
The CDA preferred to decide the matter in December 1981, and make the decision taking 
into account the results of disarmament talks to be held in Geneva. These talks and the 
deployment of middle distance missiles formed the two components of the infamous 
NATO ’double decision’ of 1979. D66 rejected deployment ’in the present
circumstances’. This position was an intraparty compromise between those tending 
towards the PvdA and those preferring to keep other options open.
Before the final arrangement on this issue was written down, many compromises 
ended in the waste paper basket. These texts had contained all kinds of complicated 
clauses, all of them reflecting the lack o f real agreement on this matter. As Van Agt 
complained
we now have many words written down, which actually tell us that there is no real 
agreement. Let us simply show this by removing alt these words and say that we 
have not reached agreement at all (quoted in: Dittrich, Cohen & Rutgers, 1983:
52-3; author’s translation).
Yet, eventually, the parties did agree on an arrangement, which not surprisingly was an 
implicit compromise. The government would first consult the NATO partners, and then 
’determine autonomously when and on what decision making would take place’. In the 
parliamentary discussions that followed, the three parties would be free to consider these
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decisions in the light of their respective election manifestos.
In the constituent meeting of the government, the PvdA ministers underwrote a 
letter by Ed van Thijn, a former informateur and new minister of Internal Affairs, which 
said that the Social Democrats in the government would resign if a majority within the 
government took a positive decision.
School po licy
Within the field o f education, conflict existed between the parties and again mainly 
between the CD A and the PvdA, over a reform of the system of secondary education. 
The PvdA and to a lesser extent D66 were protagonists of reforming secondary education. 
In its election manifesto, the PvdA had argued in favour of one general and public system 
of secondary education for the age group 10-14 years (this was called the middenschool 
because it formed a bridge between primary and secondary education). In the view of the 
Social Democrats, this reform was an important step towards equal opportunities in 
education. This new system would be more egalitarion than the existing system, and this 
was precisely the point of concern for the Christian Democrats, who wanted to preserve 
the existing system in which state schools and subsidised religious schools existed side by 
side.
In the coalition agreement, it was stated that the existing system of secondary 
education would be changed. To this purpose, legislation would be submitted ’as soon as 
possible’. This legislation would bear a transitional character and enlarge the possibilities 
of experiments with the newly thought out system of secondary education. As the 
government would draft legislation, parliament should decide on the matter not later than 
during the course of 1983. Further, it was stated that the article on education in the 
constitution would be amended, to warrant the financial equality between state (neutral) 
and religious schools. To this end, the constitutional amendment was to mention that 
delegation of legislative competences to local government would not be possible. This last 
point benefited the CD A, but the arrangement as a whole was an implicit compromise.
Table 7.1 shows the results of bargaining on the relevant issues.
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Table 7.1
Arrangements in Van Agt II coalition agreement
type of arrangement
policy field
financial/budgetary policy
explicit
2
procedural general
3 5
socio-economic policy 3 - 3 6
school policy - - 1 1
nuclear policy - 3 - 3
5 3 7 15
Arrangements and policymaking
As with all new governments, the Van Agt II government had to present itself in 
parliament, though unlike in Belgium, no formal investiture exists in the Netherlands. It 
was decided that the prime minister would read the government declaration one month 
after the government had taken office. This was because Van Agt expected that the 
preparation of the declaration would not be as easy as usual, as this time clarification had 
to be given on a number of issues on which the parties had been unable to reach 
substantive agreement.
Some of the key issues in the coalition agreement were on the cabinet agenda 
immediately after the government took office. These issues were the employment plan, 
cuts in expenditure, the budget deficit and nuclear weapons. As we have seen, 
arrangements on these issues were mostly rather general and implicit compromises. With 
regard to nuclear weapons, the cabinet agreed on what position it would take at the next 
meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group of NATO, which would be held at the end of 
1981. This position was kept secret until the presentation of the government declaration. 
On financial and socio-economic policy, however, the government got into political 
problems. As we will see below, these issues were already critical to the life of the 
government at an early stage.
F inancial/budgetary a n d  socio-econom ic p o licy
Two of the central issues were cuts in expenditures and the employment plan. The 
problem was that the policies preferred by the coalition parties were to a large extent 
mutually exclusive. With regard to the employment plan, the coalition agreement only 
stated that such a plan would be developed within four months after the government had 
taken office. Further bargaining was also necessary on the size o f cuts in expenditure. As 
the negotiators during government formation, the ministers involved directly had different
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priorities. In the view of the vice prime minister, the government was to act immediately 
to fight unemployment, beginning with the public sector. The ministers of the CDA and 
D66 argued instead that more time was needed for the elaboration of the employment plan 
and also that the private sector should be given more emphasis in govenmental policy. 
The minister o f Finance contributed to the discussion by demanding more cuts than 
agreed on for the coming four years. All this contrasted rather sharply with claims made 
by the spending departments (these amounted to 4 billion). Since the size of the cuts and 
certainly determining where they would fall was still not decided, most of the ministers 
from the spending departments tried to grab what they could. These ministers were 
mostly Social Democrats.
Conflict also resurfaced on the budget deficit. Though the 1 percent decrease for 
1982 mentioned in the coalition agreement was not called into question, several ministers 
disagreed on the percentage that was to be reached in 1982 (this was because there were 
different estimations of the percentage for 1981). In the calculations of the minister of 
finance, the deficit was to be 6.5 percent in 1982, whereas his colleague at Social Affairs 
& Employment mentioned a percentage of 7 percent. In early October, the cabinet agreed 
that the government would aim at 6.5 percent in 1982, this entailed a concession from 
Den Uyl.
At the beginning of October, the government also reached an arrangement on the 
financial resources for the employment plan. In 1982, 2.6 billion would be made 
available. Consensus on this issue however, did not last long, as the next day the minister 
of finance declared that due to a ’miscalculation’ far too much money had been promised. 
In the new situation, only 300 million would be available. The prime minister supported 
the minister of Finance on this point, as on most other matters. The consequence however 
was an escalation of conflict, which led to the fall o f the government on 16 October 1981, 
before it had made its presentation in parliament.
A n attem pt at governm ent reparation
A paradoxical element in the fall of the government was that the ministers had resigned 
collectively to leave open the possibility of repairing the government. If the Queen would 
only ’consider the resignation of the cabinet’ without immediately accepting it, the parties 
could try to patch up the cabinet without elections taking place (these after all had been 
held less than five months before).
The PvdA was given primary responsibility for finding a way out of the crisis. 
Two inform ateurs were appointed from this party. The inform ateurs first declared that 
they would take the coalition agreement as the starting point. These negotiations were 
between the ministers directly responsible and the leaders of the three parliamentary 
groups. The results of the discussions were carefully kept secret until agreement was 
reached. The attempt at government reparation was thus made in a setting very similar to 
the government formation arena.
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The inform ateurs started by noting the key points of conflict. These were the same 
issues as those discussed during government formation. A proposal was made for the 
financing of the employment plan, containing among other things an increase in income 
tax by one percent (the PvdA called this a ’solidarity levy’). With regard to cuts in 
expenditure, the inform ateurs reported that new economic problems had increased the gap 
between expenditure and income to about 10 billion.
The proposals made by the inform ateurs were not all well received by the three 
parties. Some elements were rejected outright by all parties. The CDA opposed a 
proposal for income dependent children’s allowances, and there were also objections to 
the 1 percent 'solidarity levy' which had been included on the instigation of the PvdA.
Reactions were more positive when the inform ateurs produced a second version of 
the report. In early November, the prime minister declared that the government ’expected 
to be able to reach agreement’ on the basis of the new report, which itself had become 
almost a new coalition agreement on financial and socio-economic policy. The report 
mentioned the 'solidarity levy’ as well as an intention to collect financial resources 
amounting to 1 billion for the employment plan in 1982. No specific decisions were made 
on the contents of the plan.
The income dependent children’s allowance was mentioned, but only very 
generally. The report also stated that the government would ’do its best’ to avoid the 
spending power of the lowest income group decreasing by more than 1 percent in 1982. 
With respect to the budget deficit, the in form ateurs noted that a decrease to 6.5 percent in 
1982 (on which the parties had already reached agreement) would be very difficult to 
realise.
Though the report was presented as a more elaborate version of the section on 
socio-economic and financial policy in the coalition agreement, the above points indicate 
that even this did not result in clear cut and unambiguous statements on the key issues of 
budgetary policy (HTK, 17000/9: 23-30; Dittrich, Cohen & Rutgers, 1983: 96-102).
The governm ent a n d  socio-econom ic po licy: a  replay in  slow m otion  
The official 'restart* of the government was scheduled for 16 November 1981. The 
government quickly made a text for the government declaration. This was more because 
the parties felt that they could no longer postpone presentation of the government in 
parliament than because they truly agreed on all issues. The declaration also contained the 
arrangement on nuclear weapons on which the government had earlier reached agreement. 
The arrangement was again procedural and stated that no decision on the deployment of 
cruise missiles would be taken in 1981, and that after 1981 the procedure would be as 
indicated in the coalition agreement.
The government faced the task of taking more specific decisions on cuts in 
expenditures, income policy and the employment plan on the basis o f the results o f some 
5 months of negotiations. Before engaging in discussions on the budget for the next year,
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the budget for 1982 had to be revised, i.e. updated to the economic situation. The 
minister of Finance proposed cuts of 4.5 billion in 1982 and added that in 1983 spending 
needed to be reduced by at least 5 billion. This meant that the total amount of cuts for the 
entire legislative term mentioned in the coalition agreement was to be realised in the first 
two years, at least if the coalition agreement was followed.
A problem which was still on the agenda however was specifying the employment 
plan and once again the incompatibility of party preferences became manifest. In early 
1982, the budget deficit appeared to be higher than estimated, a consequence being that 
the agreed 1 percent decrease was insufficient to reduce the deficit to 6.5 percent in 1982. 
To Den Uyl, this was not a real problem, but Van Agt and the minister of Economic 
Affairs (D66) said that the government was committed to 6.5 percent in 1982.
All this caused the government to postpone the presentation of the Voorjaarsnota , 
a white paper containing the financial/budgetary framework for the coming year. Just 
before Easter, a compromise was reached on the size of cuts in 1982 and 1983. The 
parties also decided to leave the budget deficit unchanged in 1982. The government thus 
deviated from the coalition agreement (a 1 percent decrease in 1982) on this point and 
also abandoned the intention of a decrease to 6.5 percent in this year. The consequence of 
these decisions was an increase in the level of rates and taxes, also at variance with the 
coalition agreement. This deviation from the agreement did not however, generate new 
conflict between the parties.
The concept version of the Voorjaarsnota mentioned the ’solidarity levy’. 
Maintaining the coupling between wages and social benefits was seen as politically 
important, which was in accordance with the coalition agreement. At the same time, 
however, the real income of the ’minima’ would decrease by nearly 2 percent if no 
additional measures were taken. This was in contradiction to an explicit comrpomise in 
the coalition agreement which gave a maximum decrease of 1 percent. The basis of 
agreement within the government was thus a policy package containing major concessions 
from all the parties (especially the CDA and PvdA). This agreement could easily be 
disrupted by any change in one of the components of the package.
Failure as the definitive outcome
Economic developments continued to form an important constraint on the government 
during the discussions on the definitive version of the Voorjaarsnota . The ministers of the 
PvdA asked for more clarity about the way in which the government would protect the 
’minima’ against further decreases in spending power. With regard to financial resources 
for the employment plan, the minister of Finance said that the only way to find money 
was by increasing cutbacks in other fields of spending. This was rejected by the ministers 
of the PvdA, who declared that the only cuts they were willing to support were cuts in 
the defence budget.
In early May, discussions in parliament on a revision of the Health Insurance Act
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as one way to make cuts in the field o f health were broken off. Continued pressure from 
the trade unions to undo an increase in premiums for employees meant that the CDA and 
D66 gave up hope that a revision of the Act would really lead to the intended decrease in 
costs and spending. Facing the risk of a defeat in the Second Chamber, Den Uyl proposed 
deferal of the parliamentary discussions, which was accepted by the leaders of the 
parliamentary groups. This however did not mean that the issue was removed from the 
agenda, at least not to the Christian Democrats, and certainly not to the prime minister. 
In Van Agt’s view, the government was to find an alternative, and so he proposed extra 
cuts of 500 million, on which he called a vote in the cabinet held on 11 May. The CDA 
and D66 voted for the proposal, but the PvdA voted against and subsequently withdrew 
from the government, eight months after it was sworn in (and even more shortly after it 
had presented itself to parliament), and with this the government fell.
Other arrangem ents on socio-econom ic p o lic y
Given this short term in office, the question arises, what happened about other 
arrangements on issues that had been controversial during government formation? Within 
the field of socio-economic policy, not all arrangements had been dealt with at length 
when the coalition broke down. Despite the limited amount o f time spent on other issues, 
the general implicit compromise on investment regulation had given rise to conflict. The 
issue of fiscal facilities for mortgagees was not dealt with.
School policy
The intention within the field of school policy was to set up experiments on a new type of 
school for which special legislation needed to be developed. In addition, the constitutional 
article on education had to be amended to prevent local governments depriving religious 
schools of financial resources. In January 1982. the government issued a note on the 
experiments with the new school type. This note was to form the basis of legislation. 
Though the government made a relatively ’quick start’ on this issue, the fall of the 
government prevented the legislation, including a draft for a constitutional amendment, 
being submitted to parliament.
Nuclear policy
The coalition agreement contained an implicit compromise on the problem of the two 
nuclear power stations, which said that an expert committee was to report on the matter 
within six months, and that a decision on the nuclear power stations should follow the 
report. When the government fell, the commitee had still not presented its report, and the 
issue was shelved. An unwritten rule o f constitutional law in the Netherlands says that 
politically controversial decisions should not be taken during the incumbency of a 
caretaker government. The other arrangement on new nuclear power stations was that no 
decisions would be taken during the term of the Van Agt government. This at least was
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something that did not form a problem for the coalition parties.
The arrangement on the deployment of cruise missiles contained an open ended 
postponement. The only clear cut point was that the government would inform its NATO 
partners that it would refrain from deciding on the issue in December 1981. Decision 
making on the cruise missiles and the existing military nuclear tasks would be based on 
the results of international disarmament talks in Geneva. These talks would start only at 
the end of November 1981, and no results were expected before the second half of 1982. 
There was no conflict on these issues during the life of the government.
SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF THE VAN AGT II COALITION
It will have become clear from the discussion above that failure was more frequent and 
also politically more important than success. Let us consider the outcomes more 
systematically and relate these to the hypotheses on the three types of arrangements. The 
outcomes in terms of conflict and implementation are given in table 7.2.
Table 7.2
Outcomes of arrangements in Van Agt II coalition agreement
Type of arrangement
explicit procedural implicit-general
Outcome
elaborated/implemented 
(no conflict} 1 (so-ec) 2 (nuc) (3)
not elaborated/implemented 
(no conflict} 
elaborated/implemented
2 (fin,so-ec) 1 (nuc) 2 (so-ec,scho) (5)
(conflict) - - - (-)
not elaborated/implemented 
(conflict) 2 (fin,so-ec) - 5 (fin,so-ec) (7)
(5) (3) (7) (15)
k e y  to s y m b o ls :
so-ec “ socio-economic policy fin = financial policy nuc = nuclear policy
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The streamlining effect of explicit compromises
The first hypothesis was that explicit compromises are implemented peacefully, and thus 
smooth policy making within a coalition. This outcome however was the exception rather 
than the rule, as only one of the five explicit compromises (on the coupling of wages and 
social benefits) was implemented without involving conflict.
Two compromises were neither implemented nor did they become the object of 
dispute. The issue of fiscal facilities for mortgagees had not been dealt with when the 
government fell. The government deviated from the agreement to stabilise the level of 
rates and taxes by deciding to increase taxes in 1982. This decision was related directly to 
the parties’ inability to reach agreement on the size and distribution of cuts in 1982. This 
is considered further below.
The explicit compromises on the budget deficit and on the spending power of the 
lowest income groups were not implemented and gave rise to conflict. Soon after the 
government took office, it became clear that the intended decrease of the deficit was no 
longer realistic and that the income situation of the ’minima* would deteriorate more than 
outlined in the agreement (a 2 percent instead of a 1 percent decrease in spending power). 
These developments however, did not mean that the coalition agreement was laid aside 
overnight. Indeed, conflict on these two issues contributed to the fall of the government.
The freezing effect of procedural arrangements
With regard to procedural arrangements, the hypothesis was that these prevent the re- 
emergence of conflict on the relevant issues. This was also the outcome of the three 
procedural arrangements that had been formulated, though one arrangement was actually 
not implemented. This arrangement stated that an expert committee was to report on the 
effects of closing down the two existing nuclear power stations in the Netherlands within 
six months, but this had not been done when the government broke down. The other 
procedural arrangements were also on nuclear policy, and both were observed. Thus, by 
formulating procedural arrangements, the parties had removed nuclear policy from the 
agenda. We should realise that the government collapsed on other issues even before 
nuclear policy, given the content of the arrangements, could become the object of 
controversy.
The boomerang effect of general implicit compromises
Arrangements which only mentioned general or even vague intentions were expected to 
appease rather than to resolve conflict and were also expected less often to lead to
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substantive decisions in line with the ’spirit’ of the coalition agreement than explicit 
compromises.
This type of arrangements was never elaborated successfully by the Van Agt II 
coalition. Two arrangements did not give rise to conflict and were also not implemented. 
These concerned fiscal facilities for mortgagees and school policy.
The most typical outcome of general arrangements was conflict that paralysed 
policy making (5 out of 7 cases). These arrangements were all on financial/budgetary 
matters and income policy. The basic point of controversy was the setting of priorities, 
which in the view of the PvdA was to be an active employment policy involving 
spending, whereas the CD A insisted on drastic cutbacks. These incompatible preferences 
led to a situation of stalemate which lasted until a formal vote on the size of cuts was held 
in the cabinet. The result of what had become essentially a zero sum game was defeat for 
the PvdA, which immediately withdrew from the government.
To the PvdA, the small base of support for developing the employment plan meant 
that the coalition had lost its raison d '  être. Within the CDA, an influential group led by 
prime minister Van Agt seems to have been intransigent because it made a different 
calculation: the subsequent elections were likely to bring a coalition with the Liberals 
within sight and such a coalition was much preferred to continued cooperation with the 
PvdA. From this perspective, a government crisis formed an opportunity rather than a 
threat. This underlines the notion that ’failure’ as the outcome of the implementation 
process may not be a failure for all the parties involved.
This does not change the conclusion that developments in the Van Agt II coalition 
sustain the view that general implicit compromises do not prevent conflict effectively. The 
outcomes are also in line with the expectation that this type of arrangement is often less 
successfully elaborated than explicit compromises.
The overall outcomes are presented in table 7.3. Clearly, the coalition agreement was not 
functional in terms of policy predefinition (only 3 arrangements were implemented, of 
which only one contained substantive intentions). Though the frequency of conflict as an 
outcome was not particularly high (7 out of 15), the conflicts which did arise were intense 
and had a long duration, or re-emerged several times. Moreover, in a paradoxical way, 
the early breakdown of the coalition meant that in a number of cases there was an absence 
o f conflict, as not all issues were dealt with.
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Table 7.3
Success and failure of the Van Agt II coalition
implementation 
+ —
conflict
+
3 5 
7
FACTORS EXPLAINING SUCCESS AND FAILURE
What were the causes of failure? The factors considered in this study are concerned with 
the characteristics of a coalition, individual parties, a government and the economic 
context within which these coalition governments operate. These different factors are seen 
to form favourable or unfavourable conditions for the enforcement of a coalition 
agreement.
The low rate of implementation was due partly to the early breakdown of the Van 
Agt II coalition. Excluding the arrangements which were not implemented because the fall 
of the government (and no other reason) prevented this, there are 10 arrangements left for 
consideration in this section. The area of school policy is not considered (there was one 
arrangement which was still at the stage of elaboration when the government fell). The 
associations between factors and outcomes are given in table 7.4. These associations may 
have been more or less 'strong' but must represent at least half of the arrangements 
considered in this section. As in the preceding case studies, the representations given in 
table 7.4 are only meant to give general indications. ,
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Table 7.4
Association between factors and outcomes in the Van Agt II coalition2
policy field
finance/ socio­ nuclear
factor
budget economic power/arms
coalition size (++) { + ) 0
internal party unity -- - 0
negotiators in government 0 0 0
prime ministerial support 0 0 +
coalition committees - - 0
personal relationships -- - 0
economic situation — — 0
k e y  to s y m b o ls :
+ + or + direct association between factor and success
-* or - direct association between factor and failure
o no association found
n.a. not assessed {no indication presence or absence factor)
Coalition size and reciprocal control
One assumption is that in multiparty coalitions arrangements are less likely to be 
implemented because reciprocal control is reduced. The complexity of interparty 
relationships in multiparty coalitions was expected to make ’disloyal* behaviour by 
individual parties more likely. The incentive for such disloyal behaviour was seen to lie in 
the distribution of payoffs from policy bargaining. Given that payoffs from individual 
arrangements are never really equal for all parties, there will often be at least one party 
that ’regrets’ the concessions made when the matter reaches the agenda, though this need 
not mean that the party is no longer willing to compromise. When there are three or more 
parties, such second thoughts are more likely to occur and it may also be that a second 
party supports modifications of an arrangement made during government formation.
Given the frequency of failure (7 out of 10 arrangements were not implemented) 
and the multiparty character of the Van Agt II coalition, these two variables can be seen 
to be associated in the way assumed. Does this really mean that the presence o f a third 
party made a difference to the outcomes? Here, we could argue that D66 as the third 
party, rather than the other two, which were both necessary for a majority, had not 
profiled itself in the areas of financial and socio-economic policy as strongly as the CD A 3
3 See the appendix for more detailed findings on the coalition.
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and PvdA. In these fields especially, the Liberals Democrats often took a position 
carefully between the CD A and the PvdA, and we might say that this weakened 
reciprocal control between the two larger parties.3
The question, however, is whether in the process of enforcing arrangements 
(which mostly contained few payoffs for any party) the role o f D66 as the third party in 
the coalition was so important. In fact, it seems to have been less the number of parties 
per se than the structure of the agenda set by these parties which meant that reciprocal 
control was not an effective enforcement mechanism. The agenda contained largely 
incompatible preferences, which were to be dealt with simultaneously. The parties 
expected few payoffs from other issues, in part because in other areas arrangements were 
often procedural rather than substantive. This is likely to have demotivated the parties to 
compromise on the central issues.
The internal unity of coalition parties
Another assumption was that manifest intraparty divisions in the relevant fields hinder the 
implementation of arrangements in these fieds. In the Van Agt II coalition, manifest 
divisions within the parties that may have influenced the policy making process appear to 
have existed only within the CDA. This party was the result of a merger of three 
previously separate religious parties in 1980. The manifest programmatic rivalry between 
those preferring a ’truly progressive’ policy and a more conservative group (which cut 
across the religious groups) seems to have been more directly relevant to the central 
issues. This division had been a major source of trouble in the preceding CDA-VVD 
coalition government. As we saw in the first section of this chapter, during the formation 
of the present government the leadership of the CDA was unable to conceal internal 
differences; the coalition agreement was not really supported by the whole parliamentary 
group. Internal dissent was especially strong over socio-economic policy and the cruise 
missiles issue.
The presence of internal party divisions within the CDA went hand in hand with 
failure in the fields of financial and socio-economic policy (7 out of 8 relevant cases). 
These were the fields in which the most substantive (if also vague) intentions were 
formulated. Arrangements on nuclear policy were implemented despite conflict within the 
CDA during government formation. Despite this, even if the CDA was split over socio­
economic policy, the impact of this factor should not be overestimated and seems to have 
been relatively limited when compared to the two Belgian coalitions. The impact of this 
split is also limited when compared to the factors discussed below. 3
3 D66 supported cutbacks demanded by the CDA, but at the same time did not really oppose 
the PvdA’s intentions on the employment plan.
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Negotiators as ministers
At the level of the government, the third factor concerns the extent to which cabinet 
ministers with portfolios in relevant fields had participated directly in the government 
formation process. The assumption was that ministers with a background as a negotiator 
were more likely to guard the elaboration and implementation of arrangements than 
’outsiders’. The Van Agt II government contained negotiators in the relevant fields of 
policy. The three party leaders had been very prominent in the negotiations, especially on 
financial and socio-economic policy, and they were also included in the informal socio­
economic cabinet committee, nicknamed the ’pentagon’. In the fields of nuclear policy 
and education, some but not all ministers had been negotiators; the minister of defence 
was an outsider.
The factor of ministerial background however is related negatively rather than 
positively to outcomes; the assumed relationship was found in 2 out of the 10 cases. The 
implicit compromise on cruise missiles (defence policy) was one of the few implemented 
arrangements. With respect to the other cases, the common ’spirit’ that the party leaders 
took with them into office was of the inflammable variety. In this sense, ministerial 
experience during government formation was counterproductive for the Van Agt II 
coalition.
Prime ministerial support
What was the role of the prime minister? Van Agt withdrew from the negotiations on the 
coalition agreement in August 1981. Intraparty and interparty tensions led to this decision. 
Once in office he was barely able to conceal his dissatisfaction with the coalition 
agreement and his actual dislike of the whole coalition. Hence he did not support the 
elaboration and implementation of arrangements actively; precisely where arbitration was 
most necessary, Van Agt firmly expressed the view of the conservative group within the 
CD A. In doing so, he increasingly came to stand against Den Uyl, the vice prime 
minister and party leader of the PvdA. Because of this, we may conclude that the absence 
of prime ministerial support, often in fact active opposition, contributed to the failure of 
the coalition when implementing the coalition agreement.
Coalition committees
Were informal coalition committees relevant to the implementation, or rather the 
nonimplementation, of the coalition agreement? The assumption was that informal 
committees containing prominents from different sections o f the parties would facilitate 137
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the enforcement of the coalition agreement. At the beginning of the government’s term 
there was an intermezzo during which policy making was shifted back to the government 
formation arena. After a month in which several attempts were made to specify the 
coalition agreement, the problems re-emerged within the government and became 
concentrated increasingly within the socio-economic ’pentagon*. This informal cabinet 
committee contained the party leaders which, as said, were in charge of portfolios in the 
field of socio-economic policy, but it was not a coalition committee in actual sense. As 
Andeweg has pointed out, the ’pentagon’ of the Van Agt II government had nothing to do 
with defence policy but everything to do with party political warfare (1985: 150).
Further, contacts between ministers and other sections of the parties were 
maintained separately within the three parties. These contacts often took the form of 
pressure upon the relevant ministers to stand firm in policy bargaining. The PvdA party 
executive took every chance to emphasise that the party’s ministers should First and 
foremost be faithful to the election manifesto.
Thus, in the case of the Van Agt II coalition, there was no really informal arena in 
which tensions within the government, especially within the ’pentagon’, could be reduced. 
This feature was typical of the Van Agt II government, and it seems to have contributed 
to its failure.
The economic situation
The economic forecasts on which the coalition agreement had been founded were soon 
felt to be too optimistic. Though there were few specific intentions, the new economic 
'facts’ gave rise to interparty conflict in the attempts to elaborate implicit compromises on 
financial and socio-economic policy. In fact, as the consequences of the second 
international oil crisis became visible, the CDA and PvdA took this situation as a reason 
to insist even more strongly on realising their own policy preferences and because of this 
the failure of the government may, at least in part, be attributed to these unfavourable 
economic conditions.
Personal relationships
The central factor in journalistic accounts of the Van Agt II government seems to have 
been the troubled personal relationship between prime minister Van Agt and vice prime 
minister Den Uyl. For these two heavyweights, political and personal conflicts went hand 
in hand. Since both party leaders were involved directly in policy making in the field of 
budgetary and socio-economic policy, this factor is likely to have had a negative influence 
on the process of elaboration of the coalition agreement, and indeed seems to have
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contributed strongly to the early fall of the government.
CONCLUSION
The Van Agt II government emerged from a coalition formation process in which party 
political constraints were important. Due to these constraints, in particular the exclusion 
of particular party combinations, the CDA and PvdA were stuck with each other. D66 
became the third coalition party, something which was preferred by the two other parties; 
the CDA and the PvdA expected that the participation of D66 would weaken the other 
party’s position in the government.
Policy bargaining took place in four distinct fields, the typical result being implicit 
compromises which either contained procedural statements or general or indeed vague 
intentions on issues (10 were implicit, and only 5 were explicit). This meant that in most 
areas and especially on financial and socio-economic issues, further bargaining was 
necessary, at least if the government was to take substantive decisions.
The possibilities for implementing policy intentions directly were thus limited by 
the often general or ambiguous character of arrangements. Sometimes, the intentions were 
even contradictory. In accordance with the hypothesis on general implicit compromises, 
conflict was frequent and relatively more frequent than in the case of explicit 
compromises (5:7 against 2:5). This contrasts with the outcomes of procedural 
arrangements, which in confirmation with the hypothesis did not give rise to conflict 
(though we should note that there were relatively few procedural arrangements). When 
considering all arrangements, conflict was not the most frequent outcome, which in part 
was because some matters had been dealt with when the government fell, but the 
* boomerang effect* of general arrangements was so strong that coalitional decision making 
in the important areas of financial and socio-economic policy was entirely paralysed.
In terms of policy préfiguration, the coalition agreement was even less functional, 
this was so with respect to both explicit and general implicit compromises (only one 
explicit compromise was implemented). The arrangements that were implemented were 
mostly procedural (2:3). The extremely short duration of the government is one (indirect) 
reason why a number of arrangements was not elaborated; matters were sometimes not 
even dealt with. More often, however, failure in this respect was either because the 
parties deviated from the coalition agreement or because conflict on the arrangements 
hindered their implementation.
The factors that are likely to have contributed to failure in the areas of financial 
and socio-economic policy are the absence of coalition committees, the lack o f prime 
ministerial support for the financial/budgetary and socio-economic section in the coalition
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agreement and especially economic developments and the highly strained personal 
relationship between the party leaders o f the two major parties. As the personal tensions 
were between ministers who had both been prominent during government formation (they 
were after all party leaders), the factor of ministerial background had an effect that was 
the opposite of what was assumed. Intraparty divisions might be a potential source of 
difficulties, but this factor was not manifest in the Van Agt II coalition. Outcomes in the 
field of nuclear policy, which were more positive, are more difficult to relate to these or 
other factors. Here, however, it must be realised that the number of arrangements was 
rather small; two arrangements were considered in this section.
Another factor which must be seen in conjunction with the unfavourable conditions 
at the level of the government and the economic environment is the structure of the 
coalitional agenda, rather than the number of coalition parties. Payoffs from arrangements 
were typically very low for the two major parties, in part because there were few clear 
cut intentions. The incompatibility o f demands that was concealed in the implicit 
compromises meant that expectations of actual policy payoffs were also low. The PvdA 
became increasingly unwilling to compromise as realisation o f a number of central party 
goals mentioned in the election manifesto became less likely. At the same time the CD A 
saw the prospect of a coalition with the Liberals after new elections. This is another likely 
reason why not only the elaboration of arrangements, but also the coalition foundered.
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T h e  L u b b e r s  I  C o a l i t i o n  
( 1 9 8 2 - 1 9 8 6 )
8
A TWO PARTY COALITION
After the Van Agt II government had broken down in May 1982, there was a caretaker 
government composed of the CD A and D66 until elections were held in September 1982. 
Perhaps the most surprising result of these elections was that the PvdA and not the CDA 
became the largest party (47 against 45 seats). In the provicial elections held six months 
earlier, the PvdA had suffered heavy losses and had became the third largest party after 
the CDA and VVD. In the run up to the parliamentary elections, the CDA had 
emphasised that the biggest party should take the initiative in government formation, so 
the PvdA was required to supply a form ateur  or informateur. Another remarkable, but 
more expected, result was the decline of D66 (from 17 back to 6 seats) and the success of 
the VVD which went from 26 to 36 seats. Though in the Netherlands elections are 
typically weak predictors of who will participate in the next government, with the VVD 
gaining this electoral victory it was possible to form a C D A -W D  majority government. 
Such a two party government would control 54 percent of the seats in the Second 
Chamber.
The formation process
The first step into the process of government formation was, however, the appointment of 
a PvdA in form ateur  on 10 September 1982. In contrast to the formation of the Van Agt II 
government some 16 months earlier, there was only one party political constraint which 
limited the number of viable coalitions. This constraint was that the PvdA refused to form 
a coalition with the CDA and VVD. Given the election results of the four main parties 
and the general constraint that a majority government had to be formed, six different
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coalitions were possible.1 Experiences within the previous government, however, followed 
by a polarised election campaign, meant that a coalition including both the CDA and 
PvdA was not a viable alternative. The new parliamentary leader of the VVD, Ed Nijpels, 
openly expressed his preference for a coalition between the CDA and VVD. Though the 
outgoing prime minister Van Agt and the leader of the CDA’s parliamentary group 
Lubbers were more cautious about making statements on future cooperation, it was 
sufficiently clear that the VVD would be more than just a discussion partner of the CDA 
and because of this an attempt to form a government that included the PvdA was not 
likely to be successful.
This did not prevent the PvdA informateur from discussing policy issues with the 
parliamentary leaders of the four parties, but Nijpels from the VVD withdrew after a few 
days. On the agenda were financial and socio-economic policy and the nuclear weapons 
issue, which as we have seen had been the primary source of conflict between Christian 
Democrats and Social Democrats over the preceding 18 months. The informateur made 
different proposals, which were rejected by the CDA as being ’too much the same story’ 
as the previous Van Agt II coalition. This brought about the end of the first formation 
attempt, which in the eyes of some prominents within the parliamentary group of the VVD 
had been little more than a ritual dance (KHA, 1982: 737).
A second formation attempt
It is difficult to tell with certainty whether or not the CDA used the first round of 
discussions to remove the PvdA from the formation table, but there can be little doubt that 
the decision to conduct negotiations with the VVD was taken fairly quickly. The invitation 
to the VVD was made officially by the new informateur. On 4 October 1982, the 
informateur started discussions with spokespersons from the CDA and VVD. D66 had 
earlier declared that it would not participate immediately in the formation talks but await 
the results of the negotiations. A CDA-VVD coalition would have a parliamentary basis of 
54 percent o f the seats and be minimal winning. A few years before, a coalition having 
the same party composition (the first Van Agt government, 1977-1981) became vulnerable 
due to the presence of dissidents within the parliamentary group of the CDA. These 
dissidents also divided the party on nuclear policy in the Van Agt II coalition, but during 
the 1982 formation, the party leadership declared that party discipline would be 
maintained firmly.
Part of the formation agenda was dealt with by two work groups, composed of 
three spokespersons from the parliamentary groups. Several top civil servants also 
participated in the discussions. Financial and socio-economic policy was discussed in what 
was called ’work group A ’. Work group B dealt with social and welfare policy, including
1 These coalitions were: CDA-PvdA, CDA-PvdA-D66, CDA-VVD, CDA-VVD-D66, PvdA- 
VVD, and PvdA-VVD-D66.
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1education and media (broadcasting) policy and ethical issues. This work group was 
presided over by the outgoing minister of Education (CDA), who had also taken a seat in 
the Second Chamber since the elections.2 The two work groups were to report before 9 
October 1982, 12:00 hours. The two parliamentary leaders would then have two days to 
list those matters on which further negotiations were necessary. During the same period, 
the informateur and the two parliamentary leaders dealt with the headlines for financial 
and socio-economic policy and with foreign/defence policy.
Conflicts on policy became manifests! within the two work groups. Work group A 
(financial and socio-economic policy) was unable to report before the deadline and 
presented the results of the negotiations three days late. There were also conflicts within 
work group B (social and welfare policy), which presented its report in time, but 
arrangements in different fields were rather general or even ambiguous. The party 
delegations had been unable to reach substantial agreement on secondary education, 
broadcasting policy and on legislation on euthanasia and prohibition of discrimination. The 
party spokespersons made mutual accusations with regard to obstructing the government 
formation process. Indeed, compared with earlier cases of coalition negotiations between 
Christian Democrats and Liberals (1967, 1971, 1977), the degree of interparty mistrust 
seems to have been high.
A draft version of the coalition agreement was made public on 19 October 1982. 
The inform ateur noted that the document contained primarily those matters on which 
major differences between the parties had become manifest (HTK, 1982-83, 17555/7). 
The results of discussions between the party leaders of the work group reports were also 
incorporated in this document. The parliamentary groups, however, were not satisfied 
with the results, so that another round of negotiations was necessary. In these 
negotiations, Van Agt withdrew and was replaced by Ruud Lubbers, which implied that 
there was a new candidate for the office of prime minister. D66 found the results 
sufficiently incompatible with its own preferences that it decided to stay outside the new 
government.
On 26 October, the final version of the coalition agreement was completed. This 
document contained numerous changes and also several entirely new paragraphs, for 
which especially CDA leader Lubbers had pressed. The leader of the Liberals in 
parliament had recieved ca n e  b lanche; the parliamentary group of the VVD would 
automatically approve the coalition agreement after it was signed by the party leader. 
After Lubbers had presented and explained the text, the CDA group also approved the 
coalition agreement.
The final point to be discussed was the distribution of cabinet portfolios, on which 
agreement was reached relatively easily. The CDA obtained 8 seats in the cabinet and the *143
3 This combination of a seat in the cabinet and in parliament at one and the same time is 
possible in the Netherlands until a new government is sworn in.
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VVD 6. To reduce the likelihood of party political difficulties which had so much troubled 
and shortened the life of the previous government, the portfolios of finance and social 
affairs & employment were allocated to one party, the CDA. On 30 October 1982, the 
inform ateur reported officially to the Queen and on the same day CDA leader Lubbers 
was appointed as fo rm a teu r , presenting his government on 4 November 1982. The 
formation process had taken less than two months, the shortest government formation 
period since 1967 which nonetheless resulted in the longest coalition agreement ever in the 
Netherlands. This underlines that contrary to what is often believed, no relationship exists 
between the length o f the formation process and the length of the coalition agreement.
General features of the coalition agreement
Again, the coalition agreement had reached an unprecedented length of some 18,500 
words. The agreement consisted of three documents: the actual coalition agreement and 
the reports of the work groups A and B after these had been amended by the 
parliamentary groups. There were 44 paragraphs, in which such different matters as 
budget cuts, legislation on the prohibition of discrimination, environmental protection, the 
budget deficit, broadcasting policy, development aid, and drugs policy were dealt with. 
Unlike previous coalition agreements, there was no introductory paragraph underlining the 
parties’ commitment to the agreement; only in report A was there a note saying that those 
obtaining a cabinet portfolio were expected to commit themselves to the report (HTK, 
1982-83, 17555/7: 38).
CONFLICTS, ARRANGEMENTS, AND POLICY MAKING
From conflicts to arrangements
Financial/budgetary a n d  socio-econom ic p o licy
The summer of 1982 brought heavy weather for the Dutch economy. Unemployment had 
risen to a postwar record, investments were running back, and the budget deficit had risen 
to more than 11 percent of the national income. Given the state of the economy, no party 
denied that a policy of retrenchment was needed in the coming years. When, however, 
this general point o f agreement had to be translated into more specific policy choices, the 
Christian Democrats and Liberals presented different viewpoints at the formation table. 
These viewpoints were sufficiently conflictual to require substantial bargaining before a 
joint policy programme could be issued. The were manifest conflicts over the size and
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distribution of cuts in government expenditure, and on several items of income and tax 
policy. Finally, there were manifest differences between the parties on the profile of a 
new Postbank.
Cuts in governm ental expenditures Financial and socio-economic policy was discussed in 
work group A, which as said was composed of three specialists from the two parties. The 
general point of departure of the work group was an annual growth rate of 3 percent. This 
was the average o f a high (4 percent) and a low (2 percent) growth scenario made by the 
Central Economic Committee (CEC), a standing committee of top civil servants. The CEC 
however believed that the low scenario was the more realistic (Toirkens, 1988: 106).
A first point of disagreement was the size of cuts in government expenditure over 
the next four years. The VVD was most radical in this respect, as it demanded cuts of 40 
billion over the next four years (NRC, 10 Oct. 1982). The CD A on the other hand found 
that the Liberals were putting too much emphasis on cutbacks. The only clear intention of 
the CD A was to decrease the budget deficit by 1 percent each year.
Negotiations within work group A resulted in several explicit compromises. To 
begin with cuts would be Dfl. 13 billion in 1983 and 7 billion each year in the period 
1984-86, the total cuts would thus be 34 billion. This entailed a concession from the 
VVD. At the same time, however, report A stipulated that this was a scenario which 
would only apply if annual wage increases were restrained to 2.5 percent. If the social 
partners were not prepared to restrain wage increases, total cuts in the four year period 
would be 43 billion, 13 billion in 1983, and 10 billion in each following year. This ’high 
scenario’ benefited the VVD, so that the arrangement contained payoffs for both parties.
The distribution of cuts would be as follows: social security and wages public 
sector 35 percent, departmental budgets 20 percent and health 10 percent.3 If an annual 
wage restraint was realised, annual cuts in each of the sectors would be 2 billion, except 
in the area of health, in which cuts would be 1 billion. Without wage restraint, annual 
cuts in social security and public sector wages would increase to 3.5 billion. These cuts 
were to result in a decrease in the budget deficit by 1 percent each year, leading to a 
deficit of 7.5 percent in 1986.
Further, there was an explicit and indeed very detailed compromise on cutbacks in 
departmental budgets for the period 1984-1986, however, the possibility to re-allocate part 
of the specified cuts over the different ministries was also included. One condition was 
that at each department would carry out at least 60 percent of the cuts originally allocated 
to that department, and another condition was that the total size of cuts would remain 
unchanged. Spending on public sector wages would be decreased by cutting down on
3 The total national budget thus consisted of spending on social security, public sector wages, 
health, interest payments and what was referred to as the departmental budgets (which included all 
expenses except in the aforementioned sectors).
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departmental staff by one percent each year, with the exception of the police and the tax 
office. Filling the nature of cuts in the other sectors was left largely to the government. 
The agreement only mentioned that to realise cutbacks in social security the government 
had to revise the system of social security, or to develop an anti fraud policy. Finally, the 
parties agreed explicitly to stabilise the general percentage of rates and taxes (collectieve  
lastendruk) and to decrease rates and taxes for the private sector by between 1.5 and 2 
billion annually and to spend 750 million each year to stimulate employment, for example 
by initiating vocational training projects.
Incom e and tax policy* The parties also disagreed on income and tax policy. Differences 
which involved party principles, such as the coupling of social benefits to minimum wages 
and the issue of income levelling were highly problematic. Conflicts on income and tax 
policy contained the elements of principle and contingency.
To begin with, the CD A advocated the maintenance of the coupling of social 
benefits to the official minimum wage, whereas in the view of the Liberals the 
government should ’decouple’ if it believed this was becoming too expensive. Moreover, 
the VVD argued in favour of a reduction of 5 percent in the minimum wage and social 
benefits. Though the Christian Democrats also intended to revise the social security 
system, such drastic decreases in social benefits were rejected as being impossible to sell 
to the country. A general implicit compromise was reached on the coupling issue. It stated 
that no relevant instrument for the reduction of spending on social security would be 
excluded in advance, which meant that the coupling mechanism could also be abandoned.
Another controversial point was the levelling of incomes. According to the CD A, 
there could a levelling of incomes above Dfl. 60,000, but the VVD argued in favour of a 
much higher limit, to prevent differences between lower and middle incomes being further 
reduced. This was a point on which the VVD had long profiled itself. As on the previous 
issue, the parliamentary leaders agreed on a rather vague arrangement which said that 
there were ’limited possibilities’ for income levelling, without mentioning whether or not 
the government would decide to level incomes. As nothing was said about the limit 
preferred by the CD A, the final arrangement was a typical general implicit compromise.
A final issue was income tax for couples with two incomes. There were two 
different approaches to levying such double income couples. In the first, advocated by the 
VVD, only the individual income was taken into account, with the tax regime being the 
same for any individual tax payer. In the other approach promoted by the CDA, the 
financial strength of couples was taken as the point of departure. This conflict could only 
be removed from the negotiation table by formulating a general implicit compromise 
which mentioned only that the government was to develop a system in which both 
principles would be recognised.
The postbank  A next point of controversy regarded the postbank, a new bank for giro
146
money transactions. There was a bill dating from 1976, when a centre left government 
was in office. That bill contained instructions for the establishment of a state owned 
postbank, but it had never been discussed in parliament. The Liberals preferred a 
’minimal’ postbank, the competences of which would be limited to the financial services 
provided thusfar. In the view of the CD A, the postbank was to develop the same main 
activities as the commercial banks.
A general implicit compromise was made by the parliamentary leaders. The 
government was to define its position once the Second Chamber had discussed the existing 
bill. If the parliamentary discussions were delayed or important changes were thought 
necessary, provisional legislation was to be passed to secure a continuation of the existing 
national institutions for money transactions.
Nuclear policy
The nuclear weapons conflict was left unresolved by the previous government. As the 
pressure from the NATO partners was increasing, the general feeling was that the new 
government could no longer postpone a decision on the cruise missiles issue. One problem 
was that the issue divided the CD A. For this reason, it was not immediately obvious that 
an agreement could be reached easily with the VVD, a party that advocated firmly the 
deployment of cruise missiles and conformity to NATO policy in general.
The issues was dealt with by the parliamentary leaders, who made a procedural 
arrangement that stated that the government would postpone the decision on the 
deployment of cruise missiles while at the same time making preparations to build the 
facilities needed for deployment. This was thought necessary to remain credible to the 
NATO partners. First, however, the Second Chamber was to have ’the opportunity to give 
its opinion*, which left some to wonder whether or not the parliamentary groups would 
have a free vote on the issue (NRC, 4 November 1982). With regard to existing nuclear 
military tasks, a general implicit compromise was made which said that the government 
would specify its position before the beginning of the new parliamentary year in 
September 1983. It was expected that by then more clarity over the cruise missile situation 
would exist. Until this time, the status quo would be maintained with respect to existing 
nuclear tasks (Nederlandse Staatscourant, 28 October 1982; KHA, 1982: 740).
M edia po licy
With regard to television broadcasting, there were fundamental differences between the 
VVD and CDA which dated back to the mid-1960s, when a coalition of these parties had 
broken down over the same issue. Here, the W D  here was the change oriented party. 
The Liberals advocated strongly a liberalisation of broadcasting policy, to accomplish a 
’breakthrough’ in the traditional pillarised and noncommercial Dutch system. In the view 
of the Liberals, commercial broadcasting should be possible at national level as well as on 
a local and regional basis. The VVD also demanded that foreign commercial stations be
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given access to the cable network. In contrast, the Christian Democrats defended the 
traditional broadcasting system, in which the religious pillars (zuilen) were represented 
strongly. The CDA feared that liberalisation would in reality mean plain 
commercialisation. Foreign commercial broadcasting oriented on the Dutch public was 
rejected firmly. The three central points o f conflict were (I)  the admission of foreign 
television programmes to the Dutch cable network, (2) the possibility of advertising on 
local and regional stations and (3) financing an extension of national television 
broadcasting.
One possibility for the parties was simply to leave things open. Though in this case 
the CDA could theoretically form a legislative majority in parliament with the PvdA. the 
Christian Democrats were not really waiting to be driven in the arms of this party. 
Moreover, it was unlikely that the VVD would ever accept such a manoeuvre. In fact, the 
leader of the VVD emphasised that his party wanted clarity on the issue before the 
government took office (NRC Handelsblad, 12 October 1982).
Foreign transmissions Negotiations on the access of foreign television programmes to the 
Dutch cable network resulted in an explicit compromise. Until the government could 
present its view on the problem, no foreign programmes with advertisements directed 
towards the Dutch public would be allowed. In an earlier version of the arrangement 
foreign programmes which ’formed a threat to national security, public order or public 
morality’ were also banned, but this restriction had been removed under pressure from the 
parliamentary group of the VVD.
Local and regional broadcasting Another conflict was over the question whether local 
and regional broadcasting could be financed through advertising. In the view of the CDA, 
the financing of local broadcasting should be through local taxes exclusively. The VVD 
advocated the introduction of local and regional advertising under the auspicies of what in 
the Netherlands is known as the STER (Stichting Ether Reclame), a foundation for the 
broadcasting of advertisements.
The coalition agreement contained an implicit compromise which stated that 'if  
regional and local advertising appear not to be feasible’, public resources at a local level 
were to be used, with the possibility of a supplement from the radio and television licence 
fees colected centrally. What exactly was meant by ’not feasible* was left open. This was 
a provisional solution, until the governmental had formulated its long-term policy on the 
issue.
The extension o f national broadcasting Finally, the parties had different views on the 
financing of an extension of national broadcasting. The points o f conflict were, first, the 
conditions for an increase in air time for the STER (advertising) and second, the question 
whether or not radio and television licence fees should be increased. The CDA advocated
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such an increase, but the VVD opposed it as being another national intervention in 
broadcasting. With regard to advertising through the STER, the Christian Democrats had 
more strict conditions, such as no advertising in ’floating blocks’ interrupting programmes 
and on Sundays.
Bargaining resulted in an implicit compromise which stated that an extension of 
national broadcasting would ’in principle’ be financed exclusively through increased 
revenues from advertising under the auspices of the STER. Though at first sight this 
constituted a gain to the VVD, ambiguity was brought in by the statement that if revenues 
from this extended advertising alone were not sufficient, an increase in licence fees would 
be considered. Increased revenues from advertising were to be achieved by a gradual 
increase in air time for the STER. The conditions were those mentioned by the CDA, 
which entailed a concession from the VVD.
School policy
As during the formation of the Van Agt II government, the issue of secondary education 
reform was a source of dispute. Though the CDA certainly did not promote the abolition 
of the existing school system in the short term (this after all was something on which 
conflict with the PvdA had existed), the party preferred to continue discussions and 
experiments with a new school type between primary and secondary education. If these 
experiments were successful, the Christian Democrats would support the general 
introduction of the new system. The VVD had many difficulties with the more 
'egalitarian’ type of school and for this reason demanded that the scale of the experiments 
be limited.
Two implicit compromises were made. One general arrangement mentioned the 
continuation of discussions and experiments and announced a special bill on the financing 
of these experiments, which was to be submitted to parliament. To warrant the (financial) 
equality of public and private (religious) schools, the constitutional article on education 
would be amended. This last part of the arrangement was taken from the coalition 
agreement of the previous government, in which as we know, the CDA’s partners were 
the PvdA and D66, the other two secular parties. The second arrangement was procedural 
and contained a postponement of a decision on the general introduction of the new school 
type until after the next elections, or in any case until in the second half of the 1980s.
Ethical issues: euthanasia and equal treatment
The next issue that divided the prospective coalition parties was euthanasia. The question 
was whether or not the criminal law should include exceptions to leave euthanasia 
unsanctioned under certain conditions. The VVD, as did the other secular parties, 
advocated a relaxation in the penal law, whereas in the view of the CDA, euthanasia 
should never remain unpunished. The issue was a typical position issue, with the ethical 
principles held by the parties leaving little room for compromises. Yet the W D  raised the
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issue to place it on the agenda of the new government.
This was all the Liberals obtained from the negotiations, as a general implicit 
compromise was formulated which said that the government would take a position after it 
was advised by a special commission on euthanasia. Until the government had defined its 
position, the status quo would be maintained.
Another ethical issue was equal treatment, on which a first draft of a bill had been 
completed in September 1981 by the first Van Agt government (CDA-VVD), which 
however had remained undiscussed during the term of the second Van Agt government. 
This first draft focused on the prohibition of sex discrimination, including that against 
homosexuals, but it was criticised heavily by the religious organisations, as the prohibition 
implied that religious schools could no longer refuse to employ or discharge homosexual 
teachers by referring to the traditional constitutional freedoms of religion, education, and 
assembly. Against this background, the CD A rejected special legislation, which in the 
party's view would only violate this constitutional right. The CDA suggested a revision of 
the penal law on the point of discrimination. The VVD demanded a special anti 
discrimination law and anticipated support on this matter from the other secular parties. 
On this issue also, the parties went no further than compromising implicitly. The general 
arrangement on the issue stated that the government would reconsider the first draft of the 
1981 bill and formulate new legislation in which there ’might be’ elements from the initial 
draft. Thus, on this issue also the more difficult task of formulating substantive policy was 
postponed until the coalition was in office.
The types of arrangements reached in the relevant fields of policy are given in table 8.1. 
Though the Lubbers I coalition agreement was generally considered to be the most 
specific and detailed coalition policy programme thusfar, implicit compromises and even 
only general implicit compromises, were relatively more frequent than explicit ones. In 
fact, as the table illustrates, explicit compromises were reached almost exclusively in the 
area of financial and budgetary policy.
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Table 8.1
Arrangements in Lubbers I coalition agreement
type of arrangement
policy field
financial/budgetary policy
explicit
6
procedural general
1 7
socio-economic policy 1 - 5 6
media policy 1 - 2 3
nuclear policy - 1 1 2
school policy - 1 1 2
ethical issues - - 2 2
8 2 12 22
From arrangem ents to policy making
Financial/budgetary and socio-economic policy
The coalition agreement contained arrangements which indicated or indeed stipulated in 
detail the size of cutbacks in different sectors over the next four years. Though 
arrangements were also made on ways to realise these cuts and to increase state revenues 
within a general constraint of a decrease in rates and taxes for the private sector.
Cuts in 1983 The first ’test’ of the coalition agreement was the discussions on the 
Voorjaarsnota 1983, a white paper from the minister of finance giving the financial 
possibilities and impossibilities for the rest of the budgetary year that must be submitted to 
parliament in the first half of the year. The budget for 1983 had been made by the 
previous government and the minister of finance declared that the financial situation 
required more drastic cutbacks in the fields of social benefits, health and wages in the 
public sector, so that the budget deficit could be decreased in the way stated in the 
coalition agreement (Toirkens, 1988: 109). Before these problems occurred, the 
government had already made some changes in the distribution of cuts in the departmental 
budgets for 1984. The coalition agreement mentioned the possibility of re-allocating a 
certain part of the cuts in departmental budgets.
Expectations of new financial problems caused the minister of finance to demand
3.5 billion extra cuts in 1983, the explicit compromise made during government formation 
was for 13 billion. Agreement was reached on extra cuts of 2 billion and 3.5 billion in
1984. At variance with the coalition agreement, rates and taxes would be increased, which 
implied that the promised relief for private business would also not be realised (Toirkens, 
1988: 111-112). One of the ways of realising these cuts was a decrease in social benefits
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by 2 percent on 1 October 1983, for which a special bill had to be drafted. This decision 
was a specification of the general implicit compromise covering a decrease in social 
benefits.
These developments had consequences for income policy. Conflict broke out over 
the coupling of social benefits to wages, on which the coalition agreement contained a 
genera] and ambiguous implicit compromise. The CDA insisted that the coupling 
mechanism be maintained, a point on which the VVD gave way ’because in this early 
stage of the government this issue (was) not worth a government crisis’ (KHA, 1983: 275- 
280, 343-344). As negotiations on public sector wages did not lead to an agreement, a 
precondition to measures in the sphere of social security, given the agreement to maintain 
the link between wages and social benefits, social benefits could not be decreased as 
originally intended (KHA, 1983: 452-453).
The Voorjaarsnota concerned retrenchment policy to a great extent; however, the 
government also discussed employment policy and the effects of retrenchment policy on 
spending power. With regard to employment policy, a specification was made for the way 
in which the 750 million guilders mentioned in the coalition agreement was to be spent. 
With regard to developments in spending power in 1983, the expectation was that those in 
the middle income brackets would be the worst off (minus 4 to 5 percent). This implied 
that the difference between middle and lower incomes would become smaller, which in the 
view of the VVD was a form of income levelling ’through the backdoor’. During the 
government formation process, the parties had made an implicit compromise on the issue 
of income levelling and conflict re-emerged at this point (KHA, 1983: 276-280).
During the parliamentary discussions on the Voorjaarsnota, conflict on the 
government’s commitment to the coalition agreement broke out. According to the 
parliamentary leader of the CDA, the economic problems required an modification of the 
financial goals, especially for the budget deficit, in the agreement. His Liberal counterpart 
argued instead that the government should do something about the way to achieve its 
goals, and increase cutbacks (KHA, 1983: 344).
The 1984 budget This public skirmishing about the goals mentioned in the agreement 
formed the prelude to cabinet decision making for the budget for 1984. The first move 
was made by the minister of finance, who raised the alarm, pointing to the increasing 
financial gap. This was taken seriously by the prime minister, who proposed extra cuts, 
but also an increase in rates and taxes and very much against the wishes of the minister of 
finance, a less ambitious schedule for decreasing the deficit. The coalition agreement in 
this respect was not sacrosanct, at least not to the prime minister.
Between May and July 1983, discussions were held within the cabinet and the 
’pentagon’, the informal cabinet committee on socio-economic and financial policy. At 
stake were the size and allocation of extra cuts, or the extent to which the government 
could exceed the amounts of cuts mentioned in the coalition agreement. Agreement was
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reached on an extra 3.8 billion cuts, with the total for cuts in 1984 becoming 10.8 billion. 
This was appreciably more than the 7 billion mentioned in the coalition agreement. When 
distributing the extra cuts, the emphasis would be on social security and public sector 
wages, where cuts were to be realised through a decrease in social benefits and public 
sector wages by 3 percent on 1 January 1984. In December, the bill containing these 
decreases was approved by the government majority in parliament.
In distributing the cuts over the different sectors, the ratio mentioned in the 
agreement was followed, at least as far as the ’predetermined’ cuts were concerned. The 
extra cuts were allocated differently. Contrary to the priorities stated in the agreement, 
more emphasis would be given to a decrease in the level of rates and taxes and less to the 
reduction of the deficit in 1984. In fact, the deficit was expected only marginally to 
decrease (Toirkens, 1988: 113-122; KHA, 1983: 614-617).
In December 1983. a bill containing a new system of income tax for couples with 
two incomes was approved in parliament. This bill was initiated by the government, and 
was accepted by the cabinet without problems. The new system, to take effect on 1 
January 1984, was a compromise between the two different approaches of the coalition 
partners (the VVD had preferred indivudual treatment, and the CD A the use of the 
principle of financial strength of households). The bill was not however intended to be 
definitive and a number of refinements were planned for the following year (KHA, 1984: 
53). Thusfar, the elaboration of the implicit compromise on this issue was peaceful.
The 1985 budget The discussions over the budget for 1985 also started with conflict over 
the central goals mentioned in the coalition agreement. Indeed, it was the prime minister 
himself who proposed a change of priorities, his argument being that cuts should not only 
be used for reducing the budget deficit, but also for decreasing the level of rates and taxes 
for the population, even if this was not an intention mentioned in the coalition agreement. 
He believed that the legitimacy of a policy oriented exclusively on cuts to decrease the 
deficit was waning.
In the first half year of 1984, the question of priorities was an important agenda 
item in cabinet discussions. When it became clear that the budget deficit in 1983 would be 
lower than expected, the government decided that in 1985 there would be a general 
decrease of rates and taxes for the private sector, as promised in the coalition agreement. 
At the same time, there also would be extra cuts of 2.4 billion. At the end of August, the 
government reached agreement on a package consisting of an 0 .8-percent reduction of the 
deficit, and 9.3 billion of cuts, of which the departmental budgets would bear the largest 
share (Toirkens, 1988: 122-129). Though no sector was charged less than indicated in the 
coalition agreement, the allocation of the extra cuts differed from the distribution ratio in 
the agreement (KHA, 1985: 38).
In September 1984, a bill containing the intended refinements to the income tax 
system was submitted in parliament and conflict broke out. The point of controversy was
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the size of a personal tax allowance for employees. In the first version of the bill, the 
government had fixed this allowance at Dfl. 600 per month, but for budgetary reasons this 
was reduced to Dfl. 425. This decrease was a concession from the W D . Once accepted, 
however, the CD A proposed a further decrease to Dfl. 350. An amendment containing 
this was introduced by the parliamentary group of the CDA and support was expected 
from the PvdA.
The chances of a legislative coalition between the CDA and PvdA on this issue 
were not high because the VVD took the matter very seriously. The parliamentary leader 
of the VVD refused to accept a further decrease in the allowance. The issue led to a ’cold 
w ar’ between the two parliamentary leaders, who were not on speaking terms for some 
time. Within the government, the relationship between the two parties had also become 
strained. The VVD vice prime minister declared that he and his colleagues would resign if 
the CDA’s amendment obtained a parliamentary majority. Prime minister Lubbers tried 
actively to settle the dispute and succeeded in early November. A new compromise was 
reached within the government, which was approved subsequently by the coalitional 
majority in parliament. In this compromise, the difference was split, literally, to the last 
decimal point, the allowance became Dfl. 387,50! (KHA, 1984: 774-777, 787-789).
The 1986 budget In early 1985, there was again conflict over priorities and the size of 
cuts. As before, the minister of finance demanded every ting should be done to decrease 
the deficit. Other ministers preferred a decrease in the level of rates and taxes and a small 
reduction in the deficit. These two positions were taken along party lines, with the 
exception of the minister of finance, who stood on the side of the VVD, or actually the 
VVD stood at his side. In April 1985, a compromise was reached which contained extra 
cuts for 1986 of 1 billion guilders. Cutbacks in social security, public sector wages and 
health would follow the guidelines given in the coalition agreement. As far as possible, 
rates and taxes would be decreased and the budget deficit would be decreased less than the 
minister of finance had pressed for. After a few weeks, however, it became clear that 
without policy changes the deficit would again start to increase in 1986. This not only 
shocked the minister o f finance but also other ministers, especially those of the VVD, and 
for this reason the government quickly agreed to increase its efforts to bring the deficit 
below 8 percent (KHA, 1986: 632).
Cuts or votes, 1986, the election year With parliamentary elections due in May 1986, the 
government faced the question whether or not to follow the line o f cuts with regard to the 
1987 budget. There were party political arguments for not doing so but at the same time 
there were several new urgent financial problems. An expected decrease in state revenues 
in 1986 was particularly relevant and an increase in the deficit was expected if no new 
cuts were made. This prospect did not please the coalition partners, especially since both 
were beginning to consider taking office for a further term of government.
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In the view of the prime minister, the government had to decide on cuts before the 
elections but the ministers of the VVD appeared to have problems with such decisions 
being made before the elections. The Liberals feared that starting an election campaign 
and another retrenchment operation simultaneously would not make the party more 
popular with the voters and this was seen as a problem. Under pressure from the prime 
minister, however, the VVD gave way, and the result was a package of cuts amounting to 
5 billion and an increase in rates and taxes (Toirkens, 1988: 136-141, 164).
When the government reached the end of its term in office, the budget deficit 
appeared to be 7.8 percent. This was very close to the agreed percentage of 7.5, so the 
coalition had achieved, if approximately, one of its central policy intentions (Toirkens, 
1988: 176-177). An intention that remained unaccomplished however was a decrease in 
the size of the civil service by 2 percent annually. Words on this point were more 
successful than policy, as by the end of the government’s term there seemed to be more 
people in government employed than when the government came into office (ibid).
The postbank The implicit compromise on the postbank was elaborated, the result being a 
bill which was approved in parliament in June 1985. The bill was based on a compromise 
in which the new postbank would be a private institution with limited competences.
Nuclear weapons policy’
With regard to nuclear weapons, a procedural arrangement containing a postponement of 
the decision on cruise missiles was produced, along with a general arrangement on the 
existing nuclear military tasks.
In June 1983, the government took a decision about locating launching facilities for 
the cruise missiles. The Defence minister called this a technical decision, this simply 
followed on from the coalition agreement. The coalition parties, except for three dissidents 
within the CDA group, supported this decision in parliament.
In November, the government presented its long term overview of defence policy 
to parliament. This was later than announced in the coalition agreement, which stated that 
plans would be presented before the beginning of the new parliamentary year in 
September. Due to conflict over existing nuclear tasks, only the section on conventional 
weapons was completed (NRC, 24 June 1983; KHA, 1983 : 662-664, 819).
Half a year later, on 1 June 1984, the government took a decision on the cruise 
missiles. The issue had been highly divisive within the CDA and also between the 
coalition partners. The decision was to postpone deployment by exactly one year, and the 
deployment of cruise missilies in the Netherlands was linked to Sovjet deployment policy. 
Meanwhile, preparations at the military air basis would be continued, so that, in the case 
of a positive decision, the building of facilities could be started in January 1986. The 
existing nuclear tasks would be maintained until 1 January 1986 and then be reconsidered. 
The decision received the support of a majority in the Second Chamber, however, due to
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the ’disloyal’ vote of eight members of a group within the CD A, a majority could only be 
reached with the help of the small religious parties in the opposition (KHA, 1984: 369- 
372).
The decision gave rise to differences of interpretation. According to prime minister 
Lubbers, the decision implied that the Netherlands would not deploy missiles if the Soviet 
Union stopped deploying missiles on 1 June 1984. The leader of the VVD in parliament 
declared that in that case (which he thought was highly unlikely) the government still 
needed to determine its position (KHA, 1984: 436-440).
A year later, on 1 November 1985, the government decided to deploy the cruise 
missiles in line with its NATO partners. Two of the existing nuclear tasks would be 
dropped after the actual deployment of cruise missiles took place. As a compensation, 
pressed for by the VVD, conventional defence would be strenghtened. This decision was 
also approved in parliament, but as before, the coalition parties needed the external 
support of the small religious parties to reach a majority (KHA, 1985: 750-753; 1986: 
11). With parliamentary approval, the issue could be removed from the coalitional agenda.
M e d ia  p o lic y
The government presented the Medianota, a document containing a mid term plan on 
media policy in mid-1983. This note was formulated without too many difficulties and this 
seems to have been mainly because the controversisal issues were left vague. Using the 
Medianota as a basis, the government was expected to fomulate a new media Act.
Transmissions from abroad In June 1984, the minister of Culture submitted a Royal 
Decree on cable television to the Second Chamber. This decree was a specification of a 
paragraph in the Medianota and covered the conditions for broadcasting via the Dutch 
cable network. One of these conditions was that there should be no subtitling of foreign 
programmes. When the decree was debated in parliament, the VVD pointed to the 
coalition agreement which was less restrictive in this respect and did not mention the point 
of subtitling. This view was supported by a parliamentary majority which included the 
PvdA but excluded the CDA (KHA, 1984: 579-580).
The extension o f national broadcasting Conflict on the extension of national broadcasting 
broke out in the parliamentary discussions on the Medianota, which began in the autumn 
of 1983. The CDA advocated an increase in air time by creating a third noncommercial 
channel which would primarily contain cultural and educational programmes. The W D  
opposed such a channel with the argument that there was little demand for a new public 
channel. The coalition agreement contained only general statements on a ’possible’ 
extension of national broadcasting, depending on the financial possibilities. The debates 
did not lead to substantive results until March 1984 when the CDA group made an 
overture to the PvdA; both parties voted for a motion asking the government to consider
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the possibility of a third channel. Though this was not (yet) a real legislative coalition, the 
VVD warned the CDA that it would not accept further disloyal behaviour.
In August 1985, the government decided to introduce a third channel, which was 
done to comply with the wishes of the parliamentary majority, including CDA and PvdA. 
In doing this, the threat (or opportunity) of a legislative coalition between the CDA and 
VVD was averted. To finance the third channel, advertising under the auspicies of STER, 
the foundation for advertising in broadcasting, would be further extended. In confirmation 
to the arrangement in the coalition agreement, licence fees would only be increased if the 
revenues from this extra advertising were not sufficient. In contradition to the 
arrangement, advertising would take place between programmes on the existing two 
national channels. During government formation, the parties had agreed that ’floating 
blocks’ of advertisements (not preceding or immediately following after newsprogrammes) 
would not be allowed. Especially the CDA found such floating blocks a commercial 
element which should be kept away from public braodcasting. These decisions 
immediately preceded the submission of a bill on media policy to the Second Chamber in 
September 1985. When submitting the bill, the minister of Culture said the coalition 
parties in parliament should value the bill as the result of long and difficult discussions 
within the government (KHA, 1984: 689; 1985 : 689-690).
Consensus within the government did not mean that homogeneity within the 
coalition as a whole was assured, rather the opposite was true. In early 1986, the two 
coalition parties in the Second Chamber began to question the contents of the bill. The 
VVD demanded wider possibilities for commercial television, something that was rejected 
systematically by the Christian Democrats. Conflict also broke out on the issue of 
’floating blocks’ of advertisements. If the VVD defended the governmental decision to 
allow advertising between separate programmes, the CDA pointed to the coalition 
agreement, which excluded this possibility unambiguously.
Local and regional broadcasting The was also conflict over regional and local 
advertising. The parliamentary group of the VVD argued that the coalition agreement did 
not exclude advertising in local and regional broadcasting but the CDA maintained that the 
bill on media policy, which excluded this possibility, was in keeping with the agreement. 
The problem actually revolved around the interpretation o f one single word, which meant 
that the relevant statement could be read in two different ways.
The consequence of these problems was that the bill on media policy was not approved 
before the parliamentary elections in May 1986. The next opportunity for the parties to 
continue discussions on the issue would be during the formation of a new government 
(NRC, 30 January 1986; Beleid Beschouwd, February 1986; NRC, 12 March 1986).
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School policy
On the issue of secondary education reform, the coalition agreement stipulated that the 
discussions and experiments would be continued and that a bill would be drafted by the 
government for this purpose. A definitive decision on introducing the new system would 
not be taken during the government’s term in office.
In June 1983, conflict broke out between the minister of Education (CDA) and his 
Liberal state secretary on the scale of experiments with the new type of school. The 
coalition agreement stated only that these experiments with the new school would be 
continued, without mentioning the number of experiments that would be allowed. In the 
view' of the state secretary, who was supported by the VVD in parliament, the number of 
experiments was beginning to expand beyond what was reasonable. The minister declared 
that he was observing the agreement that no definitive decisions would be taken before the 
next parliamentary elections (NRC, 24 June 1983; Beleid Beschouwd, July 1983).
In May 1984 the minister declared that legislation on the experiments, announced 
in the coalition agreement, would be completed before the end of the year. Due to 
disagreements on different elements of the bill, however, it was submitted in July 1985. 
The bill mentioned how the experiments would be financed and the objection made by the 
Liberals with regard to the increased scale of experimenting was appeased by the inclusion 
of a requirement that each year any new experiments were to be approved by the Second 
Chamber.
The bill was received by the parliamentary groups with mixed feelings. Those of 
the CDA were positive, the VVD commented that the government had followed its own 
interpretation of the agreement; this was certainly not in keeping with the Liberal view, 
and because of this, the parliamentary group of the VVD kept up the discussions on the 
bill, the consequencebeing that the bill was not approved before the parliamentary 
elections in May (Beleid Beschouwd, September 1985).
Ethical issues: euthanasia and equal treatment
The special commission on euthanasia published its report in August 1985, in which the 
relaxation of penal law under certain conditions was recommended. This advice, however, 
was not the only thing to be considered by the government. In April 1984, a private 
member’s bill had been introduced by D66. The parliamentary groups of the coalition 
parties were as divided as ever in their reactions to the commission’s advice and to the 
bill. At the same time, the views of the VVD and the PvdA were converging, but the 
CDA ministers declared that they would not accept a legislative alliance between the VVD 
and a number of opposition parties.
With the two responsible ministers (Health and Justice) belonging to different 
parties, the party political element in the conflict was also reinforced within the 
government. At the end of 1985, prime minister Lubbers stated that legislation on 
euthanasia should not be expected before the elections. In January 1986, the government
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reached agreement on a first draft, which would however only be submitted to parliament 
if a majority really wanted legislation in the short term. Prime minister Lubbers preferred 
to shelve the issue. The parliamentary group of the CDA supported the first draft, as it 
was more restrictive than the private member’s bill, while the VVD preferred the private 
member’s bill. The parliamentary leader of the CDA reacted by complaining that:
The VVD seems to participate in two coalitions. One is the formal coalition with 
the CD A, in which the country’s economic and financial problems are dealt with.
The other is an informal coalition with the PvdA and D66, to strike deals on 
immaterial issues over the C D A ’s head. Euthanasia is just one example (...) In the 
next coalition agreement, firm commitments must be made, for otherwise we do 
not know where we stand with the VVD (KHA, 1986: 299).
After the prime minister had declared that the ministers of the CDA would sooner resign 
than sign a bill they did not support, the parliamentary leader of the VVD suggested that 
the matter be postponed. The consequence was that the bill could not be submitted before 
the elections and a coalition crisis was avoided (KHA, 1986: 296-299, 324-326).
Equal treatment Halfway through its term in office, the government had still not reached 
agreement over a bill on equal treatment. There were two main points of controversy 
between the parties. First, there was the question whether or not constitutional article 1 
which prohibits discrimination in general weighed heavier than freedom of religion, 
assembly and education mentioned in subsequent constitutional articles. Second, 
disagreement existed over what should be and to what degree, specified in the new law, in 
particular with regard to the position of homosexual teachers at religious schools. This 
lack of results meant the VVD introduced a motion in the Second Chamber asking the 
government to come up with a bill and thus carry out the coalition agreement before June
1985. This motion was supported by the PvdA and D66, but not by the CDA.
In September 1985, prime minister Lubbers declared publicly that the government 
had failed to reach agreement on a bill and added that the matter would become a free 
issue in parliament. The parliamentary groups of the CDA and VVD interpreted this 
differently. A spokesman from the CDA group in the Second Chamber made the objection 
that an issue could only be free if this was stated explicitly in the coalition agreement. 
With the anti discrimination legislation this was not the case and therefore the parties 
should observe their coalitional commitments both within and outside the government. In 
contrast, the VVD group began to look openly towards the PvdA and started to prepare a 
bill. In December, the party presented what it called carefully a ’first draft of a possible 
parliamentary initiative’. This first draft extended to all sorts of discrimination. This was, 
however, an unlucky move, as the PvdA only gave priority to legislation on sex 
discrimination and the CDA was still playing for time and because of this no anti 159
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discrimination law was submitted before the end of the government (Beleid Beschouwd, 
October 1985, January 1986). Thus, on this item of ’immaterial policy’, the 
implementation of the coalition agreement also got stuck in the parliamentary arena.
There are two reasons for the length of the preceding section. One is that the scope of 
bargaining during the formation of the Lubbers I coalition was relatively broad. The other 
reason is that the Lubbers I coalition, unlike the other coalitions, lasted its full 
constitutional term and dealt with all the issues on which arrangements were made. The 
question that will be examined more systematically in the following section is whether the 
different arrangements were instrumental in preventing conflict and forming policy.
SUCCESSES AND FAILURES O F THE LUBBERS I COALITION
The outcomes in terms of implementation or nonimplementation and the presence or 
absence of conflict are presented in table 8.2. In the following paragraphs, 1 will discuss 
the patterns of outcomes in the light of the hypotheses on the three types of arrangements.
Table 8.2
Outcomes of arrangements in Lubbers I coalition agreement
Type of arrangement
Outcome
elaborated/implemented
explicit procedural implicit-general
(no conflict)
not elaborated/implemented
2 (fin,so-ec) 1 (scho) 1 (so-ec) (4)
(no conflict) 
elaborated/implemented
1 (fin) * (1)
(conflict)
not elaborated/implemented
3 (fin) 1 (nuc) 6 (so-ec,fin,nuc) (10)
(conflict) 2 (fin,med) - 5 (med,eth,scho) (7)
k e y  to  s y m b o ls :
(8) (2) (12) (22)
fin = financial and budgetarypolicy scho == school policy eth s= ethical issues
so-ec = socio-economic policy nuc = nuclear policy med = media
160
The stream lining effect of explicit compromises
Did explicit compromises streamline policy making in the Lubbers I coalition? There were 
8 explicit compromises, mostly on financial and budgetary policy, only two were 
implemented without giving rise to conflict. The general distribution of cuts between the 
major spending areas as outlined in the agreement was followed, be it that the allocation 
of extra cuts on which the government decided was different every year. The other 
arrangement implemented regarded the financial stimulation of employment, on which the 
parties had agreed to spend 750 million each year. Another possible outcome was that 
conflict did not re-emerge nor were policy decisions taken. This happened with the 
agreement to cut civil service personnel by 2 percent per year.
The most frequent outcome relatively was that in which compromises were 
implemented, but only after conflict had re-emerged (this happened in 3 out of 8 cases). 
Here, the compromises were about the size and distribution of cutbacks. Often, the 
minister of finance used the coalition agreement to legitimise these cutbacks. Even in the 
case of fairly specific compromises, however, these were not always immediately accepted 
by all the ministers involved. Decisions on cuts in the general sectors of social security, 
health and public sector wages conformed to the agreement, while part of the cuts in the 
normal departmental budgets were re-allocated, something the coalition agreement 
contained a provision for. In both cases, the decisions were preceded by conflict between 
the minister of finance and his colleagues from the spending departments. For this reason, 
Toirkens’ conclusion that the Lubbers I coalition agreement reduced mistrust between 
ministers with regard to cutbacks in departmental budgets seems too optimistic (Toirkens, 
1988: 143). It may be noted that the extra cuts that the minister of finance dragged out 
during the annual rounds of negotiations on the budget were mostly evaded. Indeed, only 
the cuts mentioned in the coalition agreement were actually carried out (ibid: 271). This 
was also the situation with the explicit compromise to decrease the budget deficit from 
some 11 percent to 7.5 percent of the national income. Though the deficit (and the 
commitment made during government formation) was a frequent source of dispute in the 
coalition, the deficit eventually appeared to have been reduced to almost the agreed 
percentage of 7.5, to 7.8 percent.
Failure was the outcome of two explicit compromises. The promise to 'freeze’ the 
general percentage of rates and taxes was not kept, as taxes were more often increased 
than decreased, even if in accordance with the agreement trade and industry were given 
some financial relief. The only explicit compromise outside the areas of financial and 
socio-economic policy was made in the field of media policy and concerned cable access 
to foreign programmes. This compromise did not however prevent the recurrence of 
interparty conflict, leading to a total lack of legislation on the topic. This must be seen in 
connection with the outcomes of other, implicit, arrangements on broadcasting policy, 
which were to be turned into legislation but also gave rise to conflict (see below).
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In short, the actual outcomes do not sustain the view that explicit compromises 
streamline policy making. If the frequency of implementation and conflict are considered 
it can be concluded that outcomes were more positive in terms of policy préfiguration (5 
out of 8) than in terms of conflict prevention (3 out of 8).
The freezing effect of procedural arrangements
There were two important procedural arrangements. One of these contained a 
postponement of definitive decisions on school reform, this removed this controversial 
matter effectively from the agenda. The other arrangement however was a postponement 
of a decision on cruise missiles until a later stage in the government’s life and though the 
postponement was observed, this did not prevent conflict occurring. As the main aim of 
the parties when making this type of arrangement was to depoliticise decision making, the 
conclusion must be that this function is not entirely indicated.
The boomerang effect of general implicit compromises
Typically, the different outcomes of general implicit compromises were linked to policy 
areas. General compromises on financial and socio-economic policy were mostly 
elaborated and implemented, but only the arrangement on the postbank was elaborated and 
implemented without conflict. Strong commitments were made on the size of cuts in 
government expenditure but the way to realise these cuts had still to be determined by the 
government and this was the main problem which dominated policy making in the field of 
socio-economic policy. When considering the period 1982-86 as a whole, the elaboration 
of the general intention to decrease social benefits and pursue wage restraint in the public 
sector took the form of many different smaller, or larger, retrenchment operations in 
different sectors. Though this involved much conflict, departmental as well as along party 
lines, substantive results were achieved. With regard to income policy, the efforts of the 
Lubbers coalition were successful, though this remained a sensitive area. Conflict over the 
levelling o f middle and lower incomes occurred mainly during the government’s first year 
in office. No such levelling took place, at least not on behalf of the government, which 
entailed a gain for the VVD, and this also seems to have been the situation with the issue 
of the coupling mechanism between wages and social benefits, which was not maintained, 
the VVD’s preferred result. On these issues, the government pursued a policy o f laisser 
fa ire , but it played a more active role when revising the fiscal regime for double income 
couples to produce a result which combined Liberal and Christian Democratic principles.
In the fields of what has been called ’immaterial’ policy, the outcomes were mostly 
less substantive. The arrangement on the existing nuclear military tasks was elaborated, at
1 6 2
least in the sense that a substantive decision was taken, a reduction of nuclear tasks in 
combination with the deployment of cruise missiles, though actual deployment would not 
be realised during the term of the Lubbers I government. It must be noted, however, that 
due to dissidence within the CD A the decisions on the issue obtained a majority in 
parliament only with the help of the small religious parties. No real legislative coalitions 
of incumbent parties with opposition parties were formed in the areas of education, 
broadcasting and the ethical issues of euthanasia and equal treatment, as this would have 
threatened the life of the coalition and as a result, the elaboration of arrangements on 
these matters foundered in the parliamentary arena.
With respect to the Lubbers I coalition, there is broad empirical support for the 
hypothesis that general implicit compromises generate rather than prevent coalitional 
conflict. The paradoxical point is however that these arrangements were often elaborated 
and implemented, at least in the area of socio-economic policy. Indeed, success in this 
respect was almost as frequent as when explicit compromises had been made (7/12 against 
5/8). The overall outcomes of the three types of arrangements are summarised in table
8.3.
Table 8.3
Success and failure of the Lubbers I coalition
implementation 
+ -
conflict
+
4 1
10 7
The coalition agreement was an important element of coalition politics between 1982 and
1986. After the dissolution of parliament in 1986, the minister of finance commented that:
Next time we should make a coalition agreement that leads less to discussions 
about the details of arrangements. (...) Sometimes, the agreement was an obstacle 
for me; colleagues in such cases referred to the text, which had become sacrosanct 
(Van Tijn & Van Weezel, 1986: 276; author’s translation).
The other, less acknowledged, side of the coin is that the agreement did not always 
streamline coalition decision making. In this case study o f arrangements on controversial 
issues, failure was also an important outcome. The coalition was more successful in 
resolving policy conflict after taking office than in preventing it beforehand.
FACTORS EXPLAINING SUCCESS AND FAILURE
In terms of implementation, outcomes in the Lubbers I coalition were more mixed than for 
other coalitions. Thus, I must account for both success and failure perhaps even more so 
than for the other cases. What has become clear is that there was only a small difference 
between the rate of implementation o f explicit and general implicit compromises. This 
suggests that the type of arrangement itself makes little difference in the process of 
enforcement (explicit compromises are not more ’self enforcing’) and that other factors 
such as those relating to the coalition and its composite parts must be relevant. In this 
section I look at whether the factors identified and examined in the preceding chapters 
were relevant favourable or unfavourable conditions for the process of enforcement of 
arrangements. As the Lubbers I government completed its constitutional term in office, 
there were no arrangements which remained unimplemented due to conflict over other 
matters triggering the fall of the government. This means that in the present case I will 
consider the complete set of 22 arrangements made during government formation.
Table 8.4
Association between factors and outcomes in the Lubbers I coalition4
policy field
factor
finance/
budget
socio­
economic
nuclear
arms
media school ethical
coalition size ( + ) ( + ) 0 0 0 0
internal party unity + + + o o 0 0
negotiators in government + + + + 0 -- o --
prime ministerial support + + + + + - 0 -
coalition committees 0 0 0 0 0 0
personal relationships n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
economic situation + + 0 0 0 0 0
key to symbols:
+ + or + direct association between factor and success
-- or - direct association between factor and failure
o no association found
n.a. not assessed (no indication of presence or absence factor)
The different factors and whether or not these were associated with the outcomes are 
given in table 8.4. Again, it should be realised that the number of cases was small and
4 See the appendix for more detailed findings on the Lubbers I coalition.
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that the numbers of arrangements varied between policy fields; on nuclear and 
’immaterial’ policy (media, school, ethical issues) there were only two or three 
arrangements. It must also be emphasised that the figures in the table tell us only whether 
or not there was, in a rough sense, a ’strong’ or ’weak’ association between a factor and 
outcomes in the way assumed. In what follows, I go somewhat further into the question of 
the impact of each of the factors.
Coalition size and reciprocal control
The Lubbers I government was a two party coalition. The assumption was that this would 
strengthen reciprocal control as an enforcement mechanism. The temptation for an 
individual party to give up cooperation unilaterally in the implementation of an 
arrangement containing relatively few payoffs was seen to depend on the extent of mutual 
control. In strictly numerical terms there appears to be a (weak) association between the 
two variables (14 out of 22 arrangements were implemented). It is important to realise 
however that success was confined to two, or when including the nuclear arms issue three, 
policy areas. Conflict without substantive results was the typical outcome in the fields of 
media policy, school policy and ethical issues, but no legislative (voting) coalitions were 
formed. Compared with the other cases, there were more possibilities for legislative 
coalitions, that is, voting coalitions, as the relatively small size of the government 
coalition implied that there were 'coalitionable’ parties in the opposition (PvdA, D66). In 
the Netherlands, parties are seen to have a free vote on issues and to be ’allowed’ to form 
legislative coalitions only if this is agreed explicitly during government formation. The 
absence of such legislative coalitions may also be seen in the light of mutual control, or 
indeed mutual blackmailing; allusions to such ’disloyal’ manoeuvres made by one party 
were sometimes countered by the threat of a coalition crisis by the other. While not 
facilitating unequivocally the enforcement of arrangements in the sense that substantive 
policies were formulated and approved, reciprocal control seems to have been important in 
the Lubbers I coalition. One of the factors that was likely to have been relevant in this 
respect was the two party character of the coalition.
The internal unity of coalition parties
At least theoretically, even a two party government in which mutual control is strong may 
have serious difficulties with implementing intentions if internal divisions are manifest 
within the parties, or even within one party. Did this kind of internal heterogeneity 
become manifest within the CDA or VVD during government formation or during the life 
of the government? With the exception of nuclear weapons policy, the two parties seem to
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have been fairly homogenous. In the fields of immaterial policy party values and 
principles were at stake but these were mostly a source of trouble between and not within 
the parties. Moreover, unlike during the formation of the Van Agt II government, there 
were no, or at least no strong, tensions over socio-economic issues within the CD A.
This factor thus was a favourable condition in all fields except nuclear policy. The 
absence of intraparty divisions may thus have contributed to success in the areas of 
finance and socio-economic policy. While the presence of such divisions may have 
contributed to failure to complete legislation on secondary education reform, though it is 
difficult to say what the influence o f this factor was exactly. Despite the absence of 
intraparty divisions in the other fields no substantive successes were reached, whereas the 
presence of internal dispute within the CDA on the cruise missiles issue did not prevent a 
decision eventually being taken and approved. Intraparty unity or disunity may have 
played some part in the enforcement process but it does not seem to have been a necessary 
condition given the different outcomes in situations in which parties were internally 
homogenous.
Negotiators as m inisters
The Lubbers I government contained negotiators in the fields of financial/budgetary and 
socio-economic policy as well as in the area of education. If ministers participated in 
negotiations on the coalition agreement this was seen as a factor that facilitated 
enforcement. In the socio-economic ’pentagon*, containing the prime minister and the four 
key ministers in the field of financial and socio-economic policy, the minister of finance 
(CDA) was the only one who had not been involved in government formation, but there 
can be little doubt about this minister’s faithfulness to the coalition agreement. In fact, he 
often demanded ’budgetary discipline’ from his colleagues, especially those of the 
spending departments. The other ministers in the ’pentagon’ also cooperated in the 
realisation of the ambitious retrenchment programme; the minister of Economic Affairs 
led work group A in which the arrangements on financial and socio-economic policy were 
made or at least prepared. Thus, at least with respect to these areas, the association of 
success with ministerial experience as a negotiator is likely to have been more than a 
coincidence.
The opposite situation existed in other fields, in which the coalition was less 
successful. Only the minister of education had been involved directly during government 
formation (he presided over the discussions in work group B), but this did not prevent 
legislation remaining uncompleted. The legislative process foundered at the stage of 
parliamentary discussions. We should, however, realise that failure was often the result of 
conflict between the parliamentary parties. If ministers are able to influence the 
implementation process, this influence decreases once matters are examined in parliament
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and un]ike in Belgium, Dutch ministers do not have a seat in parliament. Though the 
parliamentary groups contained members of work group B, their role in the critical stages 
seems to have been limited, as they for example, were not the first party spokespersons in 
the discussions. The presence of former negotiators in the government may have 
facilitated the implementation of one part of the coalition agreement, but it is more 
difficult to see how their absence in other fields of policy can be linked to failure.
Prime m inisterial support
Did the prime minister play a positive role in the enforcement of the coalition agreement? 
At the end of the term of his first government, Ruud Lubbers had certainly gained a 
reputation as an activist, in contrast to his predecessor Van Agt. During government 
formation. Lubbers had been his party's first spokesman before he became a fonnateur. 
Examples of prime ministerial influence on the elaboration and implementation of 
arrangements cover cases of success and failure. We must realise however that ’failure’ 
often was anything but unintended. Lubbers used different methods to reduce centrifugal 
forces within the government. Ministers were taken aside frequently and reminded of their 
commitments. The outstanding example of prime ministerial involvement in the 
elaboration of the coalition agreement was Lubbers’ role in the decision making on 
nuclear arms, an issue which he depoliticised by cutting it into pieces that were then dealt 
with one by one. Lubbers had already tried to limit the role of parliament on this matter 
during government formation.
In the important fields of financial/budgetary and socio-economic policy, Lubbers 
sometimes made proposals which went against the coalition agreement. This corresponds 
with the finding of one author that the prime minister did not always back the minister of 
finance, who was committed strongly to the compromises on financial and budgetary 
policy (Toirkens, 1988: 182-182). Though not all Lubbers’ proposals were followed, the 
changes from one financial priority to another and vice versa made by the government 
may at least be attributed in part to the prime minister’s manoeuvres. The role of the 
prime minister with respect to immaterial issues is less clear. Thus, if not for all relevant 
policy areas, prime ministerial support seems to have been a relevant factor, mostly in 
relation to success but also to failure.
Coalition committees
As in the Van Agt II government, there was a socio-economic ’pentagon’ in the Lubbers I 
government, with the difference that it did not form the political top of the coalition. 
Another cabinet committee, also not a coalition committee in that it contained no
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spokespersons from other sections of the parties, was formed especially to elaborate 
nuclear weapons policy. This committee was formed because there were no ministers from 
the VVD in this field, while it was politically unthinkable that decisions on this issue were 
taken exclusively by the CDA (Andeweg, 1985: 147). Though not coalition committees in 
actual sense, these informal cabinet committees played a crucial role during the process of 
elaborating arrangements and in the success of the outcome.
An actual coalition committee met weekly over the lunch table, this committee 
contained ministers and the parliamentary leaders. The ’political luncheons’ held by this 
informal group have been found to be important (Andeweg, 1990: 32). To be more 
precise about the relevance of these meetings requires much more detailed information of 
developments within the coalition and this is beyond the scope of this study. This coalition 
committee was unable to accomplish legislation on broadcasting, on secondary education 
reform, on euthanasia and on equal treatment before the elections. This underlines that it 
cannot be taken for granted that coalition committees have real 'steering potential' with 
regard to the elaboration and implementation of coalition agreements.
The economic situation
Economic problems were generally acknowledged by the parties when conducting the 
coalition negotiations. The coalition agreement contained the most ambitious retrenchment 
programme of the postwar period. With respect to budgetary policy, the economic 
circumstances seem to have motivated ministers to observe arrangements, especially on 
cutbacks, compromises over extra cuts were reached. Changes in the emphasis on 
financial and economic goals in successive years, sometimes in contradiction to the 
coalition agreement also seem to have been based at least partly on the parties’ 
interpretation of economic figures. Thus, both success and failure, in the sense that 
policies were pursued at variance with the coalition agreement, seem to have been at least 
partly, the consequence of the reactions of the parties to economic developments.
Personal relationships
Finally, the personal factor, which was so important in the preceding government, seems 
to have played a background role. This is not to say that personal relationships were 
irrelevant but rather that no personal conflicts between ministers or other prominents were 
recorded that were so important that they may have contributed to failure. Another 
indication that such problems did not occur is that that after the elections in 1986 the 
second Lubbers government contained mostly the same ministers. This had not happened 
since the ’good old days’ of the Drees governments in the 1950s.
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CONCLUSION
In contrast to the Van Agt II coalition, the Lubbers I coalition was the first preference of 
the participant parties. At the same time, there were manifest and important differences 
between policy preferences in several distinct fields, on which extensive bargaining took 
place during government formation. The results of these policy negotiations were explicit 
and especially implicit compromises (8 were explicit and 14 were implicit, of which 2 
were procedural arrangements). Explicit compromises were made almost exclusively in the 
areas of fmancial/budgetary and socio-economic policy. The typical result of bargaining 
on what were called ’immaterial’ issues was an implicit compromise. An important 
substantive motivation for the forming of the CDA-VVD coalition was the pursuit of 
retrenchment policy, however, ’immaterial’ issues such as commercial broadcasting, 
secondary education reform, euthanasia and equal treatment often involved strong party 
values and principles which were difficult to match. The parties appeared more successful 
in matching principles on issues which also involved a clear ’material’ aspect, such as the 
problem of income tax for couples with two incomes.
As conflict was frequent not only when general implicit compromises were to be 
elaborated, which was to be expected but also when explicit compromises were on the 
governmental agenda (which was contrary to the hypothesis on this type of arrangements), 
the Lubbers I coalition agreement did not function well to prevent conflict (conflict 
occurred in 17 of the 22 cases). This contrasts with outcomes in the preceding Van Agt II 
coalition, when conflict was relatively less frequent but had a much more destabilising 
effect.
The coalition agreement, or at least the relevant parts in it, constituted the agenda 
of the government. Though there were issues which had not been dealt with extensively 
during government formation, it is no exaggeration to say that what was discussed in the 
relatively short time of two months were the most important points for government action. 
More rarely, the result was a narrowed scope of action in the government’s four year 
period. Nearly two thirds (14 out of 22) of the arrangements were elaborated and 
implemented. This however did not always mean that the agreement was functional in 
terms of policy préfiguration, as certain matters were actually only placed on the agenda, 
to be taken up by the government. In the field of financial and budgetary policy, the 
agreement was not only an agenda but the arrangements also ’predetermined’ policy to a 
considerable extent. For this reason, it has been called the ’paper ally* of the minister of 
finance (Andeweg, 1989: 16-17). In other areas, policy préfiguration was more indicative. 
The more general arrangements on broadasting, school and ethical issues also had less 
concrete results. This underlines that long term governments are not automatically more 
successful in policy making, at least not in all relevant areas.
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A somewhat more indirect effect of the coalition agreement has been that despite 
conflict between the parliamentary groups of the CDA and W D , these refrained from 
forming legislative coalitions unilaterally with opposition parties on immaterial policy. 
This may be seen in the light of mutual control, which seems to have been strengthened 
by the relatively small size of the coalition, which, paradoxically, meant that there were 
more possibilities for legislative coalitions, simply because there were more ’coalitionable’ 
opposition parties. Due to the two party character of the coalition, this reciprocal control 
is also likely to have contributed to the implementing of arrangements in the important 
fields of financial and socio-economic policy, from which both the CDA and the VVD 
obtained substantive payoffs.
Apart from coalition size and its supposed effect on the mechanism of reciprocal control, 
other factors also seem to have contributed to successes or failures in different fields. The 
presence of former negotiators in the government is likely to have facilitated the 
implementation of one part of the coalition agreement, but it is less easy to see what may 
have been the role of this factor in the areas in which the outcome was failure. In these 
areas there were few or no negotiators, but failure occurred mostly in the parliamentary 
arena. In fact, the presence of negotiators in the parliamentary groups did not prevent 
failure. There are also no clear indications that the informal coalition committee of 
ministers and the two parliamentary leaders or personal relationships influenced the 
implementation process in a particular way. Further, the absence of major and manifest 
internal divisions within parties may have facilitated implementation in the areas of 
financial and socio-economic policy but in other areas in which no such centrifugal forces 
were present the outcome was failure.
A more generally relevant factor seems to have been prime ministerial support. 
Lubbers played both a procedural and substantial role in the process of elaborating and 
implementing arrangements, which not only contributed to success but also to failure in 
the sense that policy decisions were not always in accordance with the letter or the spirit 
of the coalition arrangement. Finally, if the assumption on the economic context was that 
changing economic circumstances demotivate (individual) parties form holding on to 
commitments made beforehand, this was not always true in the Lubbers I coalition. 
Economic developments were used as an argument for changes in policy priorities which 
were against the letter and the spirit of the coalition agreement but they were also used to 
legitimise the implementation of arrangements on retrenchment policy.
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High Politics in the Low Countries: 
Do Coalition Policy Agreements Matter?
INTRODUCTION
In this study I have dealt with coalition policy agreements and their effects during the life 
of governments. The leading question was whether coalition agreements function to 
prevent conflict and promote policy making within coalition governments. This dual 
question was seen to be of special relevance to Belgium and the Netherlands, two 
countries where, since the mid 1960s, comprehensive and detailed joint policy agreements 
have been formulated before a new coalition government has been sworn in.
Party manifestos form a link between parties and their respective electorates, while 
written coalition agreements may be seen to establish a relationship between parties taking 
office together. Though parties may not really discuss all matters that are normally within 
the scope of government action and certainly not make everyting the subject of 
bargaining, negotiations on a coalition agreement in the low countries seem to be more 
than just windrow dressing. Thus, apart from a symbolic function which may follow, for 
example, from the general pressure from within society to mention what the government 
intends to do in area x and to pay attention to subject y, coalition agreements may also 
have more substantive functions. These possible functions are, first, to provide a coalition 
agenda and second, to prevent the recurrence of conflict on particular issues during the 
life of the government. Both functions are based on the view that government formation is 
a policy making arena characterised by ’invisible politics’ and fewer institutionally or 
constitutionally required procedures (Peterson & De Ridder, 1986).
As said, party leaders are unlikely to negotiate on everything. At least in part this 
is so because they do not all emphasise the same issues and find it unnecessary, given 
time constraints which are usually strong during government formation, to discuss matters 
on which general consensus exists or which are not really salient to any of the parties. 
What interests us here is the set of issues which are salient to two or more parties and 
also controversial among them. These issues may change from election to election, though 
some may be more permanently salient, as for example issues in the fields of financial 
and socio-economic policy, which in the 1970s and 1980s drove parties to insist more
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strongly on their principles when confronted with financial and budgetary problems.
Controversial issues have thus formed the point of departure in the four case 
studies. The first step in each of these case studies was to go from controversial issues to 
written arrangements. These arrangements might take the form of explicit compromises or 
be general or procedural in character. In the specific context of the Netherlands and 
Belgium, parties were expected to come into contention over issues in several distinct 
policy fields, relating to different ideological cleavages, though this was not always a one 
to one relationship; some different fields could relate to one cleavage, as with school 
policy and morality issues for example, which divided religious and secular parties. This 
multiplicity of policy themes is what, in more abstract terms, constitutes a 
'multidimensional policy space’. The second step moves from arrangements to outcomes, 
which may be peace and policy, one or other of them, or neither of them. Different rates 
of 'success’ were expected as outcomes of explicit compromises, procedual arrangements, 
and more general arrangements.
I deal with the findings from the four case studies in this chapter, following the 
same analytical steps as made in the case studies. I will first look to see if particular 
patterns in the types of arrangements emerge, as well as in the outcomes of these 
arrangements across the cases. Next, I consider the question whether characteristics o f 
coalitions and their composite elements may account for successes and failures. To be 
able to make some generalisations, it is necessary to take some distance from the specific 
context of each of the cases. At the same time, it is necessary to try to avoid making 
statements which are unjust with regard to any of the findings in the case studies.
POLICY CONFLICTS AND ARRANGEMENTS
Fixed and Tixing agendas in government formation
The issues debated during government formation were in part conflicts ’inherited’ from 
the previous coalition and for another part issues were raised by the parties on the basis 
of their election manifestos. Only the formation of the Leburton government was not 
preceded by elections. In the Leburton and the Lubbers I coalition, the category of 
inherited problems contained the issue(s) that had triggered the fall of the previous 
coalition. This has been the rule rather than the exception since 1965 in Belgium, where 
internal conflicts are relatively more frequent than in the Netherlands. Developments 
within the Van Agt II coalition and subsequently in the formation of the Lubbers I 
coalition also sustain the view that policy bargaining on politically important and 
controversial issues is an ongoing process which may extend to successive governments
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and may shift between formal and informal arenas.
Areas o f policy conflict in government formation
Though at least in theory matters which divide parties could be ignored, particular fields 
of policy were felt to be so important during government formation that this was hardly 
possible. Issues often concerned matters which had a high ideological content; central 
principles and the identities of parties were at stake. Moreover, in the period 1970-1990, 
the different approaches of the Christian Democrats, Liberals and Social Democrats to the 
chronic economic problems also meant that financial/budgetary and socio-economic policy 
became a major source of interparty conflict, even though issues in these areas are usually 
more quantifiable and for this reason more compromisable than other subjects. In the two 
Belgian cases and in the case of the Lubbers I coalition, the pursuit of policy on such 
politically sensitive matters formed the raison d ’être of the government. The Leburton 
and the Tindemans V coalitions were both extended to control at least a two thirds 
majority to ’secure’ the constitutionally required two thirds majority for making 
institutional reforms. Thus, general policy ambitions in certain areas were an important 
reason why conflicting preferences on specific issues were prominent in government 
formation.
Apart from these important fields, other matters on the agenda often related to the 
’old’ religious cleavage, the division between religious and secular parties which has been 
more or less manifest since the formation of these parties. Matters where the religious 
secular divide was relevant were school policy, ethical questions and media policy. Issues 
in the fields of school and media policy especially must be seen in the context of the 
pluralist systems, which in both countries are an expression of ’peacemaking’ (pacificatie) 
between the different tendencies. The Christian Democrats have displayed great suspicion 
with regard to proposals affecting the traditional institutional arrangements in these areas.
Finally, a policy ’dimension* that stood somewhat apart was nuclear policy. Issues 
relating to this ’dimension’ (here we actually should speak of a theme) may cover both 
energy policy and foreign/defence policy, which have usually not been considered to be 
very important during government formation in Belgium and the Netherlands since the 
1960s (or at least these areas are less important than the aforementioned areas1). In the 
early 1980s, nuclear policy, especially in the military sphere, ceased to be an area of 
general consensus among the main parties. In the two Dutch cases issues in this area 
divided the coalition parties and caused internal divisions within the CD A.
The relevant policy areas in the cases are summarised in table 9.1 (the typically 
’Belgian’ issues are given from top to bottom, and the issues which were salient
1 This can be concluded from expert survey research conducted by Laver & Hunt (1992) as 
well as from the content analysis of policy programmes undertaken by the Manifesto Research 
Group (Laver & Budge, 1992).
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exclusively or mainly in the Netherlands from bottom to top). In the final column, the 
coalitions are given in order of decreasing importance of the respective policy area, i.e. 
régionalisation was relatively most important in the Tindemans V coalition. An indicator 
of this importance, if not a perfect one, is the relative number of arrangements 
concerning issues in the relevant area. Some variation between the cases with respect to 
the scope of bargaining can be seen in table 9.1. During the formation of the Tindemans 
V coalition, bargaining was limited to four policy fields, whereas the formulation of the 
Lubbers I coalition agreement involved negotiations in six different areas. Paradoxically, 
the first coalition contained five parties, the second only two.
The overall picture of relevant policy areas corresponds with the main subjects of 
governmental conflicts in Belgium in the Netherlands that have been recorded for the 
1970s and 1980s in a recent study of internal processes within European cabinets 
(Nousiainen, 1993). In Belgium, cabinet conflicts in the 1970s and 1980s were mostly 
over what are called ’cultural problems’, a broader category which includes language 
policy, régionalisation and school policy, on financial and economic policy and on issues 
relating to justice and general administrative matters (for which no clear equivalents can 
be found in the case-studies, perhaps because these matters were more departmental than 
party political conflicts). The conflicts recorded for Dutch cabinets concern mainly 
finance and economic policy, social affairs, and foreign affairs/defence and justice (ibid: 
270).
Table 9.1
Types of arrangements in relevant policy fields 
(absolute figures)
type of arrangement
explicit procedural general all where important?
policy field
language policy 2 2 Leb
régionalisation policy 18 3 1 22 Tin(ex),Leb(ex)
school policy 3 2 5 10 Leb(ex),Lub,vA
ethical questions 1 3 4 Lub,Leb
socio-economic policy 5 11 16 vA(ex),Lub,Tin,Leb
finance/budget 9 5 14 Lub(ex),vA,Tin
media policy 1 2 3 Lub
nuclear policy 4 1 5 vA,Lub
(39) (9) (28) (76)
key to symbols:
Leb = Le burton Tin = Tindemans V vA = Van Agt II Lub *  Lubbers I
(ex) = explicit compromises were relatively most frequent in the coalition agreement
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Table 9.2
Types of arrangements in coalition agreements 
(absolute figures)
type of arrangement
coalition
Leburton
explicit
14
procedural
4
general
6 (24)
Tindemans V 12 - 3 (15)
Van Agt II 5 3 7 (15)
Lubbers 1 8 2 12 (22)
(39) (9) (28) (76)
Explicit and implicit compromises as results of policy bargaining
What type of arrangements ensued in which field is also shown in table 9.1. The relative 
frequencies of these types of arrangements in the four cases are given in table 9.2. 
Explicit compromises contained commitments to intentions which differed from the 
prenegotiation preferences of one or more parties and thus involved substantive 
concessions. Implicit compromises either took the form of procedural arrangements which 
were meant to freeze, at least for a time, decision making, or were ’compromises’ that 
were sufficiently general that no clear gains and losses were made by any party (though in 
part this depends on the degree to which parties actually wanted clear cut and ’doable’ 
intentions).
The proportion of explicit compromises appears to vary between the coalitions, but 
more between the two countries. While explicit compromises were relatively frequent in 
Belgium, parties in the Netherlands were more inclined to agree implicitly on issues and 
they did so mostly in a general, non-procedural, way. These differences must be seen in 
connection with the fields of policy in which the arrangements ensued. From table 9.1, it 
can be seen that in Belgium many explicit compromises were formulated on 
régionalisation policy. Parties in the Netherlands reached both explicit and implicit 
compromises on financial/budgetary and socio-economic policy, though in this last field 
implicit compromises were more frequent. The two areas were also the most important 
areas of interparty bargaining.
With regard to other fields o f policy, mostly implicit compromises were reached in 
both countries. Issues in these fields were often seen as matters of principle, on which it 
was difficult to formulate substantive joint intentions. In Belgium, bargaining on financial 
and socio-economic policy also resulted mostly in implicit compromises. This may be 
because socio-economic issues especially in Belgium were ideologically divisive, but 
another reason also noted in the case studies may be that the heavy emphasis on
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community and régionalisation policy during government formation meant that less time 
was spent on other matters, given the general time pressure.
Given that implicit compromises were frequent, it is no surprise that when 
speaking of the contents of government policy declarations, Laver & Budge (1992; 428) 
conclude that in countries such as Belgium and the Netherlands ’no immediate obvious 
relationship between the policies of parties and the policies of governments exists’. Part 
of the ’policies of governments’ still need to be specified when these governments take 
office.
OUTCOMES O F ARRANGEMENTS
The possible outcomes of arrangements were seen to contain a conflict element, the 
presence or absence of conflict and an implementation element (the term ’implementation’ 
is preferred to ’policy’, as it covers more than substantive decisions, which sometimes 
were not intended). To examine the substantive functions of coalition agreements 
empirically, three hypotheses were formulated. Explicit compromises were expected to be 
implemented without giving rise to new conflict between the coalition parties. They were 
thus seen to be functional in preventing conflict and promoting policy making within the 
coalition. The hypothesis on implicit compromises of the general type was that these do 
not prevent the recurrence of conflict on the relevant issues and result in substantive 
decisions less often than when explicit compromises are formulated and certainly less 
often in a peaceful manner. Procedural arrangements were expected to contribute to the 
peace within coalitions, or in any case not to lead to new conflict, which was also seen to 
be the main intention behind this type o f arrangement.
When speaking of outcomes of arrangements, I mean outcomes of attempts to 
implement or perhaps to prevent the implementation of arrangements made during 
government formation. Moreover, by success and failure, I mean the extent to which 
conflicts on policy remained absent and intentions were carried out. What is called a 
’success’ may not be perceived as a failure at all by one or more of the coalition parties, 
and the same applies to what is called a ’failure’.
The outcomes of the three types of arrangements in the four coalitions are given in tables
9.3 to 9.5. In addition, the overall outcomes in different fields of policy are presented in 
table 9.6. It must be emphasised that as in the case studies. I am dealing with outcomes in 
terms of frequencies. More qualitative differences between individual arrangements will 
be considered when such differences are relevant to ou; unaerstanding of what has been 
going on within the coalitions. Qualitative aspects are the length and the intensity of
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conflicts, which may be at least as important to coalition survival as the frequency of 
conflict; they may also include differences in the weight of substantive policies for one or 
more parties.
Table 9.3
Outcomes of explicit compromises 
('success' percentages)
conflict absent implementation implementation
without conflict
Le burton 43 (42) 50 (58) 29 (33) n = 14 (12)
Tindemans V 50 (33) 8 (17) 8 (17) n = 12 (6)
Van Agt II 60 (50) 20 (25) 20 (25) n = 5 (4)
Lubbers 1 38 63 25
00llc
total 46 (40) 36 (47) 21 (27) n = 39 (30)
Figures between parentheses exclude arrangements which could not be 
implemented due to the fall of the government caused by conflict on other issues.
Table 9.4
Outcomes of implicit procedural arrangements 
('success' percentages)
conflict absent implementation implementation
without conflict
Leburton 50 75 50 llc
Tindemans V - -- -- --
Van Agt II 100 67 (100) 67 (100) n = 3 (2)
Lubbers I 50 100 50
CMilc
total 67 78 (88) 56 (63) n = 9 (8)
Figures between parentheses exclude arrangements which could not be 
implemented due to the fall of the government caused by conflict on other issues.
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Table 9.5
Outcomes of general implicit compromises 
('success' percentages)
conflict absent implementation implementation
Leburton 0 33
Tindemans V 0 100
Van Agt II 29 (0} 0
Lubbers 1 8 58
total 11 (5) 43
without conflict
(67) 0 n = 6 (3)
0 n = 3
0 n = 7 (4)
8 n = 12
(55) 5 n = 28 (22)
Figures between parentheses exclude arrangements which could not be 
implemented due to the fall of the government caused by conflict on other issues.
Table 9.6
Outcomes of arrangements in different policy fields 
(absolute figures)
Outcomes
explicit general procedural all where which outcome?
C 1 0 C 1 0 C I 0 C I 0 C I 0
Policy field
language policy 2 2 Leb
régionalisation policy 11 7 1 1 2 13 7 Tin, Leb Leb Tin
school policy 3 3 3 2 1 1 2 7 8 1 Leb,Lub Leb
ethical questions 1 3 3 1 Lub, Leb Leb
socio-economic policy 1 4 1 7 7 1 8 11 2 all Tin,Lub vA
finances/budget 5 4 2 5 3 1 10 7 3 vA,Lub,Tin Lub,Tin
media policy 1 2 3 Lub
nuclear policy 1 2 4 2 4 1 Lub Lub,vA
key to symbols:
C = conflict I « implemented O = no conflict and not implemented Tin = Tindemans V, etc.
Figures in bold indicate that a coalition broke down over an issue in the relevant field.
The scores add up to more than the total number of arrangements (76). This is because 
outcomes of individual arrangements were often both conflict and implementation.
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IThe streamlining effect of explicit compromises
With respect to explicit compromises, it can be clearly seen from table 9.3 that there is 
only limited empirical evidence for the hypothesis that arrangements of this type 
streamline policy making. The proportion of compromises that was implemented without 
conflict varied between 8 and 29 percent (with an average of 21 percent). In the 
Netherlands, conflict occurred in the field of financial and budgetary policy, while in 
Belgium explicit compromises on régionalisation and institutional reform were the main 
sources of interparty dispute. As we know, these two areas were the most generally 
important areas in the two countries (see also table 9.6). Paradoxically, conflict remained 
absent in more than half the number of cases only in the short lived Van Agt II coalition, 
whereas within the Lubbers I coalition which lasted four years, nearly two thirds of the 
explicit compromises gave rise to conflict. Long duration o f the coalition does not imply a 
low frequency of conflict. Moreover, if few different conflicts occur, this in no sense 
means that the life of the coalition was peaceful.
In the Lubbers I coalition, only explicit compromises contained ’predetermined’ 
policies which were mostly implemented by the parties (this can be seen in table 9.6). In 
the Lubbers I coalition, the implementation of explicit compromises mostly involved 
conflict (this can be concluded when comparing the percentage for implementation with 
that for implementation without conflict). The policy decisions taken by this coalition 
were however confined largely to the sphere of financial/budgetary and socio-economic 
policy. The Leburton coalition also implemented 50 percent of the explicit compromises, 
despite, as in the Lubbers I coalition, the frequent occurrence of conflict. Indeed, despite 
its short term in office, the Leburton coalition produced important achievements, such as 
legislation on secular and religious schools and on language policy, including the issue of 
Fourons which had brought about the fall of the previous government.
In contrast, even though conflict was less frequent, explicit compromises were 
often left unimplemented by the Tindemans V and Van Agt II coalition. This ’failure’ 
took two forms. Either decisions were taken which deviated from the agreement, or no 
substantive decisions were taken or approved. This failure included the premature end of 
both governments. In the case o f the Tindemans V government, conflict on the 
implementation o f explicit compromises was the main cause of collapse. The fall o f the 
Van Agt II government was partly due to such conflict.
Given that there is limited evidence for the hypothesis that explicit compromises 
are implemented without conflict, it remains true that there was no interparty conflict in 
46 percent, or 40 percent when correcting for cases which could not be implemented due 
to the end of the government after conflict over other issues. With respect to the 
implementation of explicit compromises, it would also be too pessimistic to speak only of 
failure. In two coalitions, explicit compromises predefined coalition policy in at least 50 
percent of the cases. This is actually not a bad performance if we realise that the 179
179
compromises were made months or even years before the relevant issues were dealt with 
by the cabinet and in parliament.
The freezing effect of procedural arrangements
The case studies provide more evidence for the hypothesis that procedural arrangements 
function to maintain peace within coalitions, though here also the findings do not support 
the hypothesis unambiguously. In table 9.4 it can be seen that procedural arrangements 
were observed or caried out more often than they really prevented the recurrence of 
conflict and when this outcome occurred, the arrangements were thus not really effective. 
This was especially the case in the area of nuclear policy (Netherlands), in which agreed 
postponements of substantive decisions were observed but at the same time the issues 
continued to divide the parties. Another agreed procedure which was carried out but 
nonetheless did not prevent the emergence of conflict, indeed quite to the contrary, was 
the referral of the problem of the Brussels boundaries to a special parliamentary' 
committee during the term of the Leburton government. Still, the overall proportion of 
procedural arrangements that was implemented without involving conflict was much 
higher (always 50 percent or more) than that for explicit compromises.
We must however realise that the percentages conceal the fact that the absolute 
numbers of arrangements were actually quite small. Moreover, the mostly positive 
outcomes of procedural arrangements (absence of conflict) in the case of the Leburton 
coalition and the Van Agt II coalition must be seen in connection to the short life of these 
coalitions. If conflicts on the relevant issues were latent, there was simply no time for 
these conflicts to become manifest. Another point to be emphasised once more is that the 
absence of conflict can be seen as a 'success* in terms of conflict prevention, but in the 
perception of one or more parties this may have been at the cost of substantive decisions 
(policy changes) which would have been preferred.
The boomerang effect of general arrangements
The case studies provide ample evidence for the hypothesis that general implicit 
compromises generate rather than obviate conflict. As can be seen in table 9.5, the 
average conflict percentage was high and for the two coalitions in Belgium conflict even 
occurred for all cases. As said before, frequency of conflict does not tell the whole story 
and this point is particularly relevant with respect to the case of the Van Agt II 
government, in which policy making was paralysed by extremely protracted conflict on a 
limited number o f issues in the fields o f financial and socio-economic policy (see table
9.6).
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In conformation with what was expected, general compromises were elaborated 
and implemented less often than explicit compromises, except in the Tindemans V 
coalition. A more specific outcome which is also in line with our expectations is the small 
proportion (5 percent) of general arrangements which was implemented without conflict. 
As can be seen form table 9.6, the general arrangements which were elaborated and 
subsequently translated into substantive and formally approved decisions concerned mainly 
socio-economic policy, financial/budgetary policy and school policy. Failure was the 
dominant outcome of (parliamentary) discussions on media policy and ethical questions.
When comparing the three types of arrangements, we find a pattern which is consistent 
acrosss the four cases with respect to the conflict element but not if we consider the 
implementation element. In conformation with what was hypothesised, conflictual 
outcomes of procedural arrangements were much less frequent (33 percent of the cases on 
average) than when general implicit compromises had been made (89 percent on average) 
and also less frequently than when the arrangement was an explicit compromise (54 
percent). Though considerable variation existed within coalitions and also the 
consequences of conflict varied, this pattern emerges in all the coalitions in which these 
three types of arrangements were incorporated into the coalition agreement.
In terms of implementation, outcomes follow a pattern that is less consistent acorss 
the cases. While procedural arrangements were implemented most often (78 percent on 
average), explicit compromises came next in three cases but not in the case of the 
Tindemans V coalition, in which indeed all general arrangements were elaborated and 
implemented, while explicii compromises were barely implemented. It should be realised 
that nonimplementation of arrangements does not always imply that substantive policy 
decisions were absent; it can also mean that actual policies were at variance with the 
coalition agreement, though this did not happen often.
When considering the category containing peacefully implemented arrangements, 
the pattern found for outcomes in terms of conflict again emerges. The outcomes of 
procedural arrangements were more ’positive’ than the outcomes of explicit compromises, 
and these in mm were appreciably more ’positive’ than the outcomes of general 
arrangements, which barely had positive outcomes in this respect.
In figure 9.1 a picture is given of the empirical outcomes of the three types of 
arrangements. Note the differences with the hypothesised outcomes, which are given in 
parentheses. With respect to procedural arrangements, it should be noted that the 
hypothesised outcomes were negative in terms of implementation on the understanding 
that implementation means that substantive policy decisions are taken; otherwise, the 
difference between hypothesised and actual outcomes of this type of arrangements is 
limited. Outcomes of general implicit compromises were as conflictual as expected and
also the implementation rate of just below 50 percent was in line with the expectations. 
Only in relative terms, compared to explicit compromises, outcomes were more 
substantive than expected.
Figure 9.1
Outcomes of explicit and implicit compromises
conflict
no
(explicit) (procedural)
procedural
implementation yes no
(policy) explicit
general
yes
The general performance of coalitions
The overall performance of the four coalitions is depicted in figure 9.2. The figure 
illustrates the paradoxical finding that conflict and implementation often went together, at 
least when considering the f r e q u e n c y of success and failure and when considering all 
arrangements. Conflict in the Lubbers I coalition was frequent, but this did not prevent 
nearly 66 percent of the arrangements, mostly implicit compromises, being implemented. 
Of the arrangements that were implemented, 75 percent concerned substantive policies, 
the rest procedural arrangements.
With respect to the survival of coalitions, not only the frequency but also the 
protractedness and intensity of certain conflicts was important. The coalition with the 
lowest conflict percentage (Van Agt II) held office for the shortest period (note however 
that when corrections are made for arrangements of which the outcomes involved some 
ambiguity, the conflict percentage increases).
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Figure 9.2
Success and failure: coalitions and relevant policy fields 
(all arrangements)
conflict absent
to tal
SUCCESS
•  nuclear
implementation •  socio-economic
MAXIMUM PEACE
MINIMUM
IMPLEMENTATION
Leburton
■  Lubbers j
financial/budgetarÿ •
van Agt II
■  no implementation
•  regionalisation/language 
■  Tindemans V
•  ethical
MAXIMUM
IMPLEMENTATION media •  total
MINIMUM PEACE conflict FAILURE
Coalition performance conflict implementation
in percentages 
Leburton 67 (63) 50 (63)
Tindemans V 60 (78) 27 (44)
Van Agt II 47 (80) 20 (30) !
Lubbers 1 77 63 j
average 62 (68) 43 (55)
Percentages in parentheses exclude arrangements which could not be 
implemented due to the fall of the government after conflict over other 
issues.
Success and  fa ilu re  in different policy fields '
The general outcomes in the relevant fields in terms of conflict and implementation can 
also be seen in figure 9.2 (table 9 .6  contains the information used as a basis for these *
graphical representations). In this figure, the positions of the coalitions form the weighed Ï
averages. It must be emphasised that no differentiation is made between ’big* substantive
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successes and failures and outcomes which were considered less important, nor between 
conflicts which hindered the decisions that were taken and those that triggered the fall of 
the coalition.
With the exception of the two arrangements on language policy and a number of 
arrangements on school policy, arrangements outside the direct sphere of 
financial/budgetary and socio-economic policy remained highly divisive and were mostly 
not implemented, except when they were procedural. Unimplemented arrangements 
concerned issues in which the principles and identities of parties were concerned directly. 
The apparent greater difficulty in resolving conflicts and taking substantive decisions on 
these matters is in line with the findings of a recent study by Klingemann, Hofferbert & 
Budge (1994: 264-266).
The loci o f  fa ilu re
By definition, substantive successes could only emerge from the formal decision making 
bodies, as a criterion for implementation was that policy decisions were formally 
approved within the government or by parliament (only with respect to procedural 
arrangements did this condition not apply). This was so, even if the process of 
implementation often shifted from one arena to the other and even if the government or 
the coalitional majority in parliament sometimes only ratified decisions that had been 
taken elsewhere.
Things are different with respect to failure, which could also occur in an informal 
arena. Failure indeed not always occurred within the government itself but was often the 
result of discussions between or within the parliamentary or extraparliamentary parties. In 
the Netherlands, second thoughts within other sections of the coalition parties mostly 
emerged when the arrangements were general implicit compromises, which in the Dutch 
context meant that the parliam entary  parties had not reached substantive agreement on the 
relevant issues. On media policy, school policy and ethical problems, parliament was the 
arena in which the failure occurred. In Belgium, the process of implementation of 
arrangements foundered partly in parliament and for another part conflicts occurred in the 
informal arena where the party presidents held the cards. The arenas in which the 
implementation of arrangements failed definitively are given in table 9.7. Those 
arrangements which could not be implemented because the government broke down after 
conflict on other issues are excluded. If fields are placed not under one but between two 
columns in the table, failure occurred in both arenas or in an informal arena composed of 
spokespersons form different party sections.
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Table 9.7
Locus of failure in relevant policy fields
government parliament extraparliamentary parties
Leburton socio-economic
régionalisation
Tindemans V régionalisation
Van Agt II financial/budgetary
socio-economic
Lubbers I (financial/budgetary)
ethical
media
(school)
Parentheses indicate that failure was not the dominant outcom e in the field.
FAVOURABLE AND UNFAVOURABLE CONDITIONS FOR 
THE ENFORCEMENT OF COALITION AGREEMENTS
Policy arrangements in coalition agreements are not enforcable by law, nor are they seen 
to be ’self policing’. Further, an important assumption in the case studies was that 
individual arrangements seldom contain equal payoffs for all coalition parties. Parties 
were seen to feel the temptation continually to depart from the coalition agreement, 
especially with regard to those arrangements on which they had made important 
concessions. Incentives for disloyal behaviour might concern policy, especially if 
concessions had been large and substantive, but electoral prospects or other kinds of 
chances or threats to individual parties might also play a part.
The general forces that might prevent parties from breaking compromises or 
acting against the spirit of the coalition agreement were seen to be the moral principle that 
agreements must be honoured and the mechanism of reciprocal control. The extent to 
which these forces really work effectively was seen to depend on a number of factors 
which are attributes of coalitions and their composite parts. The broader economic context 
was also mentioned as a potentially relevant factor. More specifically, the factors 
concerned (1) coalition size, in terms of the number of coalition parties, (2) the degree of 
internal unity of these parties, (3) the presence of negotiators in the government, (4) the 
attitude of the prime minister towards the relevant arrangements in the coalition 
agreement, (5) the existence of informal coalition committees, (6) the quality of personal 
relationships and (7) the general economic situation in the country.
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In this section, I deal with the impact of these different factors on the process of 
implementing arrangements during the term of four coalition governments. To limit the 
complexity of this exercise, I consider the arrangements in a general way, without 
distinguishing between types of arrangements. The small difference between the rate of 
implementation of explicit and implicit compromises, unlike the contrast between 
outcomes in terms of conflict, suggests that the type of arrangement made no real 
difference to the question of enforcement.
The factors distinguished have been dealt with at the nominal level. They have 
also been considered for each of the relevant policy fields, with the exception of coalition 
size, which was constant within each of the cases and personal relationships, with respect 
to which only manifest and recorded clashes were taken into account. Economic 
developments or events have been considered only for outcomes of arrangements on 
financial/budgetary and socio-economic policy.
Though obviously the early breakdown of coalitions cannot be seen in isolation 
from developments within these coalitions, the premature end of governments is a 
problem if we want to find out what have been the relevant conditions for success and 
failure with respect to issues which did not lead to coalition breakdown, at least not 
directly. As for the case studies, I have therefore excluded those arrangements which 
could not be implemented due to ’fatal’ conflict over other issues. This leaves us with 60 
arrangements for consideration.
Whether or not each of the factors was associated with the implementation of 
arrangements is shown in table 9.8. As in the preceding chapters, the symbols in the table 
represent general associations, or the absence of these, between factors and outcomes, so 
between favourable conditions and success, and between unfavourable conditions and 
failure. It must be emphasised that the table is meant to present, in an informal way, the 
extent to which factors and outcomes were found to be associated and the exercise 
certainly is not meant to be a formal test. The strength of the associations has been 
calculated only for the factors on with the findings from the case studies allowed 
quantification for all arrangements.2 The emerging values must however be interpreted 
with extreme caution, as they concern data from an aggregate level, placed outside the 
context of the individual case studies.
2 Epsilon (represented by the Greek £), as the most simple measure of association, has been 
used (see the appendix for the calculations). Epsilon takes a value between 0 and 100. An 
alternative statistical technique is the ^  (Phi value) based on the x 2 (Chi square). This technique 
was not used because it requires that the cell frequencies in bivariate tables are 5 or higher, a 
criterion which could not always be met (this was also a problem when making partial tables to 
control associations for spuriousness or interaction). Given the limited size of the data set and the 
status of the data, more complex multivariate techniques could not be used.
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Table 9.8
Associations between factors and outcom es
factor
Leburton Tindemans V Van Agt II Lubbers 1 ALL CASES 
(£ value)
coalition size o 0 + + (14)
internal party unity + /- •/ + - + 43
negotiators in government + /- */ + 0 + /- 40
prime ministerial support - -/ + - + /- 41
coalition committees + /o 0 - 0 (12)
personal relationships n.a. - - n.a. n.a.
economic situation/events - 0 - + n.a.
k e y  to s y m b o ls :
+ direct (positive) association between (presence) factor and success 
direct (positive) association between (absence) factor and failure 
o no association
n.a. not assessed (no quantification made, or not for all arrangements)
Let us consider the factors somewhat more closely, without taking note of the specific 
contexts in which they did or did not play a part. This may be done from two different 
perspectives, involving different levels of abstraction. In the first perspective, the focus is 
on the mechanism of reciprocal control and the factors, among which coalition size, 
which may have strengthened or weakened this mechanism. The crucial elements here are 
relative payoffs and the structure of the policy making agenda. At this level of 
abstraction, parties are treated as rational unitary actors. The relevance of economic 
developments and events is discussed in the margin of this perspective.
Second, at a somewhat lower level of abstraction, I consider the factors that may 
have influenced the degree of faithfulness to the coalition agreement among and within the 
coalition parties. By 'faithfulness’ I mean willingness but also the capacity to interprete 
arrangements. I consider differences between policy making arenas and the factors which 
may have played a pan in these arenas. From this perspective, parties are not unitary 
actors.
C oalition partie s , policy payoffs, a n d  cooperation
The number of coalition parties was seen in connection with the mechanism of reciprocal 
control. The basic assumption was that policy arrangements seldom contain equal payoffs 
for all coalition parties, which means that an arrangement is seen as 'costly' by at least 
one party, not only before but also after the government has taken office. At the same
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time, coalition parties were assumed to be committed to arrangements because of the 
threat of ’punishment’ by other parties if cooperation was be given up unilaterally. This is 
what, in the present context, is understood by reciprocal control, the expected 
consequence being that coalition politics becomes a cooperative gam e.
Reciprocal control was assumed to be most effective if there are two coalition 
parties, which so to speak are each other’s hostages, a situation with mutual blackmail 
potential. In multiparty coalitions, the temptation to propose policies which deviate from 
the coalition agreement or to ignore arrangements unilaterally was assumed to be stronger 
because of the greater complexity of interparty relationships within such coalitions. Not 
only were other parties expected to have difficulties in agreeing on how to react to the 
’disloyal’ behaviour of one party, it was also held to be possible that one or more of these 
other parties might more or less actively support deviations from the agreement.
The proportion of implemented arrangements was larger in the Lubbers I two party 
coalition than in the multiparty coalitions, which mostly implemented less than half the 
number of arrangements. Though this may suggest that the number of parties made a 
difference, reciprocal control as an enforcement mechanism seems to have been affected 
more directly by the cumulative experiences of parties during the policy making process. 
This not only weakened reciprocal control in line with the duration of the coalition in 
office but also and more dramatically, resulted in a definitive end of cooperation between 
parties. This must be seen in connection to the structure of the agenda, which was often 
such that arrangements in different fields were discussed sequentially rather than 
simultaneously (which was how, in some cases at least, government formation 
negotiations were organised). One reason for this is that the issues were of great political 
importance and the capacity of the government to deal with such issues, even if detailed 
compromises were made, was limited. Even when arrangements in different fields were 
dealt with at the same time, different constitutional requirements meant that decision 
making in these fields did not proceed at the same pace.
It is important to realise that the tolerance limit for parties during policy making 
may include a time element. If during government formation a party made concessions on 
arrangements in a particular field (which were just below the party’s tolerance limit in 
that field, for example), such concessions may become more difficult to accept when the 
relevant issues are on the agenda and are dealt with in isolation from arrangements in 
other fields. Parties, or perhaps groups within parties, are likely to continue to consider 
their payoffs from such arrangements critically, as well as their expected payoffs from 
other issues in the future.
Two types of situations seem to have occurred in the case studies. To begin with, 
one party may have tolerated concessions but have arrived at a point where the perceived 
costs exceed the expected benefits from the elaboration or the implementation o f other 
arrangements in the near future. This seems to have been the estimation of the PSB-BSP
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in the Leburton coalition. The Socialists had cooperated on school policy but began to 
feel that the elaboration and implementation of arrangements on régionalisation and 
economic policy, especially governmental support for industry in Wallonia, was 
proceeding too slowly. Hence the PSB-BSP withdrew from the government.
The second type of situation is actually the reverse and exists if one party has 
benefited from policy decisions in a certain field but expects few gains from arrangements 
in other areas which still have to be elaborated and implemented. This may be because 
major concessions were made during government formation on these issues or because 
such concessions must be made in the future. The CVP, or at least an influential group of 
Flemish Christian Democrats in the Tindemans V coalition may have looked upon things 
in this way after the party had made gains in the areas of financial and socio-economic 
policy and was then confronted with arrangements on régionalisation which contained 
important concessions which were found to be ever more difficult to sell in Flanders. In 
this coalition, the PSB-BSP cooperated on budgetary and socio-economic policy while still 
expecting substantive payoffs from the implementation of the Egmont-Stuyvenberg pact in 
the near future.
In the two Dutch coalitions, things seem to have been either more balanced in 
terms of payoffs during the life of the government (the Lubbers 1 coalition) or in terms of 
the lack of substantive payoffs, which was typical of the Van Agt II coalition even at the 
time it took office. In this last case, the predominance of issues in the field of financial 
and socio-economic policy on the agenda meant that no payoffs from issues in other areas 
could be obtained. The symmetrical character of the agenda (the intentions most strongly 
preferred by the PvdA were those strongly resisted by the CDA and vice versa) is likely 
to have contributed to the early breakdown of the coalition.
In the multiparty coalitions, the obtained and expected policy payoffs of parties in 
the first half year (or even in the first few months) may have weakened reciprocal control 
as an enforcement mechanism, which eventually led to the end of cooperation between 
these parties. With respect to this last point, electoral prospects may enter the picture as a 
pull factor, though in the present study its strength is not considered to be as large as the 
strength and relevance of policy payoffs. Nonetheless, future electoral performance may 
play a part, either in terms of expected gains in the short term or in terms of losses which 
are expected to increase as the coalition continues. An illustration of the former 
possibility may be found in the Tindemans V coalition, in which electoral motives may 
have contributed to the resignation of the CVP. This party expected electoral gains from 
attacking the VU (Covell, 1982: 463). An example from the 'preventive* sphere is that of 
the PSB-BSP in the Leburton coalition. For this party resignation may have been a means 
to limit electoral punishment for having sold out the interests of the voters, that is, the 
regional interests of Wallonia. Finally, in the Van Agt II case, intransigence within the 
CDA towards the PvdA may have been induced by restored hopes within the government 
section of this party for a coalition with the VVD after the next parliamentary elections.
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In all three cases, the results of the elections after the breakdown of the coalition 
conformed to the expectations of the parties that had favoured the elections.
Econom ic developm ents
Exogenous factors which might encroach in the enforcement of arrangements on 
financial/budgetary and socio-economic policy are macroeconomic developments and 
events. In all of the four cases drawn from the 1970s and 1980s, general economic 
problems formed part of the general context of policy making. This was also the case 
while the arrangements were formulated but the parties could anticipate economic 
developments beyond government formation only to a limited extent.
In the case studies, mixed evidence was found for the assumption that continuing 
economic and financial problems bring parties, either unilaterally or multilaterally, to 
deviate from intentions and goals set in the coalition agreement. In the four cases, ’bad 
news’ was certainly the rule rather than the exception, though ministers of finance are 
probably biased to such bad news. Continuing financial and economic difficulties did not, 
however, lead to the same reactions from parties or ministers across the cases. 
Arrangements were stretched up or conversely were given more emphasis during policy 
making. In this more general sense, economic developments do seem to have motivated 
parties in their behaviour with respect to arrangements on financial and economic policy, 
and this often involved conflict between those advocating government spending and those 
taking a more monetarist stand (this conflict line existed mainly between parties, though 
sometimes it also divided parties internally, as in the CDA in the Van Agt II case). This 
conflict became more party political in character as arrangements became more general, 
which often reflected persisting disagreement on policy priorities. Special mention must 
be made of the withdrawal of the foreign partner in the oil refinery project in the case of 
the Leburton coalition. This withdrawal meant that an important ambition of the 
WalIonian Socialists remained unfulfilled and it also formed the immediate cause (if not 
the only cause) of the coalition breakdown.
A m ultip licity  o f policy m aking arenas
Thusfar we have considered the problem of enforcement at the level of the coalition and 
the parties, there also may have been favourable or unfavourable conditions at lower 
levels. These lower levels in part represent different formal and informal policy making 
arenas, such as the government, parliament and, if formed, coalition committees. The 
point of departure here is the notion that the implementation of arrangements becomes 
more difficult as policy making is transferred to formal arenas, which are different from
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the government formation arena in which the arrangements were formulated. In a more 
formal arena, the greater emphasis on constitutional requirements and formal procedures 
during policy making and the possibility of opposition due to the presence of more and 
different party spokespersons may hinder the smooth elaboration and implementation of 
arrangements. The two central questions here concern the way in which differences 
between informal and formal arenas have been reduced and the way in which this has 
influenced the process of enforcement.
The participation of negotiators in the government3 was mentioned as one way by 
which implementation might be facilitated. This factor may be seen as a structural way of 
allowing moral commitments to be ’internalised* within the government but it also 
includes an 'economic' aspect, which is that the perceived costs of renegotiating 
arrangements may increase as party prominents have spent a lot of time and energy on 
policy bargaining during the formation of the government. Moreover, negotiators may 
have the capacity to 'read between the lines’ of written arrangements, which is especially 
relevant if these arrangements are open to different interpretations.
Outsiders are assumed to have more difficulties with this; as ministers without a 
personal involvement in policy bargaining, they may be less inclined to implement 
arrangements, as they may feel confronted with fa ils  accom plis which infringe in their 
ministerial autonomy. When arrangements are general or vague, relative outsiders may 
also have more problems in making interpretations.
Another and complementary way in which the parties might reduce the detachment 
of arrangements from the founding fathers of the coalition, was to set up an informal 
committee as an alternative policy making arena. To be effective, such committees should 
not only contain the 'founding fathers’, usually party leaders but more generally they 
should contain heavyweights from different party sections. If these are present, the basis 
of the committee's activities may be broad.
Both of these ways which in theory could facilitate enforcement, are likely to depend at 
least in part on the internal unity of the coalition parties and on the presence or absence 
of prime ministerial support for the coalition agreement. The quality of personal 
relationships may also play a pan, though in the case studies only clear instances of 
interpersonal clashes were taken into account. Internal unity is important, for example 
because an informal rule of behaviour seems to be that on generally salient issues no ad  
hoc legislative coalitions are formed unilaterally by individual coalition parties with
3 Cabinet portfolios are not necessarily the same as ’negotiation portfolios’. The latter type of 
portfolio is mostly created during government formation on an ad hoc basis. The ’jurisdiction’ of 
negotiators may differ appreciably form that of ministers in charge of a particular cabinet 
portfolio. Party prominents have often a say in all areas discussed during government formation, 
yet they obtain one (Netherlands) or perhaps a few (Belgium) portfolios.
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parties from the opposition. This increases the need for internal unity, or in any case for 
discipline, within parties. Party leaders in Belgium and the Netherlands usually exercise 
strong pressure on ministers and parliamentary representatives to keep up with the general 
party line but they cannot always prevent dissent; indeed, party leaders themselves may 
disagree. Negotiators in party delegations may also represent different groups or factions.
A rena and ac tor characteristics
Form table 9.8 it can be seen that the presence or absence of negotiators, the support or 
opposition of the prime minister and internal unity or disunity within parties is more or 
less clearly associated with outcomes. The strength of the associations at aggregate level 
are also given. When these associations are given independently from each other, it is 
possible that factors have interacted.
Internal party unity was seen in terms of the absence of policy conflict between 
more or less institutionalised groups or party sections, that is, the ministerial group, the 
parliamentary group and the extraparliamentary party. All the case studies contained 
indications that the internal unity factor was relevant to outcomes, though not to the same 
extent in all coalitions. In Belgium, the Christian Democrats were divided internally on 
régionalisation and these divisions in the Tindemans V coalition were reinforced by a 
rivalry for the party leadership between the prime minister and the party president.4 In the 
Netherlands, internal party division seems to have been most difficult to control in 
parliament. Government decisions on nuclear weapons for example obtained a majority 
only with the support of opposition parties. The reason why internal disunity did not 
prevent decisions being taken may have been that the dissent did not become manifest at 
the level of the leadership within the CDA. Elaboration of the mostly general 
arrangements on ’immaterial’ issues seems to have foundered mainly because the 
parliamentary groups did not feel like rubber stamping policies developed by the cabinet. 
The general character of implicit compromises on these matters also reflected the absence 
of substantive agreement between the parliamentary groups during government formation. 
With respect to financial/budgetary and socio-economic policy in the Lubbers I coalition, 
however, internal dissensus within parties seems to have been limited, or it did not 
become manifest. Moreover, on finance especially, decision making was strongly cabinet 
centered.
The presence or absence of negotiators appears to be associated with success and 
failure in most cases, with the Van Agt II coalition forming an important exception.5 In 
the case of the Van Agt II coalition, the factor of ministerial background seems rather to
* Though internal divisions within the (officially unitary) Socialist party were less manifest, 
the PSB-BSP split after the government fell. 3
3 Government reshuffles, when these occurred, did not affect this association.
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have been counterproductive, which is likely to have been due, at least in pan, to the 
extremely troublesome personal relationship between the party leaders of the CDA and 
the PvdA, who were prime minister and vice prime minister respectively. Though the 
factor of personal relationships has not been quantified (this was not really possible), the 
Van Agt II case indicates that it may interact with the presence of negotiators in such a 
way that the implementation of arrangements is hindered rather than facilitated.
Another factor that interacts with ministerial background is internal party unity. 
The presence or absence of negotiators appears to have a much stronger association with 
outcomes when the parties were homogenous internally than when internal divisions 
existed in the relevant fields.6 With a lack of agreement within the coalition parties, even 
ministers who were earlier involved in the formulation of arrangements had difficulty in 
securing the viability of arrangements. This may have been because these ministers faced 
opposition from within their own parties in the government, or perhaps because no real 
consensus existed among themselves. Arrangements in the relevant fields were mostly 
general, which was not only because parties could not reach substantive agreement but 
was used sometimes to appease intraparty conflict, as for example with respect to the 
cruise missiles issue in the two Dutch coalitions. A more general reason is that ministerial 
background makes less difference as policy making shifts from the government to 
parliament. This was especially relevant in the Dutch cases, as in this country ministers 
cannot take a seat in parliament. Though it is true that the parliamentary groups also 
contained negotiators, these formed only one (and sometimes a rather small) part of the 
parliamentary groups. This is consistent with the finding that in a substantial part of the 
cases, especially general arrangements in the fields of ’immaterial’ policy, the locus of 
failure was parliament.
One of the roles of the prime minister is to be an arbitrator in conflicts between 
ministers, who act as departmental heads or as party spokespersons. Prime ministerial 
behaviour, however, may also be of a different nature. He or she may be involved 
directly in conflict, as was the situation in the Van Agt II coalition and the situation that 
occurred shortly before the fall of the Tindemans V government. The prime minister may 
also play a part through more or less active support of or opposition to arrangements. All 
the cases studies contained indications that this factor was relevant, both in a ’positive’ 
and a ’negative* sense.
Typically in all cases except that of the Van Agt II coalition, the prime minister 
seems to have been most positive and active in guarding the implementation of 
arrangements on financial and socio-economic policy. Van Agt did so only with respect to 
that part of the agreement concerning retrenchment policy. In Belgium, the prime minister 
in both cases was a relative ’unitarist’ who had supported régionalisation only half 
heartedly during government formation, and began to question arrangements openly
6 See the appendix for data on which these observations are based.
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during the life of the government. One difference, however, is that Leo Tindemans (CVP) 
seems to have been more active in his resistance than Edmund Leburton (PSB-BSP). In 
the Netherlands Ruud Lubbers (CDA) did not really underwrite intentions in the fields of 
immaterial policy, on which the VVD had insisted but failures in these areas are difficult 
to attribute to particular actions or inaction from the side of the prime minister.
The factor of prime ministerial support must be seen in conjunction with 
ministerial background, in that success has been most frequent when negotiators were 
present and also the prime minister underwrote the agreement and guided the enforcement 
of arrangements. Failure has been most frequent when negotiators were absent and the 
prime minister either remained passive or actively proposed policies which were against 
the letter or the spirit of the coalition agreement. Further, where the outcome was a 
failure in the sense that no substantive decisions were taken or approved, parties were 
often divided internally.
Invisible p o litic s , visible results?
Another way in which the implementation process might be smoothed was by transferring 
policy making to informal arenas with the same characteristics as the government 
formation arena. More in particular, coalition committees were assumed to facilitate the 
elaboration and implementation of compromises. Such committees could be or become 
more or less institutionalised as ’extrainstitutional’ policy making arenas.
From looking at table 9.8, however, the existence of coalition committees is 
associated with success only in some instances and certainly not in all coalitions, while 
the absence of coalition committees is hardly associated with failure (at aggregate level 
this is expressed by the low e value in table 9.8). The most conspicuous case of a 
coalition committee which was unable to guard effectively the implementation of 
arrangements was the group of party presidents in the Tindemans V coalition. The party 
presidents, referred to by Tindemans as the coalition ’junta*, had been involved actively 
in the drafting o f legislation on régionalisation but eventually failed to guide this 
legislation through parliament. The party presidents were important in this areas also in 
the Leburton coalition. In the Van Agt II case, discussions were concentrated in the 
cabinet, or more precisely in the ’pentagon' consisting of the prime minister and the four 
key ministries in the area of financial and economic policy. In this coalition, few outlets 
for interparty and interpersonal tensions existed. It would be rather speculative, however, 
to argue that in this case the presence of coalition committees would have facilitated 
conflict resolution and the elaboration of arrangements. Finally, in the Lubbers I 
coalition, regular informal meetings o f the top of the cabinet together with the 
parliamentary leaders could not prevent many of the arrangements outside the sphere of 
financial/budgetary and socio-economic policy remaining unimplemented.
At this point, it must be realised that when speaking of coalition committees, I 
refer to informal structures ’above' the cabinet. In this respect, a difference ensues
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between Belgium and the Netherlands, as coalition committees in the actual sense have 
been relatively common only in Belgium. These committees, such as the school pact 
committee, were formed to deal with policy in a particular area, or to deal with the most 
important and often controversial issues, the ’prerogative’ of the party presidents. In the 
Netherlands, interparty discussions were more often between ministers at subcabinet level, 
or, less frequently, between ministers and parliamentary leaders. This difference 
corresponds with the general patterns found in the two countries in a recent comparative 
study of the functioning of cabinets in Western Europe. In Belgium, the 
extraparliamentary parties, embodied by the party presidents, have been found to be 
prominent in party summits, whereas in the Netherlands ministers are in contact with 
parliamentary leaders and discuss matters informally at subcabinet level (De Winter, 
1993: 163-171).
If I take these differences into account and broaden the scope to informal policy 
making arenas both ’above’ and ’below’ cabinet level, the relationship with outcomes 
becomes somewhat more clear, especially in the Netherlands. Most decisions on 
financial/budgetary and socio-economic policy based on the coalition agreement of the 
Lubbers I coalition were actually taken in the ’pentagon’, the group of five ministers with 
direct responsibility in these areas. The Dutch government decisions on nuclear weapons 
were prepared within an informal committee of ministers, which was set up especially for 
this purpose. In Belgium, the government was less central to the process of enforcement, 
so that the role of informal structures at subcabinet level is also likely to have been more 
limited; it seems to have been limited mainly to financial and socio-economic policy.
Still, the existence of informal ’coalition machinery’ in one form or another in all 
fields of policy did not prevent failure being a common outcome. This factor has only 
panly reduced the basic problem of differences between policy making arenas. In the 
parliamentary arena, where policies had to be formally approved, sometimes by a two 
thirds majority, centrifugal forces were often strong while the need for internal discipline 
was high. If coalition committees or their functional equivalents did not contain 
parliamentary leaders who were able or willing to control their groups in parliament, the 
stage of parliamentary scrutiny in the policy making process remained a risk factor.
The en fo rcem en t o f coalition agreem ents as a  dynam ic process
The different factors brought under the heading of arena and actor characteristics may be 
seen in conjunction with economic developments and with the extent of reciprocal control 
in coalitions. In this sense, the two perspectives discussed above are not in conflict but 
are complementary.
The enforcement of arrangements is a highly dynamic process. This process may 
be envisaged as a game at coalition level, containing subgames within parties. The
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dynamic character of the enforcement process is reflected in the iterative character o f both 
games; they are played many times rather than once, with parties reacting on and 
anticipating the moves of others. Intraparty games influence the way in which the 
coalition game is played and through this also the direction of the outcomes. The game 
between parties takes place in different arenas which may be more or less favourable to 
the elaboration and implementation of arrangements and variation in this respect may exist 
between different policy fields. With regard to these arenas, cooperation may be 
facilitated at least in part by attributes of the coalition and the composite elements, which 
reduce, though never remove, the differences between the government formation arena 
and the formal decision making bodies, especially parliament, where coalition policy must 
be approved. The factors which seem to be relevant here are the degree of prime 
ministerial support, the existence of informal coalition committees or their functional 
equivalents and especially, the extent of internal party unity.
Arenas form the structural aspect, while the mechanism of reciprocal control 
relates more directly to the enforcement process (the actual playing of the game) and the 
time that this process lasts. The shape of the coalitional agenda, or that pan set during 
government formation and the nature of the policy making process during the life of 
governments are important in this respect. In the process o f policy making, politically 
important issues are often dealt with sequentially rather than simultaneously. This is not 
something written in the house rules of cabinets or parliaments but rather the consequence 
of the usually limited capacity of the government or parliament to deal with different 
matters of 'high politics’ at the same time. It is also the consequence of formal or 
constitutional requirements in the legislative process which mean that legislation is not 
drafted and approved overnight.
When arrangements in fields that are first on the agenda benefit all parties (and 
the agenda in this sense is in balance), no serious problems need to arise. Often, 
however, the distribution of payoffs resulting from government formation is such that 
some parties are relative ’winners’ in one field, while other parties may have made more 
gains in different arenas.7 The phenomenon of relative deprivation of parties with respect 
to their actual policy payoffs may occur if arrangements in one or a few fields are turned 
into formal decisions. A party or a group within a party may come to feel that it has 
obtained few payoffs since the moment of taking office and may also expect, for various 
reasons, few payoffs in the near future. In such circumstances, there is not much of a 
’punishment like’ nature that the deprived party may fear (at least from within the 
coalition) and it may give up cooperating altogether and withdraw from the coalition. This 
last option may become more attractive if the party is also motivated by electoral
7 Note, that only to a certain extent may this be because the salience of matters in different 
fields differs between parties. In the present study, the focus was on those matters which were 
salient to two or more parties.
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considerations, such as expected gains from anticipated elections or an expected increase 
in losses if the party remains in office. In the parliamentary arena, where accountability 
towards the voters plays a part, such considerations may come through in the behaviour 
of parties, or groups or prominents within parties. In the present study, cooperation ended 
prematurely in three of the four coalitions; in all three cases, coalition breakdown was a 
direct consequence of frustrated expectations and conflict on issues which were among the 
central topics of the coalition agreement. Only in the Lubbers I coalition did the 
distribution of actual policy payoffs in relevant fields form a sufficiently solid basis, and 
probably one o f the reasons for keeping the coalition going. Despite this, arrangements 
were still elaborated and implemented less faithfully in this coalition and it seems, under 
less mutual pressure as time passed. With less dramatic consequences than for the other 
coalitions, the interest in cooperation within both coalition parties waned as the elections 
approached.
CONCLUSION
The different ways in which parties forming a government deal with controversial issues 
are likely to have different consequences once the coalition government is in office. This 
general notion has underlied this study of the functions and effects of coalition 
agreements, with a special focus on Belgium and the Netherlands. A general assumption 
was that parties in these countries are driven by policy considerations when conducting 
government formation negotiations. Controversial issues can be placed on the agenda and 
policies be predefined to a higher or lower degree of specificity, but the scope of action 
of the government or of the coalition in general may also be limited by not placing issues 
on the agenda or by procrastinating on substantial decisions. These possibilities were seen 
to reflect the functions of coalition agreements as perceived by the parties.
The coalition agreements of the Belgian and Dutch governments considered in this study 
were relevant during the life of these governments. This relevance, however, has a 
duality, in that arrangements have had both ’positive’ and ’negative’ outcomes. First, in a 
more general and ’neutral’ sense, the coalition agreement has constituted part (and mostly 
the major part) of the coalition agenda, which contained the government agenda. Before 
anything else, the present study provides broad support for the idea that coalition 
agreements have an agenda function.
The agenda contained issues on which substantive agreement was established, but 
also points o f persisting disagreement which were concealed more or less carefully. With 
respect to the conflict aspect, limitation by the parties of the government’s scope of action
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by procedural arrangements was found to be the most effective way of preventing 
conflict. The outcomes of arrangements on the substance of issues were less ’peaceful’, 
though here the degree of specificity o f arrangements has made a difference. Explicit 
compromises, the most specific with regard to the content of policy, were modestly 
effective in terms o f conflict prevention; conflict recurred in just over half the number of 
cases. As was expected, the least effective type of arrangement were general 
arrangements which placed issues on the agenda while leaving conflicts over the contents 
of policy unresolved. Absence of conflict here was an exception. Indeed, two of the four 
coalitions collapsed over issues on which such general arrangements had been made.
The types of arrangements can also be related to the degree of policy 
predefinition. Explicit compromises were expected to ’predetermine’ policies, while the 
function of general implicit compromises was seen more in terms of policy indication, 
with the intentions requiring to be specified.
This distinction, clear as it may seem, was not clearly sustained by the findings, at 
least not in the sense that the two types o f arrangements had markedly different outcomes 
in terms of implementation. The only difference was that explicit compromises were 
implemented relatively more often without conflict, but still in only one fifth of the cases. 
Coalition agreements have modified policy making in a general way mostly, with further 
negotiations following in the majority of cases, something which was expected in the case 
of general implicit compromises, but not in the case of explicit compromises. In otherf
words, the coalition agreements dealt with in this study seem to have functioned more as 
a framework than as a package of blueprints for policy decisions. To illustrate this, take 
the work of the ’editorial committee’ of the Tindemans V coalition, which set out to Till 
in the possible gaps’ in the Egmont pact, as it was called euphemistically (KHA, 1977: 
707).
This brings us to the important point that both the formulation of coalition 
agreements and policy making on the basis of these coalition agreements are part of a 
highly dynamic process. In this study, I have found that once in office, parties mostly 
took arrangements in the coalition agreement as the point of departure for policy making. 
Even if compromises included in the agreement were detailed, however, concrete policy 
decisions often did not evolve immediately, or indeed before the next government had 
taken office. Apart from the time usually taken by formal legislative procedures, this was 
also due to compromises giving rise to ’second thoughts’ or differences in interpretation. 
In the same example taken from the Tindemans V coalition, quite a few sessions of 
’editorial committees' in subsequent coalitions were neccesary before legislation on 
régionalisation was passed in parliament, in August 1980. If arrangements are more 
general it was sometimes, in a paradoxical way, the commitment of coalition parties to 
each other which prevented legislation being approved, or indeed submitted to parliament. 
The reason is that despite dissensus within the coalition, individual coalition parties 
refrained from forming ad  hoc legislative alliances with external parties, as this was seen
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to form a major threat to the continuity of the coalition. At least in terms of policy 
preferences, such legislative coalitions were a real possibility when issues dividing 
religious and secular parties were on the agenda.
Relatively the most substantive results were reached in the fields o f socio­
economic and financial/budgetaiy policy. In part this may be related to the formal 
requirements o f the annual budgetary process, which formed a constraint on policy 
making even if matters were party political rather than just interdepartmental. In these 
areas, however, failure also was important and in two cases this failure even involved the 
collapse of the coalition.
The process of policy formulation in which coalition agreements are a relevant element is 
called as cum ulative  process by Peterson et al. (1983: 74). This term may suggest that 
arrangements in coalition agreements are implemented or elaborated by the coalition 
which formulated these arrangements or by the following coalition as ’work in progress’ 
so to speak. The case studies however suggest strongly that the dynamics of policy 
making in coalitions is not aptly characterised in this way, at least not if this is to be a 
general characterisation. Apart from the possibility that arrangements are intended to 
remove issues from the substantive agenda for a shorter or longer time, arrangements 
containing positive and substantive statements may also be (and in this study appeared to 
be) negative reference points for parties in subsequent coalitions, inducing these parties to 
formulate alternatives to what was agreed on before. This inclination is likely to be (and 
in the case studies was found to be) strongest when a subsequent coalition contains 
different parties. Again, the different arrangements on régionalisation policy provide an 
example. Other examples include secondary education reform (Netherlands), legislation 
on abortion (Belgium) and with probably the highest frequency of change, priorities given 
to particular goals in financial and socio-economic policy. Moreover, intentions placed on 
the agenda by certain parties may even be removed altogether by parties forming the next 
coalition, as happened with the employment plan after the dissolution of the Van Agt II 
government.
The sometimes noncumulative character of policy making as it shifts between the 
government formation arena and the formal political institutions may also be seen in the 
broader context of the bargaining system. Belgium and the Netherlands are depicted as 
multipolar systems. This type of bargaining system was seen to be a context in which 
comprehensive and relatively specific coalition agreements emerge, but it also seems to be 
a context which, apart from other favourable and unfavourable conditions at the level of 
individual coalitions and their constituent elements, is generally unfavourable to the 
enforcement of agreements. Next to centrifugal forces generated within coalitions, 
relevant external parties (perhaps not all as really strong ’poles' in the system) also play a 
part in the estimations that individual coalition parties make of the benefits of continuing 
cooperation with the coalition partner or partners. This seems especially true for the
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Christian Democrats or for influential groups within the CDA in the Netherlands and the 
CVP in Belgium, which in two of the four coalitions aimed at the end of cooperation and 
a change of partners during the formation of a new government.
In this study, I have dealt with four coalitions taken from two countries, which for 
obvious reasons does not allow sweeping generalisations about the role of coalition 
agreements in Belgium and the Netherlands. Nonetheless, the case studies, which were set 
up as explorations into the relationship between the formation and the life (and end) of 
coalitions, have resulted in a picture which is sufficiently broad to maintain that, in the 
two low countries, coalition agreements are important to coalition politics, even if often 
not in a way that corresponds to the optimist’s point of view.
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